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You cannot trace how you came to the belief that there is a lamp on the desk in front of 
you, or how you detected a hint of irritation in your spouse’s voice on the telephone, or 
how you managed to avoid a threat on the road before you became consciously aware 
of it. The mental work that produces impressions, intuitions, and many decisions goes 
on in silence in our mind. 
(DANIEL KAHNEMAN) 
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STARTING POINT: THE CAUSAL KNOWLEDGE  
Causal knowledge constitutes a highly efficient tool for adaptive behavior. 
Knowing the causal relationships in which target events are embedded provides a basis 
from which to infer how those target events will unfold over time in the environment 
and thus how behavior should adjust accordingly. Causal knowledge entails a reduction 
in the uncertainty that characterizes the environment in which behavior occurs, allowing 
for accurate predictions concerning what will happen, why a specific behavior occurred 
or what the consequences of this behavior will be. The present work further attempted 
to evaluate the incidence of causal reasoning processes in a specific area: the diagnosis 
of mental disorders. Specifically, the main objectives were to find compelling evidence 
of the use of causal reasoning in the diagnosis of mental disorders, and to analyse the 
nature of these reasoning processes. In order to achieve these objectives, we conducted 
four main experiments. The first two were conducted with clinicians and students and, 
the second two, only with students. 
 
CAUSAL REASONING IN THE DIAGNOSIS OF MENTAL DISORDERS 
Causal knowledge and reasoning are crucial to make accurate inferences, to 
choose effective interventions, and to understand the world around us (cf. Waldmann & 
Hagmayer, 2013). There is substantial amount of evidence for the influence of causal 
knowledge in many different areas of cognition such as categorization (e.g., Heit, 2000; 
Rehder, 2010; Waldmann, Holyoak & Fratianne, 1995), conceptual representation (e.g., 
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Ahn, Kim, Lassaline & Dennis, 2000; Rehder, 2003; Sloman, Love & Ahn, 1998), 
decision making (e.g., Hagmayer & Sloman, 2009; García-Retamero & Hoffrage, 
2006), text comprehension (e.g., Graesser, Singer & Trabasso, 1994; Trabasso & 
Sperry, 1985; Trabasso & van den Broek, 1985), interventions (e.g., Sloman & 
Lagnado, 2005; Steyvers, Tenenbaum, Wagenmakers & Blum, 2003; Waldmann & 
Hagmayer, 2005) and inference making (e.g., Rehder & Burnett, 2005; Waldmann, 
1996; Waldmann & Holyoak, 1992). Although much of the theories explaining causal 
reasoning have come up from experiments using artificial laboratory settings (see, e.g., 
Penn & Povinelli, 2007 or Shanks, 2010 for recent reviews of causal learning), there is 
also evidence that demonstrates its influence in more natural, applied domains, such as 
in clinical tasks (see, e.g., de Kwaadsteniet, Hagmayer, Krol & Witteman, 2010; de 
Kwaadsteniet, Kim & Yopchick, 2013, Einhorn, 1986 or Haynes & Williams, 2003; 
Kim & Keil, 2003; Kim & LoSavio, 2009; Rehder & Kim, 2006; Yopchick and Kim, 
2009). However, more applied domain studies are needed in order to test whether the 
theories built up in artificial laboratory settings are valid in the former domains as well.   
In this study, we focused on the diagnosis of mental disorders. On the one hand, 
one may think that the use of causal reasoning in the diagnosis of mental disorders 
should not be surprising, as such tasks generally demand cognitive processes that are 
related to comprehension, categorization, and inference making, for which the influence 
of causal reasoning has been previously established. For example, the study by Patel 
and colleagues (Patel & Groen, 1986 and Patel, Evans & Groen, 1989), demonstrates 
the incidence of causal reasoning in medical diagnostic decisions and how the 
differences in the nature of the alleged causes of these decisions depend on whether the 
participants are professional clinicians or researchers. Nevertheless, on the other hand, if 
we take into account the conception of the classification of mental disorders in the 
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Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV, American Psychiatric 
Association, 2000), the influence of causal reasoning may seem rather surprising. The 
taxonomy of mental disorders in this manual is not based on causal considerations. Its 
classification system is intended to be atheoretical or, at least, neutral with respect to the 
different theoretical approaches clinicians may adhere to. Classifications are based on 
diagnostic criteria, most of which are neither necessary nor sufficient. For example, a 
diagnosis of borderline personality disorder only requires the presence of five out of 
nine defining features. All possible combinations of these diagnostic features are 
considered as equivalent for diagnostic purposes. In many cases, the DSM-IV assigns 
the same weight to all symptoms that are part of the diagnostic criteria for a mental 
disorder. Therefore, if causal reasoning were shown to be involved in the diagnosis of 
mental disorders in spite of the atheoretical prescriptions of the DSM-IV, a cognitive 
bias would be detected. We refer to this cognitive bias as causal bias. 
 
Kim & Ahn’s (2002) study 
Despite the atheoretical nature of the DSM-IV, Kim and Ahn (2002) found that 
clinicians and Psychology students relied on their idiosyncratic causal theories when 
asked to make diagnostic judgements. They showed that both clinicians and Psychology 
students were more likely to apply some diagnostic categories when a hypothetical 
patient presented some specific symptoms than when she/he presented some others. 
This result was consistent with previous demonstrations showing that clinicians give a 
different consideration to different diagnostic criteria of the same disorder (see Davis, 
Blashfield, and McElroy, 1993; Garb, 1996; Rubinson, Asnis, and Friedman, 1988), 
leading, in some cases, to a lack of adherence to the DSM. 
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In their experiments, Kim and Ahn (2002) requested their participants to draw 
causal maps relating with arrows different symptoms considered as diagnostic criteria 
for particular disorders according to the DSM-IV. The participants were also allowed to 
arrange these symptoms in groups if they thought that this was a better method to 
characterise the relationships between them. The participants were also asked to assign 
a causal strength to each arrow on a numerical rating scale and then to rate their 
confidence in their drawings of the causal relationships that were established for each 
disorder. The objective of this drawing task was to obtain the participants’ causal 
representation about the disorders and a causal rating of each diagnostic criterion. In a 
second session, 14 days following the drawing task, the participants were presented 
with hypothetical clinical cases concerning patients who had three causally central 
symptoms, three causally peripheral symptoms or three isolated symptoms. Central 
symptoms referred to symptoms that were able to either generate or cause a high 
number of other symptoms. Peripheral symptoms referred to symptoms caused by other 
symptoms of the disorder and that did not cause any further symptoms according to the 
specific clinician’s theory of a particular disorder, whereas isolated symptoms were 
unrelated to any other symptom or diagnostic criteria. These labels (central, peripheral, 
and isolated) were assigned according to the causal status of symptoms in the 
participants’ own causal drawings. It should be noted that the story cases of all of these 
hypothetical patients satisfied the diagnostic criteria of the DSM-IV to the same extent, 
regardless of whether the symptoms were causally central, peripheral or isolated.  
After receiving information concerning the symptoms present in hypothetical 
patients, the participants were required to make a diagnostic judgement indicating the 
disorder that best fit that set of symptoms. As a result, the participants were more likely 
to diagnose a hypothetical patient with a specific disorder if that patient had causally 
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central rather than causally peripheral or isolated symptoms. That is, the participants’ 
causal theories for each mental disorder biased their performance in the diagnostic task. 
Furthermore, the memory of the symptoms used in the experimental task was also 
biased by their causal status, such that causally central symptoms were better 
remembered than peripheral and isolated symptoms. These results are especially 
relevant considering that clinicians are trained to use the DSM-IV diagnostic criteria 
without incorporating any additional notions they may have regarding how symptoms 
relate to each other. And yet, in the experimental series, clinicians’ diagnostic and 
memory task performance appeared to have been biased by such notions.  
So far, Kim and Ahn's study is the only evidence of a causal bias in the diagnosis 
of mental disorders that we are aware of. Nevertheless, there are alternative 
explanations of their results that cannot be ruled out. In Kim and Ahn's study, the 
symptoms differing in causal status may also have differed regarding other relevant 
features, such as their statistical distribution, their conceptual centrality or their 
diagnostic value. For example, the statistical frequencies of central symptoms may be 
greater than those of peripheral symptoms in different disorders. In fact, this specific 
problem was acknowledged by the authors. In our study, an important objective was to 
find more compelling evidence demonstrating the implication of causal reasoning 
processes in the diagnosis of mental disorders. 
Kim & Ahn’s study shows how the diagnosis of mental disorders may be 
subjected to a causal biases even though clinicians are well trained in the use of the 
DSM-IV. A possible reason for this bias could be the engagement of less deliberate and 
controlled processes. If this were the case, any attempt to avoid or control the use of the 
causal bias should start by detecting such less controlled processes, explaining them and 
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understanding how they work. This idea is in line with typical dual-processes theories, 
which have strongly focused on the explanation of biases in reasoning and judgement 
tasks (Evans, 2008; Tversky & Kahneman, 1977; Sloman, 1996; Stanovich, 1999). 
 
DUAL-PROCESS THEORIES IN REASONING: SYSTEM 1 AND SYSTEM 2 
High cognitive processes encompass different processes such as thinking, 
reasoning, decision making and judgement. These cognitive processes can be 
partitioned into two main families – traditionally called intuition and reason – which are 
now widely embraced under the general framework of dual-process theories (Chaiken 
& Trope, 1999; Hammond, 1996; Sloman, 1996). These theories establish a distinction 
between processes that are unconscious, rapid, automatic, and high capacity, and those 
that are conscious, slow, deliberative and capacity-limited (Evans, 2008), or between 
cognitive operations that are associative and quick and those that are rule-governed and 
slow (Gilbert, 1999). Kahneman & Frederick (2002) and Stanovich (1999) started to use 
neutral terms for these two different modes of processing: System 1 and System 2 
process.  
Kahneman & Frederick (2002) used System 1 and System 2 as labels for 
collections of processes that are distinguished by their speed, controllability, and the 
contents on which they operate (see Table 1). According to them, System 1 quickly 
proposes impressions and intuitive answers to judgement problems as they arise, and 
System 2 monitors the quality of these proposals, which it may endorse, correct, or 
override. Although System 1 is more primitive than System 2, it is not necessarily less 
capable. On the contrary, complex cognitive operations eventually migrate from System 
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2 to System 1 as proficiency and skill are acquired (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002). The 
roles of the two systems in determining stated judgements depend on the features of the 
task and on the individual, including the time available for deliberation (Finucane et al., 
2000), the respondent’s mood (Isen, Nygren, & Ashby, 1988; Bless et al., 1996), 
intelligence (Stanovich & West, Chapter 24), and exposure to statistical thinking 
(Nisbett et al., 1983; Agnoli & Krantz, 1989; Agnoli, 1991). Kahneman & Frederick 
(2002) assume that System 1 and System 2 can be active concurrently, that automatic 
and controlled cognitive operations compete for the control of overt responses, and that 
deliberate judgements are likely to remain anchored on initial impressions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. Two Cognitive Systems, from Kahneman & Frederick (2002). 
 
System 1 (Intuitive) System 2 (Reflective) 
Process Characteristics 
Automatic Controlled 
Effortless Effortful 
Associative Deductive 
Rapid, parallel Slow, serial 
Process opaque Self-aware 
Skilled action Rule application 
Content on Which Processes Act 
Affective Neutral 
Causal propensities Statistics 
Concrete, specific Abstract 
Prototypes Sets 
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According to Kahneman (2011), System 1 is informed by natural drives and 
instincts but is also capable of learning, which it does by connecting up novel stimuli 
with known stimuli according to shared characteristics, contiguity in time and place, or 
causality. System 1 has been shaped by evolution to provide a continuous assessment of 
the main problems that an organism must solve to survive as quickly as possible, thus 
allowing us to respond to it immediately. In order to do so, System 1 relies on general 
rules and guidelines called heuristics. These heuristics are primarily geared to help us in 
the moment and are tilted towards protecting us from danger, and in this respect they are 
mostly very useful. Still, heuristics can be misleading. For example, the conjunction 
rule is the most basic qualitative law of probability: the probability of a conjunction 
cannot exceed the probabilities of its constituents. However, the representativeness and 
availability heuristics can make a conjunction appears more probable than one of its 
constituents. Interestingly, this fallacy has also been shown to be the result of the 
attribution of causal relations between elements (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983). 
The impressions that System 1 forms are also fed up to System 2. Indeed, 
whenever System 1 senses something out of the ordinary or dangerous, System 2 is 
automatically mobilized to help out with the situation. And even when System 2 is not 
mobilized specifically out of danger, it is constantly being fed suggestions by System 1. 
The impressions of System 1 are fairly effective in protecting us from moment to 
moment. Nevertheless, they are much less effective in long-term planning than System 
2. Of course, System 2 is capable of overriding the impressions of System 1, and of 
avoiding the errors. However, System 2 is often completely unaware that it is being 
influenced or misled by System 1; and therefore, is not naturally well-equipped to catch 
the errors (Kahneman, 2011).  
 CAUSAL REASONING IN THE DIAGNOSIS OF MENTAL DISORDERS: EVIDENCE FROM ON-LINE AND OFF-LINE MEASURES 
 
14 
 
 
SYSTEM 1 AND SYSTEM 2 IN CAUSAL REASONING 
Therefore, errors in judgements can be attributed to System 1 and to System 2. 
System 1 can generate a faulty intuition, which the controlled operations of System 2 
fail to detect and correct (Morewedge & Kahneman, 2010) or deliberate judgements are 
directly anchored on initial impressions (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002). These errors in 
judgements are frequently based on the use of causal reasoning. Therefore, causal 
reasoning is not restricted to System 2 processes, but some causal reasoning processes 
may take place immediately in a fast and partially inadvertent manner (Kahneman, 
2011). In fact, it has been shown that the automatic activation and processing of causal 
information may lead to judgement biases (e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, 1977, 1983; 
Fugelsang & Thompson, 2003). Thus, causal reasoning may be related not only to 
System 2 but, also, to System 1 processes. 
According to Kahneman (2011), looking for a cause that explains the events that 
are unfolding over time is a strategy that System 1 uses in order to make sense of the 
information received. This proclivity is not something that is learned, but is rather 
innate. The reason why this causal radar has evolved is fairly easy to see. To begin with, 
cause and effect adheres in nature; as such, it is a good general strategy to assume that a 
specific cause underlies any given event, and also to seek out and identify it to be better 
prepared to react. However, many phenomena are better explained in terms of 
randomness, statistics, or blind luck; and therefore, the assumption of causality that 
System 1 makes can sometimes lead us into errors.  
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Regarding the clinical domain, some researchers argue that expert clinicians’ 
knowledge (including causal knowledge) is represented via structurally organized units 
(scripts) that allow for automatic and efficient access from memory through fast 
activation processes (cf., Charlin, Boshuizen, Custers, & Feltovich, 2007; Charlin, 
Tardif, & Boshuizen, 2000; Schmidt, Norman, & Boshuizen, 1990; Smith, 1989). An 
activation of these representations enables fast inferences and the effective and efficient 
integration of new incoming information. Previous studies have already provided 
evidence that clinicians’ diagnostic decisions can take a few minutes, with only slight 
variations in the resulting diagnosis if some more time is spent (Kendell, 1973; 
Sandifer, Hordern, & Green, 1970). 
According to the considerations above, it is tempting to think that the causal bias 
in the diagnosis of mental disorders may be the result of System 1 causal reasoning 
processes. But how can we be sure that the bias found by Kim and Ahn is the result of 
System 1 rather than System 2 processes? Participants in Kim and Ahn’s (2002) study 
had plenty of time to reflect on the permanently available information on diagnostic 
symptoms, to consider various potential hypotheses and to systematically derive an 
explicit diagnostic judgement. Hence, participants had ample opportunity to engage in 
slow, deliberative and resource-demanding processes of thinking. Dual-process models 
classify such processes as System 2 processes (cf. Evans, 2008; Kahneman, 2011). 
Nevertheless, causal reasoning may not only be expected to be observed during active 
decision making or in tasks that involve an explicit, deliberate effort to make clinical 
decisions or judgements. If System 1 is involved in causal biases, causal reasoning 
should be expected to operate through rapid and efficient processes in a more automatic 
manner and without time exclusively dedicated to deliberative thinking in a judgement 
task. Therefore, to show the implication of System 1 processes in the production of 
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causal biases in the diagnosis of mental disorders, we should be able to provide 
evidence of fast and on-line causal reasoning as part of the comprehension processes 
that take place at the very same time in which reasoners receive information about 
symptoms. 
To sum up, we have some evidence that 1) causal reasoning may bias the 
diagnosis and mental disorders (Kim & Ahn, 2002), 2) System 1 processes based on 
causal reasoning can produce judgements biases (Tversky & Kahneman, 1977, 1983; 
Fugelsang & Thompson, 2003), and 3) fast processes that demand very few cognitive 
resources to operate can also take place in diagnostic decisions (Kendell, 1973; 
Sandifer, Hordern, & Green, 1970). Therefore, two main objectives were addressed in 
this study: 1) to provide more evidence demonstrating that causal reasoning can bias the 
diagnosis of mental disorders and 2) to provide evidence showing the implication of 
System 1 in such causal bias. However, we are not aware of previous studies well suited 
to study the implication of very fast, on-line reasoning processes in diagnostic 
reasoning. Thus, our aims should imply a different methodological approach.  
As said above, if the implication of causal reasoning in diagnostic judgements is 
mediated by System 1 processes, these processes should be activated very fast, at the 
right moment in which the information about symptoms is being received. In other 
words, causal reasoning should take place in an on-line manner, i.e., at the very moment 
in which relevant information is gathered. Such a demonstration of the rapid and 
efficient involvement of causal reasoning would serve to further deep into the nature of 
the processes involved in diagnostic performance. According to some dual-process 
theories, as mentioned previously, System 2 may endorse the impressions and intuitive 
answers to judgement problems of System 1, after monitoring the quality of these 
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proposals. Our methodological approach should demonstrate the involvement of System 
1 in these specific processes. Thus, this methodology should allow us to detect fast 
activation of causal features and inferences to make sense of clinical cases within a 
coherent mental model. As will be shown, the on-line techniques and procedures used in 
text comprehension are especially well suited to this aim. 
 
SYSTEM 1 IN TEXT COMPREHENSION 
Fast, automatic causal reasoning processes attributable to System 1 also seem to 
underlie text comprehension. All major accounts of text comprehension assume that 
readers make on-line inferences during reading (Graesser et al., 1994; McKoon & 
Ratcliff, 1992; van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983; Zwaan & Radvansky, 1998). One of the 
purposes of on-line inference making is to create and maintain a coherent representation 
of a text on both global and local levels. At least some of these inferences are causal 
(Black & Bower, 1980; Kendeou, Smith, & O’Brien, 2012; Schank, 1975; Trabasso & 
Sperry, 1985; Trabasso & van den Broek, 1985). Therefore, one may expect to find 
System 1 causal reasoning when clinicians read clinical reports for later diagnostic 
judgements. Based on the information provided, relevant domain specific theories or 
beliefs may be activated and expectations about additional symptoms may be generated. 
If the subsequent information is coherent with the already received information and the 
activated domain specific causal information, it can easily be integrated into a mental 
model and it could be perceived as plausible. By contrast, if it is incoherent, cognitive 
effort is required to solve the inconsistency and to integrate the new information into a 
unified structure (Ericsson & Kintsch, 1995; Kintsch, Patel, & Ericsson, 1999). If no 
solution is provided, the information would be considered implausible. Note that these 
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inference processes have to operate in a fast and on-line manner whenever reasoners are 
not provided with extra time to stop and deliberate about the given information.  
Morewedge and Kahneman (2010) identified System 1 with the automatic 
operations of associative memory and claimed that the associative coherence may 
activate and trace its role in intuitive judgements. Therefore, the computation of causal 
coherence underlying reading comprehension may rely upon mechanisms as those that 
have been modeled with dynamic or attractor neural networks. It is well known that the 
automatic activation of representations in such neural networks tends to produce a 
comprehensive and internally consistent interpretation of the information provided. It is 
not a simple coincidence that Hinton (1990) characterised intuitive inferences as the 
settling into stable states of dynamic neural networks. 
Ultimately, as causal reasoning processes attributable to System 1 seem to 
underlie text comprehension and on-line inferences are made during reading, we 
proposed a methodology based on reading comprehension. This methodology would be 
useful to register on-line reasoning processes that depend on System 1.  
 
MAIN OBJECTIVES AND RESEARCH STRATEGY 
The objectives of this work were 1) to find stronger evidence of biases due to 
causal reasoning processes in the diagnosis of mental disorders in experienced clinicians 
and in people without experience and 2) to assess the implication of System 1 processes 
in the production of such biases. The second objective reduces to assessing whether 
causal reasoning takes place through fast and on-line activation and inference processes 
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as reasoners receive relevant information, and without time specifically dedicated to 
deliberate thinking.  
Research on text comprehension has led researchers to the development of 
specific experimental paradigms to detect fast, on-line reasoning processes in a non-
intrusive way. A particularly interesting experimental paradigm for this purpose is the 
so-called inconsistency paradigm, which has been used within the reading 
comprehension research field (Albrecht & O’Brien, 1993; Long & Chong, 2001; 
Peracchi & O’Brien, 2004). According to previous results, reading an inconsistent text 
(i.e., a text in which the content of sentences is incoherent with each other at first sight) 
takes longer than reading a consistent (i.e., a text in which coherence is facilitated) or a 
neutral text. As readers attempt to maintain a coherent representation of the text, finding 
an inconsistent sentence demands time and cognitive resources to resolve the conflict. 
Note that the detection of an inconsistency during fluent reading entails the following 
processes: a) rapid access to domain specific knowledge or theories; b) rapid inference 
making from the target sentence based on the retrieved knowledge and/or theories; and 
c) detection of a contradiction between an inference and the information conveyed by a 
sentence (Long, Seely & Oppy, 1996).  
The texts used in this experimental paradigm follow a characteristic structure 
(Albrecht & O’Brien, 1993; Long & Chong, 2001). First, certain preliminary 
information regarding a character or an event is provided. Occasionally, this preliminary 
information is followed by a filler paragraph to clear the content of working memory. 
This filler paragraph is generally longer than the paragraph where the preliminary 
information is presented. Next, a target sentence follows, which is inconsistent with the 
preliminary information; reading times (RTs) for this sentence are expected to be longer 
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compared with a control condition in which the preliminary sentence is neutral or 
consistent with the target sentence. The text finishes with a post-target sentence, which 
is useful to detect possible carryover effects due to the previous inconsistent target 
sentence (Albrecht & O’Brien, 1993; Long & Chong, 2001; McKoon & Ratcliff, 1992). 
The inconsistency paradigm can be used in different ways to detect fast, 
semiautomatic, and on-line causal reasoning processes during reading of clinical 
reports. The rationale is very simple. Imagine that a clinical report starts with a series of 
sentences stating that a hypothetical client has been diagnosed with avoidant personality 
disorder, and that she/he presents some symptoms that form part of the DSM-IV 
diagnostic criteria for such disorder. Then, a target sentence is encountered stating the 
absence of one of two possible symptoms (e.g., either the absence of “views self as 
socially inept, personally unappealing, or inferior to others”, or the absence of “is 
unusually reluctant to take personal risk or to engage in any new activities”), both of 
them considered as diagnostic criteria for the disorder. If, according to the reader’s 
previous causal theories about the avoidant personality disorder, the first symptom has a 
higher causal status than the second one, the sentence stating the absence of the former 
should raise more conflict than the sentence stating the absence of the latter. Thus, the 
reading of the more inconsistent target sentence should slow down the reading process 
more than the reading of the less inconsistent target sentence. Consequently, this 
paradigm allows for a direct detection of fast and semiautomatic activation of causal 
features and inference making in an on-line manner during reading. Therefore, the 
detection of this sort of inconsistency would allow us to infer the implication of System 
1 processes on biases due to causal reasoning. 
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OVERVIEW OF THE EXPERIMENTS 
Experiment 1 
The specific objectives of Experiment 1 were 1) to replicate Kim and Ahn’s 
(2002) causal status effect and 2) to demonstrate that such causal bias could be the 
consequence of causal reasoning processes attributable to System 1. 
As mentioned before, participants in Kim and Ahn’s (2002) experiments (most 
of them expert clinicians) had to draw a causal map for each disorder, relating the 
symptoms with arrows. For each map and participant, the causal centrality score of each 
symptom was calculated according to a specific algorithm. After calculating the causal 
centrality score for each symptom per disorder per participant, an average score across 
participants was computed, on the basis of which symptoms were ordered from the most 
central to the most peripheral (or isolated) one for each disorder. What Kim and Ahn 
found was that causally central symptoms had a greater impact on participants’ 
diagnostic judgements than peripheral and isolated symptoms despite that, in all cases, 
the hypothetical patients presented symptoms of equal importance as diagnostic criteria 
according to the DSM-IV. According to this, we selected the symptom with the highest 
mean centrality score and the symptom with the lowest mean centrality score within 
each disorder to increase the difference in causal status. We used these selected 
symptoms to create clinical reports.  
We tried to detect the causal bias in two different ways: through an on-line 
technique based on the inconsistency paradigm (see the previous section), and through 
an off-line measure based on diagnostic judgements. We expected to find a greater 
inconsistency effect associated with the use of the central, compared with the use of the 
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peripheral symptom, in the target sentence. At the same time, we expected to find a 
greater impact of the central symptom, compared with the peripheral one, on diagnostic 
judgements. 
 
Experiment 2 
In Experiment 2, we assessed the implication of causal reasoning by 
manipulating the temporal order of the symptoms, which is a fundamental defining 
feature of causal relationships, as well as by providing explicit information about 
causal connections between symptoms. This manipulation allowed us to overcome 
some limitations of Experiment 1 and to provide stronger evidence of causal 
reasoning. Also, as in Experiment 1, we tested whether our manipulation could 
bias participants’ diagnostic reasoning, and assessed the implication of causal 
reasoning processes attributable to System 1 on such bias. 
We created clinical reports that could be either consistent or inconsistent 
with participants’ causal theories of different disorders. The clinical reports 
included target sentences providing information about the temporal sequence of 
the symptoms and a final sentence explicitly informing about causal links between 
them. In the consistent condition, both the temporal order of the reported 
symptoms and the causal links between them were consistent with a causal theory 
for the disorder that the participants were supposed to entertain. In the inconsistent 
condition, the temporal order was reversed and no causal link between the 
symptoms was said to have been found. Thus, the consistent condition was 
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causally plausible according to the theory, whereas the inconsistent condition was 
not.  
As in Experiment 1, RTs for target sentences in both conditions were 
compared, and so were the diagnostic judgements. We expected to observe longer 
RTs in the inconsistent than in the consistent condition. At the same time, we 
expected both the information regarding the temporal sequence of symptoms and 
the information regarding causal connections between the symptoms to influence 
participants’ diagnostic judgements.  
 
Experiment 3 
The specific objective of Experiment 3 was to find further evidence that the 
computation of causal coherence is at the core of comprehension processes 
dependent on System 1 during reading as well as of diagnostic judgements. This 
objective was addressed by assessing the impact of sentences stating the absence 
of one of three possible symptoms that formed part of a causal chain on RTs and 
on diagnostic judgements. 
We presented participants with clinical reports about hypothetical patients based 
on disorders described in the DSM-IV. Each clinical report began by providing 
information about the diagnosis received by the patient. Later on, participants read three 
sentences providing information regarding the presence or absence of three symptoms 
that are considered diagnostic criteria for the disorder according to the DSM-IV. Such 
symptoms formed part of a causal chain (S1→S2→S3) that was not explicitly stated in 
the clinical report but was supposed to form part of the participants’ causal theory for 
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the disorder. We created inconsistencies by explicitly stating the absence of one of the 
three symptoms in one of the sentences. With this manipulation, two types of 
inconsistencies were created: categorical, between the diagnosis and the absent 
symptoms, and causal, between the presence of some symptoms and the absence of 
their causal antecedents in the causal chain connecting the symptoms. From these two 
types of inconsistency, we could derive some predictions according to different causal 
theories related to coherence and causal status.  
As in Experiment 1 and 2, RTs for target sentences were compared, and so were 
the diagnostic judgements. Specific predictions concerning RTs and diagnostic 
judgements can be derived from different reasoning theories. We will elaborate more on 
these predictions later. 
 
Experiment 4 
The specific objectives of Experiment 4 were 1) to test whether diagnostic 
reasoning is sensitive to the manipulation of causal mechanisms connecting the 
symptoms, and 2) to assess whether such sensitivity to causal mechanisms can be 
traced back to System 1 causal reasoning during reading.  
Experiment 4 focused on fast and on-line reasoning processes based on the 
participants’ assumptions regarding causal mechanisms. We assessed whether 
informing participants explicitly about the mechanisms connecting the symptoms of a 
disorder affected on-line causal reasoning and later diagnostic judgements. In this 
experiment, all of the clinical reports informed that a given patient presented with three 
symptoms being diagnostic criteria of a disorder. According to clinical background 
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knowledge, the three symptoms formed a causal chain (S1→S2→S3). The only 
difference concerned the causal mechanisms leading from one symptom to the next. In 
one condition, the causal mechanisms were consistent with the causal theory for the 
disorder mentioned at the beginning of the clinical report. In the other condition, 
alternative plausible causal mechanisms were described, which were inconsistent with 
the causal theory of the disorder.  
As in all previous experiments, RTs for target sentences were compared, and so 
were the diagnostic judgements. We expected participants to be sensitive to the causal 
mechanisms and, therefore, to detect mechanistic inconsistencies. Hence longer RTs 
were expected in those cases in which the mechanisms did not conform to the causal 
theory of the disorder. We also expected the information about mechanisms to affect 
final diagnostic judgements despite keeping the diagnostic criteria unaltered.  
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EXPERIMENT 1 
The objective of this experiment was twofold. On the one hand, we tried to 
replicate Kim and Ahn’s (2002) causal bias in diagnostic judgements based on the 
causal status effect. On the other hand, we searched for evidence consistent with the 
idea that such bias could be the consequence of causal reasoning processes reliant on 
System 1. This second aim was addressed by demonstrating participants’ engagement in 
fast, on-line causal reasoning processes during reading of clinical reports. We relied on 
the inconsistency paradigm to address this goal. Although our primary interest was to 
assess clinicians’ causal reasoning processes, we were also interested in examining 
students’.  
The strategy used relied upon the manipulation of two variables. First, we 
manipulated the consistency of the clinical reports by building up inconsistent and 
control clinical reports. The clinical reports consisted of sentences that provided 
information regarding a hypothetical patient. At the beginning of each clinical report, 
there was a sentence providing information about the diagnosis received by the patient 
from a clinical psychologist. Such a diagnosis was a specific DSM-IV disorder. This 
preliminary information was potentially inconsistent with a target sentence that was 
located near the end of the clinical report. In the inconsistent condition, the target 
sentence made a statement that contradicted one of the symptoms considered as a 
diagnostic criterion (according to DSM-IV) for the disorder that was mentioned in the 
preliminary information. For example, if the diagnosis stated in the preliminary 
information was avoidant personality disorder, the target sentence could state that the 
patient was convinced of being interesting, competent and appealing, which is just the 
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opposite of  “she/he is convinced of being inferior, unappealing, or inept”, the latter 
being a DSM-IV diagnostic criterion for the disorder. In the control condition, the same 
target sentence appeared in a clinical report in which the diagnosed disorder had no 
relationship with the contradicted symptom. For example, the target sentence of the 
example could appear in a clinical report for a patient who was diagnosed with a 
sleepwalking disorder. Only in the inconsistent condition are participants expected to 
detect an inconsistency between the target sentence and the preliminary information. 
Therefore, the RT for the target sentence should be longer in the inconsistent than in the 
control condition. 
Second, we manipulated the causal status of the contradicted symptom by using 
a causally central and a causally peripheral symptom. In the Procedure section, we 
describe the procedure that was followed to determine the causal status of the 
symptoms. In the central-cause condition, the target sentence contradicted a causally 
central symptom; in the peripheral-cause condition, the sentence contradicted a causally 
peripheral symptom. If participants cannot help using their causal theories of the 
diagnosed disorder, they should perceive a stronger inconsistency in the central-cause 
than in the peripheral-cause condition. Thus, the difference in RT for the target sentence 
between the inconsistent and the control conditions should be greater in the central-
cause than in the peripheral-cause condition. 
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Method 
Participants and apparatus 
A total of 34 participants took part in the experiment on a voluntary basis. Half 
of them were undergraduate Psychology students from Malaga University (Spain) and 
the other half were experienced clinicians who worked in independent practice in 
Málaga area. Their experience as clinicians ranged from three to 28 years (average 17 
years). Two of the clinicians used a cognitive approach, one used a systemic approach, 
one used a psychoanalytic approach, three used multiple approaches, and the remaining 
participants used a cognitive-behavioral approach. 
 
Materials and design 
Overall, a total of 24 clinical reports were created: Twelve of them for the 
inconsistent condition and twelve for the control condition. The reports from the 
inconsistent condition were referred to six different DSM-IV disorders, namely, major 
depressive disorder, specific phobia, antisocial personality disorder, schizophrenia, 
borderline personality disorder, and avoidant personality disorder (as in Kim and Ahn’ 
study); whereas those from the control condition were referred to cannabis dependence, 
sleepwalking disorder, pathological gambling, orgasmic disorder, gender identity 
disorder, and hypochondria. In the inconsistent condition, texts included a target 
sentence that stated the absence of a symptom regarded as a diagnostic criterion for the 
disorder that had been previously mentioned whereas in the control condition the same 
target sentence could be read, though in a clinical report in which the diagnosed 
disorder bore no relationship with this absent symptom. Therefore, only in the 
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inconsistent but not in the control condition were participants expected to detect an 
inconsistency and hence, RTs for the target sentence should be longer in the 
inconsistent than in the control condition. Additionally, the target sentences from half of 
the reports in the inconsistent condition were referred to central-cause symptoms 
whereas the other half referred to peripheral-cause symptoms. We expected a greater 
inconsistency effect (i.e., a greater difference in RTs between the target inconsistent and 
control sentences) associated to the absence of a central-cause than of a peripheral-cause 
symptom. 
To manipulate the causal status of the symptoms, we selected those with the 
highest and lowest mean centrality scores in Kim and Ahn’s (2002) study. Of course, it 
is sensible to expect individual differences regarding the causal theories entertained by 
Kim and Ahn’s participants and by our participants. As a consequence, symptoms that 
were considered as causally central by some of their participants might be considered as 
causally peripheral by some of ours. However, according to Kim and Ahn’s results, 
there are reasons not to expect huge divergence between idiosyncratic causal theories. 
In fact, Kim and Ahn found important similarities between causal maps even when 
comparing expert clinicians and students. These similarities were especially apparent 
when comparing causal maps for familiar disorders. Taking into account that we used 
familiar disorders in our study, the causal theories entertained by our participants and by 
those in Kim and Ahn (2002) are expected to have remarkable commonalities. Thus, by 
selecting the symptoms with the highest and the lowest average score in causal 
centrality for each disorder in Kim and Ahn’s study, we maximized the possibility that 
the former would be consider as more central than the latter by our participants. Another 
alternative would be to have our participants drawing causal maps as in Kim and Ahn’s 
experiments. However, we preferred to avoid this alternative procedure because any 
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evidence of causal reasoning processes could be attributed to having artificially made 
the participants make their causal theories explicit. In other words, performing the 
causal-map drawing task would entail a strong effort and a good amount of time 
allotted, which might artificially induce the use of causal reasoning.  
 All clinical reports were made up following the structure of texts used in 
inconsistency paradigm experiments (Albrecht & O’Brian, 1993). Each clinical report 
consisted of 16 sentences of comparable length and semantics as well as syntactic 
complexity across the different reports. After an introductory sentence, participants 
could read the DSM-IV diagnosis that the hypothetical patient had received. The next 
six sentences included three sentences reporting the presence of three symptoms (one in 
each sentence) consistent with the disorder, intermixed with three more sentences 
including irrelevant information. The three symptoms were selected from those that 
received intermediate average ratings of causal centrality in Kim and Ahn’s (2002) 
study. Then, participants could read two sentences stating the presence of two highly 
frequent symptoms (i.e., present in numerous DSM-IV disorders). Right before 
including the target sentence, four filler sentences referring to non-clinical information 
could be read. Note that this filler information would make previous information 
regarding clinical symptoms unavailable from participant’s working memory by the 
time the target information is read. And finally, the last two sentences appeared in the 
text: The target and the post-target sentence. An example of target sentence (referred to 
the avoidant personality disorder) in the central-cause condition could be: “she is 
convinced of being interesting, competent and appealing”, which contradicts the 
criterion “views self as socially inept, personally unappealing, or inferior to others” 
(from DSM-IV-TR) (the most central symptom in Kim & Ahn, 2002). In the peripheral-
cause condition, the sentence that could be read was “she becomes easily involved in 
 EXPERIMENTS 
33 
 
new activities”, which contradicts “avoids personal risk or new activities” (from DSM-
IV-TR) (the most peripheral symptom in Kim & Ahn, 2002). The additional post-target 
sentence provided clinically irrelevant information and was included to detect any 
possible carryover effect that could have been produced by the reading of the target 
sentence (see Appendix A and B). 
 
Procedure  
The experimental task was performed on PCs in a laboratory that was equipped 
with ten semi-isolated cubicles to prevent participants from visual contact. 
Nevertheless, although the task was performed individually, participants were 
assembled in groups that could range from 5 to 10 individuals. The sample of clinicians 
ran the experiment individually in their consulting rooms. The experimenter went to 
some length to ensure that the participants were not interrupted by phone calls or by 
individuals entering the office or knocking on the door. All PCs were equipped with 
home-built software programmed in Visual Basic 2005 (Microsoft, USA). 
In the first session, the participants started reading the instructions on the 
computer screen and all participants’ doubts were solved before the experimental task 
began. The students were asked to imagine that they were clinical psychologists and had 
to make some decisions about several patients. All participants were instructed to read 
the material attentively and, at the same time, fluently. After reading each clinical 
report, they would be required to judge the extent to which they agreed with the 
diagnosis received by the patient. Note that this way, the use of clinical reasoning was 
promoted during the reading task.  
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After reading the instructions, all participants were presented with an example of 
a clinical report based on a disorder (generalized anxiety disorder) that was different 
from those that were used in the actual experimental task. The example text consisted of 
16 sentences with a structure similar to the experimental clinical reports. All of the texts 
were displayed within a 14 x 14 cm text box using a Courier New 12 point font. The 
whole text appeared initially unreadable and the reading task was self-paced. Initially, 
every letter of the text was substituted by a mask that consisted of a forward slash. Each 
bar press made all of the letters of a sentence visible while hiding the slashes. A second 
bar press had the reverse effect on the previously read sentence and turned the following 
sentence visible. The RT for each sentence was the time that elapsed between the two 
consecutive bar presses. As usual in self-pace reading tasks, the readers were not 
allowed to go back during the reading. Pressing the space bar after reading the final 
sentence made the text disappear, and a rectangular box at the center of the screen was 
displayed that contained a scale below the message, “The diagnosis received by the 
client was generalized anxiety disorder. Please rate the extent to which you agree with 
the diagnosis using the scale below” (translated from Spanish). The participants made 
their ratings using a horizontal scroll bar that was displayed below the message. Within 
a small text box on the right of the scroll bar, the participants could see a numeric 
representation of the location of the scroll-bar face. The ratings could range from 0 to 
100, indicating complete disagreement and complete agreement, respectively. No 
feedback was provided. After completing the example of clinical report, the participants 
could ask questions to solve any doubt regarding the task. 
 The experimental task took place in two sessions, separated at least by one week. 
Participants read 12 different clinical reports in each session. The assignment of the 
different texts per session ensured that participants could not read twice the same target 
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and post-target sentences within the same session. The reading order of the different 
texts within each session was randomized. A counterbalanced procedure ensured that 
for each session, half of the clinical reports were from the inconsistent and half from the 
control condition. Orthogonally to this, half of the clinical reports were from the central-
cause and half from the peripheral-cause condition. Each session took between 20 to 30 
minutes to complete. 
 
Results 
Our aim was to evaluate whether the participants engaged in fast, on-line causal 
reasoning processes during reading of clinical reports, and whether such reasoning 
processes were consistent with diagnostic judgements in a later diagnostic task. 
Specifically, we assessed whether RTs for target sentences in clinical reports and later 
diagnostic judgements varied depending on whether these reports offered either 
consistent or inconsistent information regarding causal theories of the disorders involved. 
Finally, we addressed these objectives in a sample of undergraduate Psychology students 
and in a sample of experienced clinicians. 
Reading times. The analyses were carried out on RTs for both, the target and 
post-target sentences. All statistical analyses reported in this study used an α of .05. 
These measures were filtered by removing outliers that were 3 standard deviations from 
the mean. Following the filtering process, a single mean RT per experimental condition 
and participant was computed, giving four averaged measures for the target and another 
four for the post-target sentences. Overall, only 12 and 10 RT measures were withdrawn 
from the target and post-target sentences, respectively. 
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Table 2 shows mean RTs for the target and post-target sentences in each 
condition within each sample. As observed, the students’ and the clinicians’ RTs for the 
target sentence were longer in the inconsistent than in the control condition, which is 
consistent with an inconsistency effect. Additionally, the difference between the 
inconsistent and control condition appeared to be greater in the central-cause than in the 
peripheral-cause condition in the case of clinicians, but not in the case of students. 
Separate analyses were performed for each sample to confirm these impressions. A 
repeated measures ANOVA 2 (Inconsistency: Inconsistent vs. control) x 2 (Causal 
Status: Central-cause vs. peripheral-cause), on the students’ RTs yielded a significant 
main effect of Inconsistency [F (1, 16) = 24.091, MSE = 271235.080; p < .001; ŋ2 = 
.56]. None of the remaining effects were significant (all F values < 2.92). The same 
trend, although much smaller, was observed for the post-target sentence. However, an 
identical ANOVA on RTs for the post-target sentence yielded no significant effect (all 
F values < 1.27). Regarding the clinicians’ sample, the same ANOVA on RTs for the 
target sentences yielded a significant effect of Inconsistency [F (1, 16) = 12.801, MSE = 
1036503.4, p = .003, ŋ2 = .44], Causal Status [F (1, 16) = 9.043, MSE = 186673.901, p 
= .008, ŋ2 = .36], and Inconsistency x Causal Status [F (1, 16) = 6.505, MSE = 
286012.319, p = .021, ŋ2 = .289]. Simple effects analyses revealed a significant 
inconsistency effect in both conditions of the Causal Status factor, F (1, 16) = 14.203, 
MSE = 882461.693, p = .002, ŋ2 = .47; F (1, 16) = 5.899, MSE = 440053.978, p = .027, 
ŋ
2 = .27 for the central-cause and the peripheral-cause condition, respectively. Table 2 
also reveals similar results for RTs for post-target sentences, i.e., a greater effect of 
inconsistency in the central-cause than in the peripheral-cause condition. This 
impression was confirmed by the same ANOVA, which yielded a significant main 
effect of Inconsistency [F (1, 16) = 5.565, MSE = 297226.601, p = .031, ŋ2 = .26], and a 
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marginally significant effect of the Inconsistency x Causal Status interaction [F (1, 16) 
= 3.691, MSE = 125731.452, p = .073, ŋ2 = .19]. The main effect of Causal Status was 
not significant (F < 0.66). Planned tests for simple effects yielded an inconsistency 
effect within the central-cause condition [F (1, 16) = 5.873, MSE = 329524.764, p = 
.028, ŋ2 = .27], but not within the peripheral-cause condition [F (1, 16) = 1.958]. 
These results indicate that, during reading, both students and clinicians engaged 
in some form of fast and on-line clinical reasoning that entailed the retrieval and use of 
DSM-IV diagnostic criteria for the mental disorders used, as the inconsistency effect 
was found in both. However, in the case of students, we could not find any sort of 
modulation by the causal status of symptoms in on-line reasoning processes, as no 
Inconsistency x Causal Status interaction was found. Conversely, in the case of 
clinicians, the on-line reasoning processes seemed to depart from the DSM-IV’s 
prescriptions, as the inconsistency effect was modulated by the causal status of 
symptoms despite that all symptoms were equivalent diagnostic criteria. This result 
suggests that clinicians engaged in on-line, fast, and semiautomatic causal reasoning. 
Therefore, clinicians’ causal reasoning during reading seemed to depend on System 1 
processes. 
Diagnostic judgements. A single mean diagnostic judgement (i.e., judgement of 
agreement with the diagnosis provided) per participant was calculated for each 
experimental condition within each sample (see Table 2). In general, participants agreed 
more on the diagnosis stated in the preliminary information in the control than in the 
inconsistent condition, indicating previous familiarity with diagnostic criteria from the 
DSM-IV. However, the difference between the means was greater in the central-cause 
than in the peripheral-cause condition in the clinicians’ but not in the students’ sample. 
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These impressions were confirmed by the statistical analyses. A repeated measures 
ANOVA 2 (Inconsistency: Inconsistent vs. control) x 2 (Causal Status: Central-cause 
vs. peripheral-cause) on the students’ judgements yielded a significant main effect of 
Inconsistency [F (1, 16) = 39.754, MSE = 189.997; p < .001; ŋ2 = .71]. Neither the 
effect of Causal Status nor the interaction between the two factors, were statistically 
significant (all F values < 3.16). Regarding the clinicians’ sample, the same ANOVA 
yielded a significant effect of Inconsistency [F (1, 16) = 46.896, MSE = 247.928, p < 
.001, ŋ2 = .75], and of Inconsistency x Causal Status [F (1, 16) = 5.586, MSE = 128.387, 
p = .031; ŋ2 = .26]. The effect of Causal Status did not reach significance [F (1, 16) = 
1.431]. The inconsistency effect was greater in the central-cause than in the peripheral-
cause condition. Simple effects analyses revealed that the effect was nevertheless 
significant in both conditions, F (1, 16) = 31.44, MSE = 288.161, p < .001; ŋ2 = .66; F 
(1, 16) = 37.257, MSE = 88.154, p < .001; ŋ2 = .7; for the central-cause and the 
peripheral-cause conditions, respectively. 
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   Central-cause symptom Peripheral-cause symptom 
   Inconsistent Control Inconsistent Control 
   M SD M SD M SD M SD 
Psychology  Target sentences 2992.83 1025.74  2205.50 630.87 2708.16  1007.04 2233.68  592.93 
students Post-target sentences 2049.21 642.46  1942.93 768.85  2104.15 623.44  1980.50 952.73  
 Diagnostic judgements 54.31 10.96  77.60 10.37  53.63 16.81 72.50  11.89 
Experienced  Target sentences 3472.15 1385.86  2257.85  562.92 2826.20 1084.93  2273.56 706.01  
clinicians Post-target sentences 2612.94  840.63 1948.70 704.45  2420.38 662.66  2329.13 824.15  
 Diagnostic judgements 36.91 19.05  69.56  23.15 47.01 22.05  67.25  24.67 
 
Table 2. Means and standard deviations of reading times (in milliseconds) for target 
and post-target sentences, as well as means and standard deviations of diagnostic 
judgements, in the sample of students and experienced clinicians. 
 
These results were consistent with those that were identified in the RT analysis 
and suggest that the reasoning processes that occurred during reading could also be 
responsible for the effects that were observed in diagnostic judgements. Hence we have 
at least indirect evidence that System 1 causal reasoning processes may have affected 
diagnostic judgements. Specifically, the greater impact of central-cause symptoms on 
clinicians’ diagnostic judgements could have been determined by a greater impact of 
such symptoms during on-line and fast reasoning processes during reading. The results 
also revealed that those symptoms that were considered as central-cause and peripheral-
 CAUSAL REASONING IN THE DIAGNOSIS OF MENTAL DISORDERS: EVIDENCE FROM ON-LINE AND OFF-LINE MEASURES 
 
40 
 
cause by Kim and Ahn’s (2002) participants were also considered differently by our 
sample of experienced clinicians.  
Finally, we also explored whether statistically different results were obtained in 
the two samples of participants, Psychology students and experienced clinicians. 
Though planned comparisons allowed us to analyse the results in the two samples 
independently, we nevertheless considered an omnibus analysis with the type of sample 
as a factor. The ANOVAS 2 (Inconsistency: Inconsistent vs. control) x 2 (Causal Status: 
Central-cause vs. peripheral-cause) x Type of sample (Psychology students vs. 
experienced clinicians) revealed that the target Inconsistency x Causal Status x Type of 
sample second order interaction was not significant in the RTs for the target sentence [F 
(1,32) = .703], marginally significant for the post-target sentence [F (1,32) = 4.02, MSE 
= 125526.813, p = .053, ŋ2 = .11] and not significant for diagnostic judgements [F 
(1,32) = 1.37]. 
 
Discussion 
The pattern of results obtained regarding RTs showed that our participants 
engaged in fast and on-line reasoning processes during their fluent reading of clinical 
reports. This detection involved fast knowledge retrieval from memory concerning the 
diagnostic criteria for the different disorders, and fast inferential and integration 
processes. In addition, experienced clinicians’ detection of inconsistencies was affected 
by the causal status of the symptoms. This causal status effect may be taken as a 
departure from DSM-IV’s prescriptions, and suggests that clinicians engaged in causal 
reasoning processes, which is consistent with Kim and Ahn’s (2002) results. At 
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variance, though, with Kim and Ahn’s study, we have shown that these causal reasoning 
processes have taken place in a very fast and on-line manner, as slow, effortful, 
deliberate reasoning processes could not be at work during fluent reading. This 
theoretical interpretation is supported by RT results that showed a greater inconsistency 
effect when the target sentence referred to the absence of a central-cause symptom than 
when it referred to the absence of a peripheral-cause symptom. The fact that clinicians’ 
fast and on-line reasoning processes were biased by their causal theories suggest that the 
causal reasoning processes that have been at work have the properties that have been 
attributed to System 1 processes. 
At odds with experienced clinicians, Psychology students did not show any 
differential weighting effect, either during the reading task or the diagnostic judgement 
task. In other words, they did not ponder differently symptoms varying in causal status 
in any of the tasks. This result, however, may have, at least, two different 
interpretations. On the one hand, students may have been more inclined to follow DSM-
IV’s prescriptions, treating all diagnostic criteria in a similar way. On the other hand, 
the absence of a differential weighting effect may have been related to the actual 
symptoms used as central-cause and peripheral-cause symptoms so that the former were 
not effectively perceived as more causally central than the latter. Should other central-
cause and peripheral-cause symptoms be used, the modulating effect might be obtained 
even with a sample of students. This, in turn, may also be a consequence of the 
students’ lack of clinical experience. Unfortunately, the present experiment does not 
allow us to distinguish between these two alternative interpretations. 
One limitation of our experiment is that it does not allow us to discard 
alternative interpretations of the results from the clinicians. For example, one may claim 
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that symptoms in the central-cause condition were also more frequent than symptoms in 
the peripheral-cause condition from the point of view of the clinicians’ professional 
experience. Also, the clinicians might consider that central-cause symptoms are more 
defining features of the disorders (or more conceptually central) than peripheral-cause 
symptoms. This idea would be consistent with studies showing clinicians’ reliance on 
the representational heuristic in diagnostic judgements (Maj, 2011; Westen, 2012; 
Westen & Shedler, 2000). This same limitation has also been acknowledged by Kim 
and Ahn regarding their own study (see the General Discussion section in Kim & Ahn, 
2002). However, in our case, this limitation may raise further concern as we did not 
directly tested the clinicians’ idiosyncratic causal theories for the different mental 
disorders in an independent task.  
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EXPERIMENT 2  
As in Experiment 1, our general aim was to show the implication of 
System 1 processes in causal reasoning when reasoners are provided with 
information about mental disorders and diagnostic criteria from the DSM-IV. One 
concern regarding previous demonstrations of causal reasoning in the diagnosis of 
mental disorders is that they have been based on manipulations of the presence or 
absence of symptoms (Kim & Ahn, 2002). However, causal reasoning should also 
be tapped by providing information with clear implications about causal 
connections between symptoms without altering the presence or absence of such 
symptoms. After all, clinical reports are much more than mere lists of symptoms 
from the DSM-IV. They frequently include additional information such as the 
temporal order in which symptoms develop, or statements making explicit the 
causal connections between symptoms inferred from the clinical assessment 
process. Imagine, for example, that a clinician is provided with information about 
a client who has been previously diagnosed with a specific disorder. If the 
clinician has a causal theory of the disorder, she/he would expect some symptoms 
to have occurred according to a specific temporal sequence as a consequence of 
the specific causal connections between such symptoms. Consequently, additional 
information consistent or inconsistent with the expected temporal order and causal 
connections should have an impact both on on-line causal reasoning processes, 
and on the extent to which the clinician agrees on the diagnosis received by the 
client, despite that neither the temporal order of symptoms nor the causal 
connections between them form part of the diagnostic criteria established by the 
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DSM-IV. The manipulation of the causal information provided through clinical 
reports without altering the symptoms suffered by the hypothetical clients has 
several interesting advantages. First, as this manipulation is not based on 
variations in the symptoms, we can avoid any confound between the causal role of 
the symptoms and their weights in the diagnostic process. Note that such weights 
may not necessarily (or exclusively) be based on causal theories. Second, this 
approach allows us to know the impact of causal information that goes beyond the 
diagnostic criteria. A strict application of the DSM-IV criteria and prescriptions 
should lead clinicians to ignore those aspects that are not considered as diagnostic 
criteria. Therefore, an effect of the inclusion of causal information on on-line and 
off-line causal reasoning while holding the symptoms constant may contribute to 
find compelling evidence of the use of causal theories in the diagnosis of mental 
disorders. 
Therefore, our main objective in Experiment 2 was twofold. On the one hand, our 
aim was to test whether diagnostic reasoning and diagnostic judgements are biased by 
aspects that go beyond the causal status of present or absent symptoms. Specifically, we 
assessed whether diagnosticians are influenced by the temporal order of the symptoms, 
which is a fundamental defining feature of causal relationships, as well as by explicit 
information about causal connections between symptoms. On the other hand, we assessed 
whether such bias could be due to fast, on-line causal reasoning processes attributable to 
System 1.  
Then, we created clinical reports that could be either consistent or inconsistent 
with participants’ causal theories of the disorder mentioned in a preliminary sentence (see 
below). The target sentences provided information about the temporal sequence of three 
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symptoms, which could be either consistent or inconsistent with participants’ causal 
theories. Assume, for example, that, according to a clinician’s causal theory of Disorder 
X, Symptom S1 causes S2, which in turn causes S3. A clinical report stating that a client 
who is diagnosed with Disorder X developed S1 followed by S2, and then S3 would be 
consistent with the clinician’s expectations based on her/his causal theory. Conversely, a 
clinical report stating that the client first developed S3, then S2, and then S1 would be 
inconsistent with the clinician’s causal theory. In such a case, clinicians should spend 
more time reading the clinical report to solve the inconsistency. Therefore, we expected 
to observe longer RTs in the inconsistent than in the consistent condition. At the same 
time, we expected both the information regarding the temporal sequence of symptoms 
and the information regarding causal connections between the symptoms to influence 
participants’ judgements of agreement with the diagnosis. Thus, these results would 
provide converging evidence for the use of causal theories both from the RT measures 
and from participants’ diagnostic judgements, as in Experiment 1.  
After the reading and the diagnostic judgement tasks, participants carried out a 
treatment efficacy judgement task. Judgements in this task were analysed to check 
whether participants’ causal beliefs were in accordance with the causal chain model (i.e., 
S1→S2→S3) on which we based our manipulation and predictions. For every clinical 
report, the participants were required to judge the efficacy of three different treatments 
for removing each symptom. Treatments T1, T2, and T3 were thought to have a direct 
removal effect on symptoms S1, S2, and S3, respectively. Interventions have an 
interesting consequence that only holds when the variables are linked within a causal 
structure and provided that people reason according to a rational approach to causal 
reasoning (Hagmayer et al., 2007; Meder, Hagmayer & Waldmann, 2008; Pearl, 2000; 
Sloman & Lagnado, 2005). For example, a direct intervention on a specific symptom not 
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only has its effects on this target symptom (i.e., a direct effect) but also on other 
symptoms that are causally connected with it (i.e., an indirect effect). In an S1S2S3 
causal chain, for instance, a direct intervention on S2 would be equivalent to removing 
the S1S2 causal link. This effect occurs because intervening on a variable renders it 
independent of its causes but not of its effects. Thus, a direct intervention removing S2 
would have no consequences on the probability of S1 (a so-called backward effect) but 
would still vary the probability of S3 (a so-called forward effect). In other words, if 
participants assume the S1S2S3 causal chain, they would conclude that the removal 
of a symptom would also have consequences down the causal chain (i.e., removing the 
effects of the intervened symptom) but not up the chain (i.e., not altering the cause of the 
intervened symptom). This asymmetry should tend to disappear if no clear causal model 
links the different symptoms (Meder et al., 2008; Sloman & Lagnado, 2005). Thus, a 
distinctive pattern of treatment efficacy judgements should be found if participants’ 
causal knowledge of the disorders was in agreement with the causal theory underlying 
our experimental manipulation of the consistency factor. 
First, if participants understood the task correctly and had basic knowledge about 
the treatments, T1, T2, and T3 should receive the highest effectiveness ratings for the 
removal of symptoms S1, S2, and S3, respectively. That is, direct effects (e.g., for 
example, the effect of T1 on S1) should have a greater impact than indirect effects (e.g., 
for example, the effect of T1 on S2).  
Second, indirect forward effects should receive higher ratings than indirect 
backward effects. For example, the efficacy of T1 to remove S3 should receive higher 
ratings than the efficacy of T3 to remove S1.  
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Third, differences between forward and backward effects should be modulated by 
the causal information provided by the clinical reports. Specifically, the difference 
between forward and backward effects should tend to disappear in the inconsistent 
condition in which no causal connection exists among the symptoms. Note that, for 
example, if S1 is thought to be a causal antecedent of S3, then removing the former with 
treatment T1 should contribute to the removal of the latter. In contrast, T3 would not be 
effective in removing S1 because, in general, removing an effect (S3) of a given 
symptom leaves its causes unaltered. This logic would no longer apply if no causal 
connection exists between S1 and S3. In such a case, the effectiveness of T1 and T3 to 
remove S3 and S1, respectively, should tend to be similarly viewed. 
Fourth, the effect of causal information should only be evidenced in forward 
effects. Efficacy judgements for forward effects – i.e., T1 on S2 (T1-S2 hereafter), T2-S3, 
etc. should be higher in the consistent causal than in the inconsistent non-causal 
condition. This is because indirect forward effects are expected only to the extent that the 
symptoms are causally connected. On the other hand, no effects of causal information 
should be observed in backward indirect effects –i.e., T3-S2, T2-S1, etc. In this case, for 
the reasons just explained, low efficacy ratings were expected in both, the consistent 
causal and the inconsistent non-causal conditions. 
To sum up, an important objective of this experiment was to evaluate whether the 
influence of causal reasoning processes may also be evidenced by altering the temporal 
order in which a set of symptoms (i.e., diagnostic criteria) of a DSM-IV mental disorder 
is expected to occur according to a causal theory for such disorder. Another objective was 
a) to evaluate whether participants’ performance in a judgement diagnostic task was 
equivalent to that obtained in a reading task, and b) to evaluate participants’ causal theory 
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through a treatment efficacy judgement task. And finally, we were interested in 
addressing these objectives in a sample of undergraduate Psychology students and in a 
sample of experienced clinicians.  
 
Method 
Participants and apparatus 
A total of 101 participants took part in the experiment. Seventy-one Psychology 
undergraduate students from the University of Malaga volunteered to take part in the 
experiment in exchange for course credits. The sample of experienced clinicians included 
thirty clinical psychologists from private and public institutions who worked in Malaga 
and volunteered to participate in the experiment. The main theoretical orientation in their 
professional practice was: 16 cognitive-behavioral clinicians, three psychoanalysts, one 
humanist, one gestaltist, and nine who used multiple approaches. Their experience as 
clinicians ranged from three to 30 years and averaged 10 years. 
 
Materials and design 
A total of 12 clinical reports were created to manipulate the causal consistency of 
the clinical reports. Accordingly, there were six consistent causal and six inconsistent 
non-causal clinical reports. We tested the effect of this manipulation on the participants’ 
RTs for the target sentences and on the participants’ judgements of agreement – i.e., 
judgements of the extent to which they agreed with the diagnosis that was stated in the 
preliminary information of the reports. Each clinical report included three different 
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symptoms considered as diagnostic criteria (according to the DSM-IV) for the diagnosed 
disorder.  
Clinical reports were referred to patients who were diagnosed with one of six 
possible mental disorders: anorexia nervosa, major depression, specific phobia, 
obsessive-compulsive disorder, posttraumatic stress disorder, and generalized anxiety 
disorder. There were two clinical reports per disorder: One for the consistent causal 
condition, and one for the inconsistent non-causal condition. These specific disorders 
were selected as they had a relatively high prevalence in the general population according 
to the DSM-IV (ranging from 0.5% of anorexia nervosa to 8% of posttraumatic stress 
disorder) and, additionally, because there are specific psychological theories that 
establish causal connections among the symptoms considered as diagnostic criteria in the 
DSM-IV (Beck, 1967, 1985; Crisp, 1980; Ladouceur, 1998, Mowrer, 1947, Salkovskis, 
1985). For example, according to Crisp’s (1980) model of anorexia nervosa, an important 
cause of the development of the different symptoms is a feared situation, such as a strong 
fear of gaining weight (i.e., S1). This fear causes a refusal to maintain a minimal body 
weight (i.e., S2), an effect that is potentially evident in several overt behaviors, such as a 
strict diet, vomiting, and laxative abuse. These behaviors in turn cause weight loss and 
eventually a deterioration that may alter menstruation in women, producing amenorrhea 
(i.e., S3). In the example, symptoms S1, S2, and S3 are DSM-IV diagnostic criteria. 
Importantly, according to this theory, these diagnostic criteria should appear in a specific 
temporal order: First S1, then S2, and finally S3. 
All clinical reports followed the same structure (see Appendix C and D). After a 
first introductory sentence, participants could read the diagnosis made by a clinician. The 
next sentences introduced the symptoms as they were verbalized by the patients. Each 
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verbalization suggested the development of one symptom and provided additional 
information regarding the moment in which the symptom appeared. For the consistent 
causal condition, the temporal order of the symptoms was consistent with the causal 
theory of the disorder (i.e., S1, S2, and S3). For the inconsistent non-causal condition, the 
temporal order of the symptoms was reversed (i.e., S3, S2, and S1). These were the target 
sentences for which RTs were registered. Following these target sentences, a final 
sentence was included that provided explicit information regarding the causal 
connections between the symptoms. In the consistent causal condition, the sentence stated 
that the three symptoms were causally related whereas in the inconsistent non-causal 
condition it stated that no relationship could be established among them.  
We used patients’ verbalizations to open up the possibility that the interpretation 
of these verbalizations as symptoms could be guided by causal theories. This way, if a 
verbalization suggesting a symptom appears in an inconsistent non-causal clinical report, 
participants may be more cautious against inferring this symptom. Consequently, the 
manipulation of causal information may have an effect on participants’ tendency to infer 
the presence of symptoms, thereby increasing the effect of causal information on 
diagnostic performance. 
In order to evaluate whether causal reasoning modulated participants’ diagnostic 
performance, it is crucial to find independent evidence showing that our participants 
actually had causal beliefs about the disorders involved in the clinical reports consistent 
with the causal theories that served to define our experimental manipulation. This 
evidence may be taken as a manipulation check. For this, we set up a task in which 
participants had to judge the efficacy of three different treatments, T1, T2, and T3 for the 
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removal of each of three different symptoms, S1, S2, and S3, that is, a total of nine 
efficacy judgements per disorder (see Appendix E). 
 
Procedure 
The experimental task was performed in the same laboratory than Experiment 1 
and the sample of clinicians ran the experiment in their consulting rooms. Again, the 
experiment took place in two sessions, separated by at least a week. All participants read 
the instructions on the computer screen. The instructions included an example of the 
different tasks participants had to carry out. First, they made a careful and fluent reading 
of a clinical report referred to a hypothetical patient. After that, participants were required 
to make a diagnostic judgement task and finally, they also had to rate the efficacy of three 
different treatments. Additionally, we also registered how long participants took to make 
each of these different judgements. Overall, we expected that judgements in the 
inconsistent non-causal condition would take longer than in the consistent causal 
condition.  
The reading task was self-paced, as in Experiment 1. Once the whole text had 
been read, the diagnostic judgement task started. The clinical report was again displayed 
at the top of the screen, so that the participants could re-read it at any time. At the center 
of the screen, a message prompted our participants to judge the extent to which they 
agreed with the diagnosis stated in the report. Below this message, the participants could 
see a horizontal scrollbar that could be manipulated to make their estimations from 0 (i.e., 
“Completely sure that the correct diagnosis is different”) to 100 (i.e., “Completely sure 
that the clinician indicated the correct diagnosis”). A small text box just below the 
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scrollbar allowed participants to observe a numerical translation of the different positions 
of the scrollbar.  
Once the diagnostic judgement had been made, the treatment efficacy judgement 
task started. Again, the clinical report was displayed at the top of the screen. The 
participants had to rate the efficacy of three different treatments for each of the three 
symptoms referred to in the report. For example: “To what extent do you think that a 
progesterone-based hormonal treatment will resolve, in the short-, medium-, or long-
term, the following problems?” Note that in the example, the treatment mentioned is 
thought to be aimed at the amenorrhea symptom. The order in which the efficacy of 
treatments T1, T2, and T3 had to be judged was counterbalanced across participants. 
Then, a list including the three statements made by the patient, each suggesting the 
presence of one symptom, appeared below this message in a random order. At the right of 
each statement, a scrollbar with a small text box below were shown. The participants 
could use the scrollbars to estimate how efficient the treatment was, whereas the text box 
automatically provided the participants with a numeric translation (from 0 to 100) of their 
estimation. Once the judgement was made, the participants proceeded to evaluate the 
efficacy of the other two treatments. The participants could revise their ratings before 
ending the task.  
Once the participants made their judgements, they could read the next clinical 
report and then carry out the corresponding diagnostic and treatment efficacy judgement 
tasks. For each of the two experimental sessions programmed, one set of six clinical 
reports was set up based on the six possible mental disorders that were described above. 
Half of the clinical reports in each set were assigned to the consistent causal and half to 
the inconsistent non-causal condition. Each set of clinical reports was used in a different 
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session, the order of the sets being counterbalanced across participants. This way, two 
clinical reports based on the same disorder were never read during the same session. The 
order of clinical reports within each session was randomised across participants. 
We also measured how long participants took to make each of the judgements 
requested (i.e., the diagnostic and the treatment efficacy judgements). We expected 
judgements in the inconsistent non-causal condition to take longer than in the consistent 
causal condition. In the former case, participants would be expected to spend more time 
and resources attempting to make sense of a clinical report that was inconsistent with the 
entertained causal theories. This effect should only occur as far as the participants relied 
upon causal reasoning processes to make their judgements and decisions. 
 
Results 
Our aim was to evaluate whether the participants engaged in fast, on-line 
reasoning processes during reading of clinical reports, and whether such reasoning 
processes were consistent with diagnostic judgements in a later diagnostic task. 
Specifically, we assessed whether RTs for target sentences in clinical reports and later 
diagnostic judgements varied depending on whether these reports offered either 
consistent causal or inconsistent non-causal information regarding causal theories of the 
disorders involved. Finally, we addressed these objectives in a sample of undergraduate 
Psychology students and in a sample of experienced clinicians. 
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Sample of Psychology students 
 Reading times. The same filtering method of Experiment 1 was used. There were 
only two outlier RTs, each from a different participant. Given that the target sentences 
were of different lengths, the RTs were normalized to the number of sentence letters (see 
Table 3). A repeated measures ANOVA 2 (Degree of Consistency: Consistent vs. 
inconsistent) x 3 [Causal Hierarchy: S1 (high), S2 (medium), S3 (low)] was performed on 
the normalized RTs, yielding a significant effect of Causal Hierarchy [F (2, 140) = 12.81, 
MSE = 40.33; p < .001; ŋ2=.16] and a significant Degree of Consistency x Causal 
Hierarchy interaction [F (2, 140) = 6.32, MSE= 50.93; p = .002; ŋ2= .08]. The main effect 
of Degree of Consistency was only marginally significant [F (1, 70) = 3.35, p = .072; ŋ2= 
.05]. 
Due to the significant interaction, simple effects were analysed. The Degree of 
Consistency effect was only significant within S3, F (1, 70) = 10.78, MSE= 67.92; p = 
.002; ŋ2= .13 (remaining F values < 1.65). Thus, the RTs for the target sentence that 
suggested the presence of S3 (the symptom with the lowest causal status) were 
significantly longer in the inconsistent non-causal than in the consistent causal 
condition. Recall that in the inconsistent non-causal condition, S3 was the first reported 
symptom as well as the first symptom that was experienced by the client. In the 
consistent causal condition, S3 was the final reported symptom and the final symptom 
that was experienced by the client. The observed effect could be interpreted as an effect 
of temporal order, which would be consistent with what would be expected if the 
participants had been reasoning according to causal theories during reading. However, 
the absence of a significant effect on RTs for the target sentences that suggested the 
presence of Symptoms S1 and S2 suggests an alternative interpretation. As the 
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participants were not clinicians and had not taken any course on psychopathology or 
psychological treatment, they may have been unaware that the S3 symptoms were 
diagnostic criteria for the disorders that were mentioned in the preliminary information. 
Examples of symptoms playing the role of S3 were amenorrhea (for anorexia nervosa), 
weight alterations (for major depression), or tiring easily (for generalized anxiety 
disorder). When these symptoms are stated in the first sentence, naïve participants may 
spend more time reading given that such symptoms are rather unexpected. However, 
reading the same sentences after the sentences that reported symptoms S1 and S2, as in 
the consistent causal condition, did not have the same impact given that such symptoms 
may have been much more expected and consequently may have provided sufficient 
information to make sense of the reported case. Consequently, given that no main effect 
of Degree of Consistency nor any simple Degree of Consistency effect were found 
within S1 or S2, the analyses of RTs do not provide convincing evidence of causal 
reasoning during reading in the sample of students. 
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Psychology students 
  
Consistent causal condition Inconsistent non-causal condition 
S1 (High) S2 (Medium) S3 (Low) S1 (High) S2 (Medium) S3 (Low) 
M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD 
RT target sentences 
  
42.54 11.94 44.71 13.83 42.95 14.61 41.05 13.88 47.45 16.73 46.83 13.86 
  M SD M SD 
Diagnostic 
Judgements   
75.00 11.56 58.97 14.96 
Decision time for 
diagnostic 
judgements   
11801.62 5004.51 14266.16 5841.43 
Decision time for 
treatment efficacy 
judgements   
112747.90 44533.17 102393.40 33604.03 
Experienced clinicians 
  
Consistent causal condition Inconsistent non-causal condition 
S1 (High) S2 (Medium) S3 (Low) S1 (High) S2 (Medium) S3 (Low) 
M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD 
RT for Target 
Sentences 
  54.69 20.77 56.92 19.33 53.57 16.97 62.89 25.63 62.92 22.86 61.28 17.82 
  
M SD M SD 
Diagnostic 
Judgements 
  70.61 14.35 60.47 11.01 
Decision time for 
diagnostic judgements 
  23690.92 10680.38 31423.11 15466.74 
Decision time for 
treatment efficacy 
judgements 
  
137554.50 49794.77 173191.10 84050.94 
 
Table 3. Means and standard deviations of reading times for the target sentences (in 
milliseconds, normalized per number of letters) across the different causal hierarchy 
conditions; means and standard deviations of times (in milliseconds) spent in diagnostic 
judgements; and means and standard deviations of diagnostic judgements (in a 0 to 100 
rating scale) in the sample of students and in the sample of clinicians.  
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 Diagnostic judgements. If students rely on causal theories to make diagnostic 
judgements, we should observe higher ratings of agreement in the consistent causal than 
in the inconsistent non-causal condition. That is, students should agree to a greater extent 
with the diagnosis provided in the report if the temporal order of symptoms and the 
information regarding causal connectivity are consistent rather than inconsistent with the 
supposedly entertained causal theory of the diagnosed disorder. 
Students’ judgements were collapsed across clinical reports into a single 
judgement per condition per participant (see Table 3 for mean judgements in each 
condition). The results revealed that students’ ratings in the consistent causal condition 
were higher than in the inconsistent non-causal condition. This impression was confirmed 
using a paired t-test, which yielded a robust significant effect: t (70) = 8.96, p < .001, ŋ2= 
.53. Thus, students agreed to a greater extent with the diagnosis provided when the causal 
information was consistent rather than inconsistent with the causal theory. 
We also analysed the time spent making the diagnostic judgements (see Table 3). 
Two outlier cases (more than 3 Sds away from the mean), each from a different 
participant, were excluded from the analysis. Consistently with the results obtained in the 
diagnostic judgements, participants took more time in the inconsistent non-causal than in 
the consistent causal condition. This impression was confirmed using a paired t-test: t 
(70) = -4.76, p < .001, ŋ2 = .24. 
 Treatment efficacy judgement task: Evaluating causal theories. The results 
from the treatment efficacy judgement task served us to have independent evidence 
regarding the causal theory that participants held concerning the disorders involved in the 
clinical reports. Specifically, we were interested in assessing whether the participants’ 
causal theories were consistent with the S1→S2→S3 causal chain model on which we 
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based our manipulation of causal information. For this, the participants’ efficacy 
judgements were considered in five different conditions: 1) The direct effect condition 
(e.g., the efficacy of T2 to remove S2), 2) the forward short distance effect condition 
(e.g., the efficacy of T1 to remove S2), 3) the forward long distance effect condition (the 
efficacy of T1 to remove S3), 4) the backward short distance effect condition (e.g., the 
efficacy of T3 to remove S2) and 5) the backward long distance effect condition (the 
efficacy of T3 to remove S1). Prior to the analyses, the judgements were averaged within 
these different five conditions and then averaged across the six clinical reports. For 
example, in the direct effect condition, an average rating was calculated from ratings for 
T1-S1 (i.e., the efficacy of T1 for removing S1), T2-S2, and T3-S3. This mean was 
calculated for each clinical report, and the means from the six clinical reports were 
collapsed into a single average. Figure 1A shows the participants’ mean ratings in each 
condition. The time spent making these treatment efficacy judgements was also analysed. 
Below, we report the results of the analyses that were conducted to test the different 
hypotheses. 
The first analyses were conducted to test whether the participants attributed to 
Treatments T1, T2, and T3 specific effects to remove Symptoms S1, S2, and S3. As can 
be seen in Figure 1A, ratings in the direct condition were, in general, higher than in the 
remaining conditions. Prior to performing the specific planned comparisons, a global 
ANOVA was performed with Degree of Consistency (consistent vs. inconsistent) and 
Treatment Effect (direct vs. forward short distance vs. forward long distance vs. 
backward short distance vs. backward long distance) as within-subjects factors and the 
participants’ average ratings as the dependent variable. The analysis yielded the 
significant effect of Degree of Consistency, F (1, 70) = 9.93, MSE = 104.05; p = .002; 
ŋ
2= .12, Treatment Effect, F (4, 280) = 228.01, MSE = 192.11; p < .001; ŋ2= .77, and 
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Degree of Consistency x Treatment Effect, F (4, 280) = 8.62, MSE = 41.24; p < .001; ŋ2= 
.11. Despite the observed interaction effect, to test our first hypothesis, we performed the 
analyses after collapsing the ratings across the levels of Degree of Consistency. This was 
done given that the differences between the ratings in the direct level and each of the 
remaining levels were significant in both of the Degree of Consistency conditions. 
Unsurprisingly, the participants’ ratings in the direct condition were higher than in the 
forward short distance condition, t (70) = 11.776, p < .001, ŋ2= .66, the forward long 
distance condition, t (70) = 13.197, p < .001, ŋ2= .71, the backward short distance 
condition, t (70) = 16.411, p < .001, ŋ2= .79, and the backward long distance condition, t 
(70) = 20.917, p < .001, ŋ2= .86. This result indicates that the participants clearly 
perceived that the treatments were especially efficient to remove the target symptom for 
which they had been devised. 
According to our second prediction, if the participants’ causal theories conformed 
to the S1→S2→S3 causal chain model, indirect forward effects should receive higher 
ratings than indirect backward effects. This should be specially the case in the consistent 
condition. As can be seen in Figure 1A, ratings in the forward conditions were higher 
than in the backward conditions. To simplify the analyses, we collapsed the means from 
the forward short distance and the forward long distance condition into a single mean, 
and so we did with the backward short and the backward long distance conditions. Then, 
we conducted a repeated measures ANOVA 2 (Degree of Consistency: Consistent vs. 
inconsistent) x 2 (Treatment Effect: Forward vs. backward) on the participants’ mean 
ratings, which yielded the significant effect of Degree of Consistency, F (1, 70) = 9.69, 
MSE = 41.92; p = .003; ŋ2= .12, Treatment Effect, F (1, 70) = 53.78, MSE = 58.42; p < 
.001; ŋ2= .43, and Degree of Consistency x Treatment Effect, F (1, 70) = 5.67, MSE = 
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34.91; p = .020; ŋ2= .08. The main effect of Treatment Effect confirms the impressions 
suggested by Figure 1A and provide evidence supporting the second prediction. 
Our third prediction stated that the difference between the forward and the 
backward effect conditions should be greater in the consistent causal than in the 
inconsistent non-causal condition. In fact, this is just the impression suggested by Figure 
1A. This impression, in turn, is supported by the significant Degree of Consistency x 
Treatment Effect interaction reported above. However, to strengthen the case for the third 
prediction, we directly compared the mean difference between the forward and the 
backward effects in the consistent causal condition against the corresponding mean 
difference in the inconsistent non-causal condition. As expected, the difference in the 
former case was significantly greater than in the latter case, t (70) = 3.62, p = .001, ŋ2= 
.16. It is worth mentioning, however, that ratings for the forward indirect effects were 
significantly higher than ratings for the backward indirect effects even in the inconsistent 
non-causal condition, t (70) = 4.40, p < .001, ŋ2= .21. This result suggests that the 
participants tended to adhere to an S1→S2→S3 causal model despite having received 
disconfirming information. This tendency may have been induced by two factors. First, 
the inconsistent non-causal clinical reports did not provide information that allowed the 
participants to build an alternative causal model with which to make sense of the clinical 
case. Second, the clinical reports were very brief and could make the participants believe 
that they lacked a good amount of information. These factors together may have led 
participants to discredit the clinical report to some extent. As a result, in many cases, the 
participants may have preferred to rely on their causal theory for the disorder to solve the 
efficacy judgement task. 
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Finally, we tested our fourth prediction namely that the consistency effect should 
only be evidenced in forward effects. Specifically, ratings in the consistent causal 
condition should be higher than in the inconsistent non-causal condition when 
considering the forward effect conditions. No difference was expected in the remaining 
Treatment Effect conditions. The impression suggested by Figure 1A is quite consistent 
with this prediction. The analyses of simple effects of Degree of Consistency within the 
different levels of Treatment Effects corroborated this impression. The Degree of 
Consistency factor was significant within the forward short distance condition, t (70) = 
3.973, p < .001, ŋ2= .18, and within the forward long distance condition, t (70) = 3.858, p 
< .001, ŋ2= .17. None of the remaining simple effects were significant (all t’s < 0.682, 
and all p’s > .49). 
We also analysed the time the participants spent in the treatment efficacy 
judgement task. In this case, if the participants had been engaged in causal reasoning, 
they might have taken longer to give their efficacy judgements in the inconsistent non-
causal than in the consistent causal condition. In the former case, the absence of 
information regarding causal links between the symptoms may have made participants 
uncertain regarding the indirect effects of treatments, and thus, participants should have 
taken longer to make their judgements. Table 3 gives the mean time spent in the 
consistent causal and in the inconsistent non-causal conditions. As can be seen, a paired 
t-test yielded no significant effect [t (70) = 1.152, p = .253]. Thus, the time that the 
participants took to make their treatment efficacy judgements did not appear to reflect 
the use of causal reasoning. Nevertheless, given the effects found in the treatment 
efficacy judgements, the absence of significant effects on the time spent very likely 
reflects a lack of sensitivity of the dependent measure rather than the absence of causal 
reasoning. 
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The results found in students provide partial evidence of causal reasoning 
processes. The participants’ diagnostic and treatment judgements were consistent with 
causal reasoning based on both the causal information that was provided in the clinical 
reports and on previous causal theories, which were shown to be consistent with the S1 
S2  S3 causal chain model. However, when considering on-line dependent measures of 
reasoning processes, we did not observe consistent evidence of causal reasoning. 
Specifically, the RTs were not consistently affected by the temporal sequence of 
symptoms. This result cannot be explained by claiming that students do not possess 
causal theories of the disorders used in the clinical reports. The pattern of results found in 
the treatment efficacy judgement task clearly suggest that students do possess causal 
theories of the disorders and that such causal theories are quite consistent with the causal 
chain model on which we based our manipulation of the temporal sequence of symptoms. 
There are several possible explanations for the absence of effects on RTs. One 
explanation is that RTs may not be sensitive enough to reflect the effects of the 
manipulation of the temporal sequence of symptoms. Another explanation is that students 
may have performed the reading task in a rather passive manner, which, in turn, could 
have lead them not to spend enough time and resources to solve the inconsistencies 
detected. Finally, students may not be familiar enough with the causal theories on which 
we based our manipulation. As a consequence, the information provided about symptoms 
may not have produced fast, on-line activation of their causal features, which is an 
important requisite for System 1 processes to get involved in causal reasoning. 
Unfortunately, our data do not allow us to distinguish which is the correct explanation. 
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Panel A 
 
Panel B 
 
Figure 1. Mean treatment efficacy judgements across different conditions (Direct effects, 
Forward Long Distance effects, Forward Short Distance effects, Backward Long 
Distance effects and Backward Short Distance effects), in consistent causal and 
inconsistent non-causal reports, in the sample of students (Panel A) and in the sample of 
experienced clinicians (Panel B). 
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Sample of experienced clinicians 
 Reading times. As with students, RTs were filtered and normalized to the number 
of letters per sentence. Only two RTs from one participant were withdrawn from the 
analysis. Table 3 gives the mean normalized RTs per condition. As expected, the mean 
RTs were consistently longer in the inconsistent non-causal than in the consistent causal 
condition. This result was confirmed by a repeated measures ANOVA 2 (Degree of 
Consistency: Consistent vs. inconsistent) x 3 [Causal Hierarchy: S1 (high), S2 (medium), 
S3 (low)] performed on the normalized RTs, which revealed a significant effect of 
Degree of Consistency, F (1, 29) = 10.60, MSE =226.71, p = .003, ŋ2=.27. Neither the 
effect of Causal Hierarchy nor the Degree of Consistency x Causal Hierarchy interaction 
were significant (all F values < .546). Consequently, the clinicians’ RTs were altered by 
on-line reasoning processes as a consequence of the manipulation of the temporal 
sequence of symptoms. This result suggests that clinicians engaged in on-line causal 
reasoning processes during reading of clinical reports. In other words, clinicians could 
engage in fast retrieval of causal theories consistent with the S1→S2→S3 causal model 
as well as in fast inference processes from such causal model. This result is quite 
consistent with the idea that causal reasoning processes are based on System 1 when 
clinical information is processed during reading. 
 Diagnostic judgements. As with the students, clinicians’ judgements were 
collapsed across clinical reports into a single judgement. An inspection of the mean 
judgements of agreement shown in Table 3 reveals that, as expected, the clinicians’ 
ratings in the consistent causal condition were higher than in the inconsistent non-causal 
condition. This impression was confirmed by a paired t-test: t (29) = 4.27, p < .001, ŋ2= 
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.39. Consistent with this result, the clinicians took longer to make their diagnostic 
judgements in the inconsistent non-causal than in the consistent causal condition (see 
Table 3): t (29) = -3.83, p = .001, ŋ2=.33. 
The consistency between the results from RTs and from diagnostic judgements 
provides indirect evidence that System 1 causal reasoning processes may have affected 
diagnostic judgements. However, we cannot discard that, besides the System 1 processes 
detected during the reading task, the clinicians may also have engaged in System 2 
processes during the diagnostic task that could bias their diagnostic judgements. 
 Treatment efficacy judgement task: Evaluating causal theories. Ratings in this 
task were analysed to assess whether the clinicians relied on causal theories consistent 
with the S1→S2→S3 causal chain model. As in the case of the students’ ratings, a single 
mean rating was calculated for each Treatment Effect condition within each level of 
Causal Information. Figure 1B shows the mean ratings in each condition. 
We first started by assessing whether treatments T1, T2, and T3 were attributed 
some specificity regarding symptoms S1, S2, and S3, respectively. An inspection of 
Figure 1B clearly suggests that ratings for direct effects were higher than for the 
remaining treatment effects. A repeated measures ANOVA with 2 (Degree of 
Consistency: Consistent vs. inconsistent ) x 5 (Treatment Effect: Direct vs. forward short 
distance vs. forward long distance vs. backward short distance vs. backward long 
distance) as within-subjects factors performed on the participants’ average ratings yielded 
the significant effect of Degree of Consistency, F (1, 29) = 7.172, MSE = 71.95, p = .012, 
ŋ
2= .20, Treatment Effect, F (4, 116) = 77.28, MSE = 163.36, p < .001, ŋ2= .72, and a 
Degree of Consistency x Treatment Effect interaction, F (4, 116) = 4.73, MSE = 21.35, p 
= .001, ŋ2= .14. To assess the differences between ratings in the direct condition and the 
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remaining conditions of Treatment Effects, we first collapsed the ratings across both 
consistency conditions. Again, the participants’ ratings in the direct condition were higher 
than in the forward short distance condition, t (29) = 6.146, p < .001, ŋ2= .56, the forward 
long distance condition, t (29) = 7.176, p < .001, ŋ2= .64, the backward short distance 
condition, t (29) = 9.767, p < .001, ŋ2= .77, and the backward long distance condition, t 
(29) = 12.138,  p< .001, ŋ2= .83. This result indicates that clinicians perceived that the 
treatments were especially efficient to remove the target symptom for which they had 
been devised. 
To test the second prediction, we assessed whether ratings in the forward 
conditions were higher than in the backward conditions. An inspection to Figure 1B 
suggests that the data are consistent with the prediction. As explained above, we 
collapsed the means from the forward short distance and the forward long distance 
conditions into a single mean, and so we did with the backward short and the backward 
long distance conditions. Then, we conducted a repeated measures ANOVA 2 (Degree of 
Consistency: Consistent vs. inconsistent) x 2 (Treatment Effect: Forward vs. backward) 
on participants’ mean ratings, which yielded the significant effect of Degree of 
Consistency, F (1, 29) = 6.58, MSE = 32.42, p = .016, ŋ2= .19, Treatment Effect, F (1, 29) 
= 65.28, MSE = 47.67, p < .001, ŋ2= .69, and a Degree of Consistency x Treatment Effect 
interaction, F (1, 29) = 12.52, MSE = 12.84, p = .001, ŋ2= .30. The significant main effect 
of Treatment Effect provides evidence consistent with the second prediction. 
An inspection of Figure 1B also reveals that the difference between the forward 
and the backward effect conditions was greater in the consistent causal than in the 
inconsistent non-causal condition, which is in agreement with our third prediction. This 
impression was supported by the significant Degree of Consistency x Treatment Effect 
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interaction reported above. However, as we did for the sample of students, we directly 
compared the mean difference between the forward and the backward effects in the 
consistent causal condition against the corresponding mean difference in the inconsistent 
non-causal condition. The resulting difference was greater in the consistent causal than in 
the inconsistent non-causal condition, t (29) = 3.55, p = .001, ŋ2= .30. As with students, 
the asymmetry observed between the forward and backward inferences indicates that 
clinicians were reasoning according to an S1→S2→S3 causal model and that their 
reliance on such causal model was less pronounced in the inconsistent non-causal than in 
the consistent causal condition. However, the ratings for the forward indirect effects were 
significantly higher than the ratings for the backward indirect effects even in the 
inconsistent non-causal condition, t (29) = 7.22, p < .001, ŋ2= .64. As with students, this 
result suggests that the clinicians tended to adhere to an S1→S2→S3 causal model 
despite having received disconfirming information. 
Additionally, we assessed whether the effect of Degree of Consistency was 
significant in the forward indirect effect conditions only. An inspection of Figure 1B 
confirms this fourth prediction. The greatest difference between the consistent causal and 
the inconsistent non-causal conditions were observed in the forward indirect effects. The 
analyses of the simple effects revealed that the Degree of Consistency factor was 
significant within the forward short distance level, t (29) = 3.619, p = .001, ŋ2= .31, and 
within the forward long distance level, t (29) = 3.274, p = .003, ŋ2= .27. In both cases, the 
ratings were higher in the consistent causal condition than in the inconsistent non-causal 
condition. None of the remaining simple effects were significant (all t values < 1.68). 
 Finally, the analysis of the time spent in the efficacy judgement task revealed that 
clinicians were significantly slower in the inconsistent non-causal than in the consistent 
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causal condition (see Table 3), t (29) = -2.394, p = .023, ŋ2= .16. This result suggests that 
in the absence of consistent causal information, clinicians appeared to spend time 
attempting to determine the causal mechanism that explained the symptoms to judge the 
efficacy of treatments on symptoms. 
Overall, the results provide consistent support for the use of causal theories in 
rapid and efficient reasoning processes during reading of clinical reports referred to 
DSM-IV disorders, and when making diagnostic and treatment judgements. Furthermore, 
the results obtained in the treatment efficacy judgement task showed that clinicians’ 
causal theories of the disorders were consistent with the causal chain model on which our 
manipulation was based. This result supports the hypothesis that the clinicians’ use of 
causal theories is not limited to the processing of information regarding what symptoms 
are present or absent. These theories also appear to be used to process all the relevant 
information regarding the causal structure underlying the different symptoms. 
 
Discussion 
In this experiment, the results found in students showed that their diagnostic 
judgements were affected by information about the temporal sequence of symptoms 
together with information about causal connections between them. Specifically, students 
agreed on the diagnosis received by the hypothetical patients to a greater extent when the 
temporal sequence of symptoms and the causal connections between them were 
consistent with their causal theories of the diagnosed disorders than when the information 
provided was inconsistent with such theories. Also, students spent more time in the 
diagnostic judgement in the inconsistent non-causal than in the consistent causal 
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condition. However, we did not find convincing evidence of fast and on-line causal 
reasoning processes in this sample, as the time spent reading the target sentences 
conveying information about the temporal sequence of symptoms seemed to be 
unaffected by whether the temporal order was consistent or inconsistent with the 
students’ causal theory of the disorder mentioned in the preliminary information of the 
clinical report. 
The results found with experienced clinicians also showed a greater agreement on 
the diagnosis received by the hypothetical patient in the consistent causal condition than 
in the inconsistent non-causal condition. Clinicians also took longer in the diagnostic 
judgement task in the latter than in the former condition, suggesting that they were trying 
to solve the causal inconsistencies found in the clinical report before making the 
judgement. Additionally, we found evidence of fast and on-line causal reasoning, as 
evidenced by the clinicians’ RTs for the target sentences. Specifically, RTs were 
significantly longer when the information was inconsistent than when it was consistent 
with the clinicians’ causal theories of the disorder with which the hypothetical patient had 
been diagnosed. 
A key issue of this experiment is to show that the effects found are due to the 
consistency or inconsistency of the clinical reports with participants’ causal theories. In 
other words, to show that participants’ causal theories or believes conformed to the causal 
chain model (S1→S2→S3) that served as a basis for our manipulation of consistency. 
The treatment efficacy judgement task developed served this purpose. In this task, 
participants had to judge the efficacy of three different treatments to remove each of the 
three symptoms suffered by the patient. Each treatment (T1, T2, and T3) was devise to 
have a specific direct effect on one of the symptoms (S1, S2, and S3, respectively). The 
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results found in this treatment efficacy judgement task provided compelling evidence that 
both students’ and clinicians’ causal theories were consistent with the causal chain model 
we assumed for the consistency manipulation. First, we found that judgements for 
forward indirect effects (indirect effects down the causal chain; e.g., the effect of 
Treatment 2 on Symptom 3) were higher than judgements for backward indirect effects 
(indirect effects up the causal chain; e.g., the effect of Treatment 2 on Symptom 1). This 
difference persisted even in the inconsistent non-causal condition despite the fact that the 
information provided through the clinical reports was inconsistent with the causal chain 
model. As expected, however, this difference was larger in the consistent causal than in 
the inconsistent non-causal condition. Second, the manipulation of the degree of 
consistency affected participants’ judgements of treatment efficacy only within the 
forward indirect conditions. Judgements in the direct and backward effect conditions did 
not differ as a function of the consistency condition. This pattern of results is what should 
be expected if participants assumed a causal chain model of the form S1→S2→S3, and 
provided that their causal reasoning followed a rational approach. Consequently, the 
results suggest that both the students’ and the clinicians’ causal theories of the disorders 
used in our clinical reports were consistent with this specific causal model, even when the 
information provided through the clinical reports was inconsistent with such model and 
discouraged participants to engage in causal reasoning. 
It is important to note that, when a specific domain is concerned, the detection of 
causal inconsistencies through fluent reading not only requires the possession of causal 
theories relevant within such domain but, also, that such causal theories are represented 
so as to allow for a fast and efficient access and use. The acquisition of these special 
representations, in turn, is not likely to occur if domain-specific causal theories are not 
predominantly used to understand and make sense of events within the domain. 
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Therefore, the results corresponding to the sample of clinicians suggest that the use of 
causal theories in the diagnosis of mental disorders is not something rare that only occurs 
in artificial environments as a result of experimental manipulations. Rather, such use of 
causal theories seems to be part of reasoning process that takes place in natural 
environments.  
A possible criticism regarding our interpretation of the effect of inconsistency on 
clinicians’ RTs is that, although causal relationships between the symptoms necessarily 
involve a specific temporal order, the latter does not necessarily imply that the symptoms 
are causally connected. Longer RTs in the inconsistent non-causal condition could be due 
to the low frequency of clinical cases in which the different disorders develop according 
to the inconsistent temporal sequence. Thus, in their experience, clinicians may have 
encountered more cases in which the disorders develop according to the consistent 
temporal order than cases in which the development conforms to the inconsistent 
temporal order. According to this account, although clinicians encounter many cases in 
which symptoms develop in the consistent order, they would nonetheless remain 
uncommitted to any interpretation regarding how symptoms are causally related. 
Therefore, the inconsistency effect would be due to clinicians’ previous knowledge of 
temporal precedence completely free of any causal interpretation. Although this 
alternative explanation cannot be completely ruled out, it is not very convincing. As said 
above, the results that were observed in the inconsistent non-causal condition in the 
treatment efficacy judgement task strongly suggest that the clinicians hold causal theories 
for the different disorders according to which S1 would be a causal antecedent of S2, and 
S2 would be a causal antecedent of S3. Moreover, it appears that the clinicians were 
somewhat reluctant to avoid using such theories despite having received a) information 
regarding the temporal order of symptoms that contradicted their theories and b) explicit 
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information regarding causal connections discouraging the participants from engaging in 
causal reasoning. Given this strong tendency to assume the existence of causal links 
between symptoms, it is more likely and parsimonious to think that such causal theories 
played an important role in explaining the impact of the temporal order of symptoms on 
RTs. 
A slightly different explanation of the inconsistency effect on RTs would be that 
clinicians may prefer to read and write down symptoms of mental disorders in the 
consistent order (i.e., S1-S2-S3). Thus, the participants may have expected to receive 
information regarding the symptoms in the consistent rather than in the inconsistent 
order. According to this hypothesis, the inconsistency effect would be a consequence of 
the order in which the symptoms are listed in the text rather than the order in which the 
symptoms appeared in the patient. The problem with this account is that we would lack 
an explanation of why clinicians’ preferences coincide with the causal model that they 
appear to assume. Given that we used six different disorders to design the clinical reports, 
it is not very likely that this coincidence is due to randomness. A reasonable explanation 
would be that clinicians’ preference for one symptom order or another is determined by 
their causal theories. However, if clinicians’ preferences for the consistent text order are 
determined by their causal theories, such causal theories would play an important role in 
explaining the inconsistency effect on RTs after all. 
Our results are in line with previous findings. Specifically, as explained in the 
Introduction section, Kim and Ahn (2002) also found evidence for the impact of causal 
theories on diagnostic judgements concerning mental disorders of the DSM-IV. 
Regarding this previous finding, we have gone some steps further in several respects. 
First, we have shown that clinicians’ causal reasoning can be the result of very fast, on-
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line activation and inference processes attributable to System 1. Additionally, the 
consistency between the reasoning processes detected through on-line measures and the 
causal-theory-based bias found in clinicians’ diagnostic judgements suggests that the 
former could have a determinant role for the latter. Second, our results show that causal 
reasoning can be tapped by information that goes beyond the presence or absence of 
diagnostic criteria. Specifically, the temporal sequence in which symptoms develop 
seems to play a significant role. Third, by holding constant the symptoms across different 
conditions, we avoided the confounding influence of other variables such as the 
conceptual centrality of symptoms or their frequency given each of the disorders used in 
our experiment. Finally, at variance with Kim and Ahn’s study, participants in our 
experiment did not perform any odd task, such as drawing causal maps, which may be 
thought as having artificially prompted the use of causal theories. Therefore, the use of 
causal reasoning (especially, in clinicians) has been shown to occur even when 
participants are not requested to make their own causal theories explicit through effortful 
and long, time-consuming processes. 
Our results regarding the efficacy judgement task are also in line with previous 
findings in clinical (Yopchick & Kim, 2009) and in non-clinical contexts (Meder et al., 
2008; Sloman & Lagnado, 2005). Specifically, Yopchick and Kim showed that treatment 
efficacy judgements were determined by the causal status of the symptom more directly 
affected by the treatment. Thus, if the treatment was aimed at removing the first symptom 
in a causal chain, it was considered as more effective than if the same treatment was 
aimed at removing the second symptom in a causal chain. One of the main differences 
between Yopchick and Kim’s study and this experiment is that the causal chain models in 
their study were created by the experimenters. Also, treatments in their study were not 
realistic treatments devised to remove specific symptoms. Another important difference is 
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that the task used by Yopchick and Kim was not focused on mental disorders from the 
DSM-IV taxonomy. Finally, their study did not include a sample of clinicians. Regarding 
Meder et al. (2008) and Sloman & Lagnado (2005), participants in their experiments were 
provided with causal models to link different variables and were requested to make 
predictive and diagnostic inferences from direct interventions on certain specific 
variables. As a result, these authors observed the same sort of asymmetry as in our 
experiment. Specifically, intervening on a variable was judged to have a greater impact 
on its effects than on its causes. This asymmetry disappeared or tended to decrease when 
the variables were merely correlated or when the variables were observed rather than 
acted upon. The interesting aspect of these results is that they indicate the special 
consideration that interventions have in causal thinking. This consideration is a 
distinctive feature of causal reasoning that makes intervention tasks a highly relevant 
experimental tool from which to infer the structure of the causal theory entertained by 
reasoners. 
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EXPERIMENT 3 
So far, we have used the inconsistency effect as an instrument to detect on-line 
causal reasoning attributable to System 1. In Experiments 1 and 2, we have found 
evidence based on the inconsistency effect suggesting that the biases found in the 
diagnostic judgement task may have occurred as a consequence of causal reasoning 
processes attributable to System 1. However, our experiments also suggest that, rather 
than a mere manifestation of causal reasoning, the inconsistency perceived during 
reading could be understood as a heuristic for diagnostic judgements. According to this 
idea, as reasoners receive diagnostic information about a patient, they build a coherent 
and stable mental model to make sense of the case. The more coherent and stable the 
mental model is, the greater the tendency to agree on the previously established 
diagnosis. Conversely, the more incoherent and unstable the mental model is, the lesser 
the tendency to agree on such diagnosis. As said in the Introduction, the formation of 
mental models based on coherence-driven processes is just what one would expect 
System 1 to be well suited for. Such processes may well be conceived as the spreading 
activation processes in dynamic neural networks, which have been shown to be good at 
producing coherent representations based on fast retrieval and inference. An interesting 
consequence of these ideas is that the causal coherence of clinical reports can be 
manipulated to produce a specific pattern of results that can be empirically 
discriminated from other causal reasoning influences such as the causal status. In the 
present experiment, we manipulated the coherence of clinical reports to see if such 
manipulation produced a specific pattern of effects on diagnostic judgements consistent 
with the effects on RTs. Such consistent effects would provide interesting evidence 
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supporting the idea that diagnostic judgements are significantly determined by System 1 
processes responsible for the computation of causal coherence. 
Another concern of Experiment 3 was to assess whether Psychology students 
could engage in System 1 causal reasoning processes. The effects found in the students’ 
RTs in the previous experiments did not provide any evidence of causal reasoning 
attributable to System 1. One factor that may have contributed to such results is the use 
of symptoms whose causal features are not quickly activated in the case of non-
experienced clinicians. In Experiment 3 we tried to favour such quick activation by 
using symptoms whose causal relationships could appear as self-evident, and that could 
be easily derived from causal theories which students had been previously trained in as 
part of a course in the academic context. For this reason, we only used students in the 
present experiment 
Participants in Experiment 3 read clinical reports each of which provided 
information about the diagnosis previously received by a hypothetical patient and about 
the presence or absence of three symptoms considered as diagnostic criteria according 
to the DSM-IV (APA, 2000). As in the previous experiment, the symptoms formed part 
of a causal chain of the sort S1→S2→S3. This causal chain was deduced from a causal 
theory in which our participants (advanced Psychology students) had recently been 
trained in a specific course in clinical psychology. By manipulating which of the three 
symptoms was absent, we created three versions of the clinical report. Information 
about the diagnosed disorder appeared in the second sentence of the report and was 
intended to activate participants’ representation of the disorder. Later on, participants 
read a sentence informing about S1 followed by another sentence informing about S2 
followed by one more sentence informing about S3. Participants were instructed to read 
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fluently through the information. Their task was to make a diagnostic judgement after 
reading all the information. Times spent reading each sentence were recorded 
unbeknownst to participants. Diagnostic judgements and judgements about causal 
connections had also to be made by using rating scales without any temporal limitation.  
The manipulation allowed us to derive predictions with respect to two types of 
inconsistencies. The first type of inconsistency is the inconsistency between a diagnosis 
and the absent symptoms (categorical inconsistency). For example, a sentence stating 
the absence of S1 should conflict with the sentence stating the diagnosis, which should 
result in longer RTs compared to a sentence stating the presence of S1. Note that this 
type of inconsistency does not necessarily results from causal inferences, but may only 
reflect a violation of expectations with respect to symptoms. However, if a causal chain 
theory connecting the symptoms is activated, then the absence of S1 would be 
inconsistent with the presence of S2, which is caused by S1 according to the theory 
(causal inconsistency). This should result in longer RTs for the sentence stating the 
presence of S2 after reading a sentence stating the absence of S1 in comparison to the 
same sentence on S2 after reading a sentence stating the presence of S1. This specific 
inconsistency effect is predicted from a simple assumption to compute coherence. 
According to this assumption, if two elements are positively associated, a good 
coherence would entail that either both are present, or both are absent. If only one of 
them is present, the result would be incoherent. This simple assumption is very common 
in the computation of coherence in some dynamic neural networks. Therefore, a causal 
inconsistency effect on RTs would suggest that participants engage in System 1 
reasoning processes based on the causal chain model.  
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The combination of symptoms described in the text and participants’ 
assumptions about the causal relations among them should also affect the final 
diagnostic judgement. According to the Causal Model Theory of Categorization 
(Rehder, 2001, Rehder & Hastie, 2004, Rehder & Kim, 2010), a good member of a 
category is a member whose features are coherent with the causal laws that form part of 
the causal model for that category. If we assume that the causal chain S1→S2→S3 is 
part of the causal model of the disorder, the least coherent exemplar would be the 
patient lacking symptom S2. This is because the absence of S2 entails the violation of 
two causal mechanisms. The presence of S1 should produce S2, which is inconsistent 
with the absence of the latter. S3 should be the effect of S2, but, again, this is 
contradicted by the absence of the latter. Thus, the patient lacking S2 should receive the 
lowest ratings in the diagnostic judgement task. The absence of S1 and S3 each violate 
one causal mechanism. However, according to the Generative Model, which is a 
quantitative model extending Causal Model Theory (cf. Rehder & Kim, 2010), higher 
diagnostic ratings are predicted for S1 being absent provided that deterministic (or 
almost deterministic) causal relationships between symptoms are assumed. Otherwise, 
the Generative Model predicts higher ratings for S3 being absent than S1 being absent. 
The latter prediction also follows from the Causal Status Hypothesis (Ahn, Kim, 
Lassaline, & Dennis, 2000), according to which the number of features causally affected 
by a feature should determine its weight in classifications. However, the Causal Status 
hypothesis could not predict the lowest ratings for the patient lacking S2. 
The computation of coherence in Rehder’s causal model theory is based on the 
same assumption referred in the previous paragraph. Basically, if two events are thought 
to be causally connected, a coherent situation would require the presence or the absence 
of both of them. The presence of one of them and the absence of the other would lead to 
 EXPERIMENTS 
79 
 
an incoherent situation. Interestingly, Rehder’s theory is not committed to a specific 
algorithm for this computation. Therefore, System 1 processes responsible for the 
computation of causal coherence may be conceived as an instantiation of Rehder’s 
proposal. 
Specific predictions about RTs and diagnostic judgements can be derived from 
the theoretical models outlined above. Assuming that participants automatically 
activated a causal chain theory of the disorder, made respective inferences and used 
them to detect inconsistencies in the text, the predictions shown in Table 4 can be made. 
Based on the causal model theory of categorization (Rehder & Kim, 2010) predictions 
with respect to final diagnostic judgements can be derived. They are also presented in 
Table 4.  
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 Patient condition (type of clinical report) 
 Patient 1 Patient 2 Patient 3 
Sentence about S1 S1 absent (cat 
inconsistent) 
S1 present 
(consistent) 
S1 present 
(consistent) 
RT prediction Slow reading Fast reading Fast reading 
Sentence about S2 S2 present (caus 
inconsistent) 
S2 absent (cat and 
caus inconsistent) 
S2 present 
(consistent) 
RT prediction Slow reading Slow reading Fast reading 
Sentence about S3 S3 present 
(consistent) 
S3 present (caus 
consistent) 
S3 absent (cat and 
caus inconsistent) 
RT prediction Fast reading Slow reading Slow reading 
Diagnostic judgement 
predictions 
Intermediate Lowest Highest 
 
Table 4. Predicted pattern of reading times for target sentences drawn from the 
assumption that participants engage in fast, on-line activation of causal theories and 
inferences, leading to fast detection of inconsistencies, resulting in longer reading times. 
The table also shows the predictions derived from the generative model for diagnostic 
judgements. See text for further explanations. 
Note. cat and caus stand for categorically and causally, respectively. 
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Method 
Participants and design  
Thirty one undergraduate students from the School of Psychology at the 
University of Göttingen (Germany) volunteered in our experiment. All of them had 
been previously trained on the disorders used in our clinical reports in at least two 
courses. The type of patient factor, defined by the missing diagnostic criterion within a 
causal chain theory of the disorder (not S1, not S2, or not S3), was manipulated within-
subjects. As three types of disorders were used, each participant took part in all nine 
resulting conditions in random order.  
 
Materials 
Depression, obsessive-compulsive disorder of cleaning, and specific phobia to 
dogs were used to create the clinical reports. The theories on which the causal chain 
models were based were the following: Beck’s (1967) cognitive theory of depression, 
which proposes that symptoms such as sadness or apathy are the result of an inadequate 
and biased processing of information; Salkovskis’ (1985) cognitive-behavioral model of 
obsessive-compulsive disorder, according to which the patient tries to reduce her/his 
anxiety and unease produced by her/his obsessions by doing compulsive rituals; and 
Mowrer’s two-factors model of specific phobia, which states that, initially, an 
individual acquires an aversion to a stimulus, and then tries to avoid it to reduce the 
anxiety. The symptoms selected to play the role of S1, S2, and S3 were, in the case of 
depression, S1: ‘To think that bad things always may happen to oneself everywhere’, 
S2: ‘Not to feel like going out with friends’, S3: ‘To be socially isolated and to have a 
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lot of social problems’; in the case of obsessive-compulsive disorder, S1: ‘To feel 
anxious about getting a bacterial infection’, S2: ‘To wash hands around 40 times per 
day’, and S3: ‘To have strong problems in the workplace because of lack of time’; in the 
case of specific phobia, S1: ‘To have suffered from bad experiences with dogs during 
childhood’, S2:‘To feel bad when passing close to dogs’ and, S3:‘To avoid going to pet 
shops or parks’, respectively. 
Every clinical report consisted of six sentences and was structured in the 
following way. The first sentence was an irrelevant sentence introducing the patient. It 
was followed by a sentence informing about the diagnosis given by a professional. The 
third, fourth, and fifth sentences informed about the presence or absence of symptoms 
S1, S2, and S3, respectively. Every hypothetical patient presented with two of the three 
symptoms. The absence of a symptom was made explicit by referring to an opposite 
state or behavior. For example, if the symptom was “she/he never feels like going out 
with friends”, its absence was made explicit by saying that “she/he always feels like 
going out with friends”; or if the symptom was “she/he washes her/his hands 40 times 
per day”, the corresponding sentence for stating its absence was “she/he washes her/his 
hands 4 times per day”. This way, the sentences referring to the presence and the 
absence of a specific symptom were almost identical regarding length, wording, 
structure and number of syllables (in German). Finally, the clinical report ended with a 
final sentence that was held constant across the different clinical reports based on the 
same disorder (see Appendix F and G). 
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Procedure 
The task was performed in a laboratory with 10 PCs equipped with home-built 
software programmed in Visual Basic 2005 (Microsoft, USA) and Power Point 
(Microsoft Office). Participants started by reading the instructions on the computer 
screen. As in previous experiments, they were informed that they were required to read 
attentively and fluently a series of clinical reports about hypothetical patients who had 
been diagnosed with a mental disorder by a clinical psychologist. After reading the 
instructions, they were presented with an example of a clinical report based on a 
disorder (anorexia) that was different from those used in the actual experimental task. 
The example text had the same structure as the experimental clinical reports.  
The reading procedure was the same as in Experiment 1 and 2, but instead of 
using the keyboard to advance, they clicked on the screen by pressing the left mouse 
button. Each click made all of the letters of a sentence visible while hiding the slashes. 
A second click had the reverse effect on the read sentence and rendered the following 
sentence visible. The RTs for each sentence was the time that elapsed between the two 
consecutive clicks. Clicking after reading the final sentence allowed participants to 
proceed to the diagnostic judgement task.  This time, the ratings could range from 0 to 
10, meaning “Completely sure that the correct diagnosis is another one”, and 
“Completely sure that the diagnosis is correct”, respectively. After the diagnostic 
judgement task, participants had to judge the causal relationship for each of all the 
possible pairs of events mentioned in the clinical report. This task was designed to 
check whether participants’ causal beliefs conformed to the causal chain model on 
which we based our manipulation. Thus, if a clinical report informed, for example, 
about the absence of S1 and the presence of S3, the participants had to judge the extent 
 CAUSAL REASONING IN THE DIAGNOSIS OF MENTAL DISORDERS: EVIDENCE FROM ON-LINE AND OFF-LINE MEASURES 
 
84 
 
to which they thought that the absence of S1 could be the cause of the presence of S3, as 
well as the extent to which S3 could be the cause of the absence of S1. As there were 
three symptoms per clinical report, and two possible causal directions, participants had 
to make a total of six causal judgements per clinical report. The order in which 
participants made their judgements for the different pairs was completely randomized. 
Before facing this task, the message “Now, you will have to judge the extent to which 
you think that each symptom could cause the others. You will use scales from 0 to 10 
again” appeared on the screen. Then, six questions with the wording “To what extent do 
you think that [Symptom X] affects [Symptom Y]?” prompted participants to make 
their judgements. Below these messages, the same scrollbar from 0 (meaning 
“Completely sure that it does not affect at all”) to 10 (meaning “Completely sure that it 
affects strongly”) was displayed. After the causal judgement task, participants 
performed further clinical tasks for a different study. Once these tasks were finished, 
participants proceeded to the next clinical report. As we used three different disorders to 
build up the different texts, and there were three different versions per disorder to 
manipulate the symptom that filled the role of the absent symptom, every participant 
read a total of nine clinical reports, each one followed by the corresponding diagnostic 
and causal judgement task. The clinical reports were presented in a random order. 
 
Results and discussion 
Manipulation check: Causal-link judgements. The participants’ judgements in 
the causal-link judgement task were analysed to check whether their causal beliefs were 
in accordance with the causal chain model (i.e., S1→S2→S3) on which we based our 
predictions. Causal-link judgements were distinguished according to three different 
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criteria based on the causal chain. If we take into account the direction of the causal 
link, we have forward (e.g., the extent to which S1 caused S2) and backward causal 
judgements (e.g., the extent to which S2 caused S1). With respect to the presence of 
symptoms, we have judgements about the causal relationship between two present 
symptoms (e.g., the extent to which S3 caused S1) and about a present symptom and an 
absent symptom (e.g., the extent to which S3 caused the absence of S1). Finally, 
regarding the contiguity of symptoms in the causal chain, we have causal judgements 
about the relationship between two contiguous symptoms (e.g., the extent to which S1 
caused S2) and between two non-contiguous symptoms (e.g., the extent to which S1 
caused S3). These criteria were considered as factors in a 2 (Direction: Forward vs. 
backward) x 2 (Presence: Two present vs. one present) x 2 (Contiguity: Contiguous 
symptoms vs. non-contiguous symptoms) repeated measures design. For each 
participant, judgements were collapsed into a single mean judgement for each of the 
eight conditions (see Table 5). 
 
 Both symptoms present Only one symptom present 
 Mean SD Mean SD 
Contiguous, forward 8.49 0.82 1.10 0.74 
Non-contiguous, 
forward 
5.73 2.01 0.96 0.83 
Contiguous, backward 4.38 1.78 1.90 1.33 
Non-contiguous, 
backward 
3.20 1.71 1.23 1.04 
Table 5. Means and standard deviations of causal link judgements (from 0 to 10).   
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Table 5 shows the participants’ mean judgements in each condition. As can be 
seen, judgements in the two-present condition were much higher than in the one-present 
condition. Judgements in the latter condition were near 0 and differed between each 
other by less than one point. This is just what one would expect provided that the 
participants’ causal beliefs conformed to the causal chain model. If we now focus on the 
two-present conditions, we can also appreciate that, consistent with the causal chain 
model, judgements in the forward condition were considerably higher than in the 
backward condition. This occurred, especially, in the contiguous conditions. Finally, 
and consistent with the causal chain model, ratings were higher in the contiguous than 
in the non-contiguous symptoms condition. Consistent with the causal chain model, this 
difference can be more easily appreciated in the forward than in the backward 
conditions. Thus, those causal links that were consistent with a causal chain model 
received high ratings, whereas those that were inconsistent with the causal chain model 
received low ratings. These impressions were confirmed by a repeated measures 
ANOVA 2 (Direction: Forward vs. backward) x 2 (Presence: Two present vs. one 
present) x 2 (Contiguity: Contiguous symptoms vs. non-contiguous symptoms) on the 
participants’ judgements, which yielded a significant effect of Direction, F(1, 30) = 
56.44, MSE = 2.14; p < .001; η 2 =.65, Contiguity, F(1, 30) = 97.51, MSE = 0.89; p < 
.001; η 2 =.77, Presence, F(1, 30) = 531.15, MSE = 2.02; p < .001; η 2 =.95, Direction x 
Presence, F(1, 30) = 160.56, MSE = 1.43; p < .001; η 2 =.84, Contiguity x Presence, F(1, 
30) = 27.58, MSE = 1.37; p < .001; η 2 =.48, Contiguity x Direction, F(1, 30) = 9.61, 
MSE = 0.45; p = .004; η 2 =.24, and the significant three-way interaction Contiguity x 
Direction x Presence, F(1, 30) = 22.19, MSE = 0.79; p = .004; η 2 =.43. Because all the 
differences between ratings tend to disappear when only one of the symptoms is 
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present, it seems that Factor Presence interacts with the remaining factors and with the 
Direction x Contiguity interaction by decreasing their effects to make them almost 
disappear in the one-present condition. Because of this, we only analysed the results in 
the two-present condition as a follow-up of the global analysis. A repeated measures 
ANOVA 2 (Direction: Forward vs. backward) x 2 (Contiguity: Contiguous symptoms 
vs. non-contiguous symptoms) on the participants’ judgements in the two-present 
condition yielded a significant effect of Contiguity, F(1, 30) = 66.55, MSE = 1.8; p < 
.001; η 2 =.69, Direction, F(1, 30) = 124.67, MSE = 2.75; p < .001; η 2 =.81, as well as 
the significant interaction Contiguity x Direction, F(1, 30) = 20.94, MSE = 0.94; p < 
.001; η 2 =.41. For the reasons stated above, the main effects found are quite consistent 
with the causal chain model. The Contiguity x Direction interaction is also hardly 
surprising because, if participants were entertaining a causal-chain theory, backward 
causal links should tend to be viewed as implausible regardless of the contiguity 
between symptoms. Thus, the difference between the contiguous and non-contiguous 
conditions should tend to disappear in the backward condition (see Table 5). Overall, 
the pattern of results found in the participants’ causal-link judgements fits quite well the 
causal chain model on which we based our manipulation and predictions.  
Reading times. Statistical analyses were conducted to test whether RTs were 
longer for the inconsistent sentences than for the consistent sentences. Inconsistent 
sentences included those sentences stating the absence of a symptom (categorical 
inconsistency) as well as those sentences stating the presence of a symptom given the 
absence of the previous symptom in the causal chain (causal inconsistency). As 
explained above, causal inconsistencies provide direct evidence for fast, on-line causal 
reasoning processes.  
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Before the analysis, as in Experiment 2, RTs were normalized by the number of 
letters of the corresponding target sentence and were subjected to the same filtering 
process as in the previous experiments. As a consequence, twelve measures were 
removed. Then, RTs across the different mental disorders were collapsed into a single 
average RT per patient and symptom condition. Table 6 shows the RTs for every target 
sentence in each of the different patient conditions collapsed across the different 
disorders. Thus, the first column shows the RTs for sentences referring to Symptoms 
S1, S2, and S3 in the patient condition in which the absent symptom was S1. The 
second and the third columns show the corresponding RTs in those patient conditions in 
which the absent symptoms were S2 and S3, respectively. As can be seen, the RTs for 
the inconsistent sentences were, in general, longer than for the consistent sentences. For 
example, in the case of Symptom 1, the RTs in the first patient condition were longer 
than in the remaining conditions. In the case of Symptom 2, the RTs in third patient 
condition (the consistent condition) were shorter than in the remaining inconsistent 
conditions. Finally, in the case of Symptom 3, the RTs in the first patient condition (the 
consistent condition) were shorter than in the remaining inconsistent conditions. This 
pattern of results is consistent with the predictions shown in Table 4. To confirm these 
impressions, we performed a repeated measures ANOVA 3 (Patient: Patient 1-absence 
of S1, Patient 2-absence of S2, Patient 3-absence of S3) x 3 (Symptom: Symptom 1, 
Symptom 2, Symptom 3), which yielded a significant main effect of Patient, F (2, 60) = 
5.7, MSE = 124.68; p < .005; η 2 = .16, a significant effect of Symptom, F (2, 60) = 
18.85, MSE = 101.26; p < .001; η 2 = .39, and the significant interaction Patient x 
Symptom, F (2,60) = 13.8, MSE = 100.37; p < .001; η2 = .32.  
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Patient 1 
(S1,S2,S3) 
Patient 2 
(S1,S2,S3) 
Patient 3 
(S1,S2,S3) 
 M SD M SD M SD 
RT Symptom 1 53 ms 14.1 43 ms 9.3 44 ms 11.8 
RT Symptom 2 60 ms 14.4 59 ms 12.6 47 ms 9.9 
RT Symptom 3 48 ms 11.8 59 ms 19.3 55 ms 12.8 
Diagnostic 
judgements 
5.74 1.58 4.41 1.71 7.05 1.35 
 
Table 6. Means and standard deviations of reading times [RT] for the target sentences 
(in milliseconds per letter), and mean and standard deviations of diagnostic judgements 
(from 0 to 10).  
 
To test whether participants activated a causal chain model of the disorder and 
detected causal inconsistencies, we conducted planned comparisons for Symptoms 2 
and 3. Note that Symptom 1 is involved in a categorical inconsistency when it is absent 
in the first patient condition. Thus, it is not possible to disentangle a possible causal 
inconsistency from a categorical inconsistency in this case. A t-test for paired 
comparisons yielded a significant difference between Patient 1 and Patient 3 conditions 
for Symptom 2, t(30) = 4.63, p < .001, η 2 = .42. Although Symptom 2 was present in 
Patient 1 and Patient 3, and its presence was consistent with the diagnosis stated in the 
clinical report, different RTs resulted. As Symptom 2 was present despite its cause 
Symptom 1 being absent (Patient 1), the participants seemed to have experienced a 
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causal inconsistency. This was not the case when both Symptom 1 and Symptom 2 were 
present (Patient 3), which is in accordance with the causal chain model. A t-test for 
paired comparisons also revealed a significant difference between Patient 1 and Patient 
2 conditions for Symptom 3, t(30) = -4.04, p = .001, η 2 = .35. This finding replicates the 
finding for Symptom 2. Again, Symptom 3 was present for Patient 1 and Patient 2, but 
it occurred despite Symptom 2 being absent in Patient 2, which created an inconsistency 
according to the assumed chain model. The participants were apparently sensitive to the 
causal inconsistencies. 
However, one may argue that the differential RTs may not be due to an 
inconsistency of the observed symptom with the assumed causal chain model, but were 
due to a carry-over effect of the longer RTs of the previous sentence stating the absence 
of an expected symptom. To assess the plausibility of this account, we analysed the RTs 
for the final sentence, which was an irrelevant sentence conveying no information about 
symptoms. If the reading of an inconsistent sentence stating the absence of a symptom 
produces a carryover effect on the following sentence, the RTs for the final sentence 
should be longer in the Patient 3 than in the Patient 1 and Patient 2 conditions. Note that 
only in the Patient 3 condition, the final sentence was preceded by a sentence stating the 
absence of a symptom. The mean normalized RTs for the final sentence were 34.7 ms, 
33.3 ms, and 32.3 ms, corresponding to the Patient 1, Patient 2, and Patient 3 
conditions, respectively. This pattern of results is clearly at odds with a carryover effect. 
Hence the longer RTs found for Symptom 2 when comparing Patient 1 to Patient 3, and 
for Symptom 3 when comparing Patient 2 to Patient 1 are most likely due to 
participants’ causal reasoning based on the assumed causal chain model. Thus, the two 
findings provide strong evidence for the involvement of causal reasoning while reading 
through a clinical report. As the participants did not stop to deliberate about the given 
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information, but read fluently through the information, these findings indicate that the 
participants automatically activated their respective causal theories, engaged in fast 
inference making, and in fast detection of inconsistencies. This speaks to the presence 
of System 1 processes of causal reasoning as diagnostic information is being gathered.  
Diagnostic judgements. Judgements for the different disorders were collapsed 
into a single mean per patient condition for each participant. The analyses reported were 
conducted on these resulting means. Table 6 shows participants’ mean judgements in 
each condition. Participants agreed with the diagnosis stated in the preliminary 
information to a greater extent in the Patient 3 than in the Patient 1 condition, and, in 
turn, in the Patient 1 more than in the Patient 2 condition. These impressions are 
supported by a repeated measures ANOVA (Patient: Patient 1 vs. Patient 2 vs. Patient 
3) on the participants’ judgements, which yielded the significant main effect of Patient, 
F (2, 60) = 41.44, MSE = 1.31; p < .001; η 2 = .58. T-tests for paired comparisons 
revealed significant differences between the Patient 1 and Patient 2 conditions, t (30) = 
4.52; p < .001; η 2 = .40, between the Patient 1 and Patient 3 conditions, t (30) = -4.99; p 
< .001; η 2 = .45, and between the Patient 2 and Patient 3 conditions, t (30) = -8.49; p < 
.001; η 2 = .71. Note that these differences would still be significant even if we take the 
Bonferroni approach (i.e., with α = .016), which is very conservative, to protect the 
statistical analyses against an accumulation of Type 1 error. 
These findings clearly show that the participants’ assumptions about the causal 
relations among symptoms affected diagnostic judgements. More precisely, the pattern 
of diagnostic ratings supports the generative causal model of categorization (Rehder & 
Kim, 2010). As outlined above, this model predicts that the Patient 2 condition should 
be the least coherent and the Patient 3 condition the most coherent (assuming 
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probabilistic causal relations). Thus, the lowest judgements of agreement should be 
found in the Patient 2 condition and the highest in the Patient 3 condition, which was in 
fact the case. Other models, like the causal status hypothesis (Ahn et al., 2000) cannot 
predict this finding.  
Although we cannot rule out that the participants may have engaged in some 
form of deliberative, System 2 reasoning processes when facing the diagnostic 
judgement task, our findings suggest that more intuitive, System 1 processes have been 
involved as well. The participants’ detection of inconsistencies during reading preceded 
the diagnostic judgements made and they were in accordance with the diagnostic 
ratings. For Patient 2, two inconsistency effects were found in readings times (for 
Symptoms 2 and 3) and diagnostic ratings were lowest. For Patient 1, one strong 
(Symptom 2) and one rather weak (Symptom 1) inconsistency effect resulted and 
ratings were intermediate. Finally, for Patient 3, only one inconsistency effect in RTs 
was found (for Symptom 3) and high diagnostic ratings resulted. Hence, perceived 
inconsistencies between diagnostic categories and observed symptoms (categorical 
inconsistency) and between causal chain models and observed symptoms (causal 
inconsistency) were together predictive of diagnostic ratings. These perceived 
inconsistencies resulted automatically when participants read the clinical information. 
This strongly suggests that the computation of coherence envisaged by Rehder’s Causal 
Model Theory could have been undertaken by System 1 during reading, which, in turn, 
could have anchored or significantly determined System 2 at the diagnostic judgement 
task.  
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EXPERIMENT 4 
The previous experiments showed that reasoners relied on System 1 causal 
reasoning processes during reading and that the outcomes of such processes were 
consistent with later diagnostic judgements. Also, the pattern of results found in 
Experiments 2 and 3 suggests that participants are sensitive to information confirming 
or contradicting there assumptions about the causal structure underlying the 
relationships between symptoms. Specifically, the participants in these experiments 
seemed to have reasoned according to a causal chain model of the type S1→S2→S3. 
However, several authors have pointed out that causal reasoning is not only based on 
assumptions about causal relatedness but on assumptions about causal mechanisms 
through which variables are connected (Ahn & Bailenson, 1996; Ahn & Kalish, 2000; 
Ahn, Kalish, Medin, & Gelman, 1995). According to this notion, when people say that 
A causes B, they mean that there is a mechanistic process between A and B, which 
allows for the transmission of power from the former to the latter and that somehow 
forces the occurrence of B given A (Ahn & Kalish, 2000). If this is correct, causal 
reasoning about two causally related symptoms, S1 and S2, should involve assumptions 
about the mechanism connecting S1 and S2, and explaining how the former causes the 
latter. These assumptions in turn could result in a new type of perceived causal 
inconsistency: Mechanistic inconsistency. These inconsistencies should be experienced 
if a) participants automatically activate causal theories of a disorder including 
assumptions about the causal mechanisms connecting potential symptoms, and b) they 
are informed that symptoms indicating a certain disease or disorder were linked through 
unexpected mechanisms. Note that this type of inconsistency may arise even when all 
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observed symptoms are coherent with the assumed disorder. In this case, causal 
inconsistencies should be experienced without categorical inconsistencies.  
Experiment 4 tested this hypothesis by manipulating the information concerning 
the causal mechanism connecting the symptoms within a causal chain while holding 
constant the causal structure underlying the connections between symptoms. In one 
condition (the consistent condition) the presented mechanisms were consistent with the 
participants’ causal theory of the disorder mentioned in the clinical report. In the 
alternative, inconsistent condition, the causal mechanisms were inconsistent with the 
causal theory. In both conditions, the hypothetical patient presented with the same 
symptoms, which were connected through the same causal chain (S1→S2→S3). For 
example, in one condition readers were informed that a patient had been diagnosed with 
anorexia nervosa. Later in the clinical report, they were informed that the patients’ fear 
of getting fat (Symptom 1) led to food aversion (Mechanism 1), which, in turn, led to 
weight loss (Symptom 2), which, in turn, led to a strong hormonal change (Mechanism 
2), which, finally, led to amenorrhea (Symptom 3). In this case, a causal mechanism is 
made explicit that is consistent with some theories of anorexia nervosa. Alternatively, 
participants were informed that the patient’s fear of getting fat (Symptom 1) led to 
stomach bleeding (Mechanism 1b), which, in turn, led to weight loss (Symptom 2), 
which, in turn, led to the ingestion of prescribed vitamins and medicines (Mechanism 
2b), which, finally, led to amenorrhea (Symptom 3). These mechanisms may be seen as 
less consistent with psychological theories of anorexia nervosa, and more consistent 
with bio-medical mechanisms related to stomach ulcer. Hence as a first factor we 
manipulated the type of mechanism connecting the symptoms. As a second factor we 
manipulated the diagnosis assigned to a patient. For each set of symptoms, the 
hypothetical patient could have been diagnosed with either a psychological disorder, for 
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which the symptoms were diagnostic criteria, or a bio-medical disease consistent with 
the observed symptoms. We expected participants to experience causal inconsistency 
either when the patient was diagnosed with a psychological disorder but the clinical 
report informed about a bio-medical mechanism or if the patient was diagnosed with a 
bio-medical disease but the clinical report informed about a psychological mechanism. 
Consequently, we predicted longer RTs in the inconsistent than in the consistent 
condition. As in our previous experiments, we also expected participants’ diagnostic 
judgements to be higher in the consistent than in the inconsistent conditions. Note that 
in contrast to Experiments 1 and 3 these judgements would be determined only by 
causal and not categorical inconsistency as the same diagnostic criteria were present in 
all conditions.  
 
Method 
Participants and design 
Thirty-four Psychology students from the University of Malaga (Spain) 
participated. Twenty seven were Psychology students in their last year, whereas the 
remaining participants were postgraduate students enrolled in a Master’s degree 
program in Health Psychology. All of them had received some training on the 
diagnostic criteria and theories of the different disorders. All students participated 
voluntarily. Although we were also interested in clinicians, we preferred to start 
conducting the experiment with students to see if we could find further evidence of 
System 1 causal reasoning in students. Two factors were manipulated within-subjects: 
Type of disease/disorder (psychological vs. biomedical) and type of mechanism 
 CAUSAL REASONING IN THE DIAGNOSIS OF MENTAL DISORDERS: EVIDENCE FROM ON-LINE AND OFF-LINE MEASURES 
 
96 
 
(psychological vs. bio-medical). Three psychological disorders and three bio-medical 
diseases were used with each participant receiving a set of twelve problems. 
 
Materials 
Half of the hypothetical patients suffered from one of three possible mental 
disorders: Anorexia nervosa, social phobia, and generalized anxiety. The other half 
suffered from one of the following medical diseases, which could result in the same 
symptoms: Stomach ulcer, psoriasis, and migraine. The symptoms used in the reports 
were selected from the diagnostic criteria of the mental disorders established by the 
DSM-IV-TR. Three symptoms per mental disorder were selected: For anorexia S1: 
High anxiety about the possibility of gaining weight, S2: Substantial loss of weight and, 
S3: Amenorrhea; for social phobia S1: Fear of feeling embarrassed in social situations, 
S2: Avoidance of social situations and, S3: Problems at work; for generalized Anxiety 
disorder S1: Excessive and uncontrollable worries, S2: Fatigue, muscular tension and 
restlessness, and S3: Sleep problems. These symptoms formed part of a causal chain 
(S1→S2→S3) that was made explicit in the clinical reports. Each causal chain could 
operate according to two different sets of mechanisms: a) mechanisms compatible with 
causal psychological theories of mental disorders, and b) bio-medical mechanisms 
compatible with causal theories of medical diseases. The theories that we relied on to 
derive the psychological mechanisms were: Crisp’s (1980) behavioral model of 
anorexia nervosa, Clark and Wells’ (1995) cognitive-behavioral model of social phobia, 
and Ladouceur’s (1998) cognitive model of generalized anxiety disorder. All 
participants had been previously trained on these theories in different courses. The bio-
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medical mechanisms were compatible with familiar notions that people normally 
acquire from exposure to the media. 
Twelve clinical reports were built up to fill up the four cells of a 2 (Diagnosis: 
Psychological disorder vs. medical disease) x 2 (Mechanism: Psychological mechanism 
vs. bio-medical mechanism) within-subjects design. For each triplet of symptoms (or 
causal chain) there were two possible mechanisms, one psychological and one bio-
medical. The psychological mechanism of anorexia nervosa was contrasted with the 
bio-medical mechanism related to stomach ulcer, the psychological mechanism of social 
phobia with the bio-medical mechanism of psoriasis; and the psychological mechanism 
of generalized anxiety with the bio-medical mechanism of migraine. Each clinical report 
comprised ten sentences. The first one was an introductory sentence. The second 
sentence informed about the diagnosis previously received by the patient. This 
diagnosis could be either consistent with the mechanism described in the report or 
inconsistent. The third sentence provided information about a precipitating event 
consistent with the causal mechanism described later in the text. For example, in the 
case of anorexia nervosa, participants read the sentence “She told that, in her childhood, 
her schoolmates called her ‘fat’”. The next sentence introduced the causal mechanism. 
The next five sentences described the causal mechanisms together with the symptoms. 
For example, in the case of anorexia nervosa, the participants read the following 
sentences: “It all started with high anxiety about the possibility of gaining weight. The 
high anxiety about the possibility of gaining weight led to food aversion. The aversion 
to food led to a remarkable loss of weight. The remarkable loss of weight led to a strong 
hormonal change. The strong hormonal change led to the stopping of the period” (all 
the sentences have been translated from Spanish). As can be seen, these sentences 
describe the causal mechanism step by step from the first through the last link of the 
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chain. This same structure was used in every clinical report. Following the description 
of the mechanism, participants read an irrelevant final sentence (see Appendix H). 
 
Procedure 
The experimental task was programmed in Visual basic 2005 and was run  in the 
same laboratory than Experiment 1 and Experiment 2. The participants started by 
reading the instructions on the computer screen, which included an example based on a 
patient diagnosed with obsessive-compulsive disorder. The reading task of clinical 
reports proceeded as in previous experiments: The participants moved from one 
sentence to the next by pressing the space bar. After reading each clinical report, the 
participants were confronted with a diagnostic judgement task in which they had to rate 
the extent to which they agreed with the diagnosis received by the patient (in a scale 
from 0 to 100).  
Once the participants had made their diagnostic judgement, they were asked to 
decide whether a psychological or a medical treatment would be more effective for the 
patient. For this purpose, a new display was shown on the screen in which the 
participants could read the following message: “Now, you will have to make a decision 
about treatment. For the client described in the report, what type of treatment do you 
think it would be more efficient: A psychological or a medical treatment? Place the face 
of the scale below on the position that best represents your decision. Although the face 
appears at the centre of the scale, you can move it to the left or right depending on your 
preferred treatment”. Below this message, a horizontal scale was displayed together 
with a label indicating the psychological treatment at one extreme and another label 
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indicating the medical treatment at the other extreme. The specific side for each 
treatment was counterbalanced. The percentage numbers 50%, 75%, and 100% were 
shown on top of the scale. The former appeared in the middle position, whereas, each of 
the remaining numbers appeared at both sides of the scale at further positions from the 
centre. The initial position of the scrollbar face corresponded to the 50% rating, and the 
participants could move it to the left or right depending on which of the treatments they 
would choose according to the information provided through the clinical report. Thus, 
the percentage ratings for the two types of treatment were complementary in such a way 
that if the participants’ rating for the psychological treatment was, for instance, 75%, the 
rating for the medical treatment was 25%. As people’s decisions on interventions 
depend on their causal model explaining the symptoms, the participants’ preference for 
the psychological treatment should be greater in the psychological mechanism than in 
the medical mechanism condition. Complementarily, the preference for the medical 
treatment should be greater in the medical mechanism than in the psychological 
mechanism condition. However, this result should be found only if the descriptions 
provided for the psychological and the medical mechanisms through the clinical reports 
are interpreted as such by the participants. Therefore, this treatment-decision making 
task could be used to check whether the participants interpreted the descriptions of the 
causal mechanisms as intended.  
After the treatment decision task the participants proceeded to the next clinical 
report. They had to read a total of twelve different clinical reports (3 causal chains x 2 
causal mechanisms x 2 diseases) followed by the corresponding diagnostic judgement 
and treatment decision tasks. The order of the clinical reports was completely 
randomized across subjects. 
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Results and discussion 
Reading times. Statistical analyses were conducted to test whether RTs for the 
target sentences (i.e., the sentences describing the causal mechanism together with the 
symptoms) were affected by their consistency (or inconsistency) with the preliminary 
information. As outlined above, we expected to find longer RTs for the bio-medical 
mechanism than for the psychological mechanism in clinical reports about patients who 
had been diagnosed with the psychological disorder. The opposite pattern of results was 
expected in clinical reports about patients who had been diagnosed with a medical 
disease. 
The analyses were performed on the sum of the RTs for the five target sentences 
normalized by the total number of letters. The same filtering process as in previous 
experiments was used. As a consequence, six outlier RTs were removed. After the 
filtering process, a single mean RT per condition and participant was computed, leading 
to four average RT measures, one per condition. 
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Diagnosis Psychological Medical 
Mechanisms Psychological Bio-medical Psychological Bio-medical 
 M SD M SD M SD M SD 
Reading times 53 ms 15.6 58 ms 18.5 52 ms 12.5 42 ms 14.0 
Diagnostic 
judgements  
 
76.72 20.52 33.92 22.19 9.95 13.51 35.20 20.03 
 
Table 7. Mean normalized reading times and standard deviations for target sentences 
(in milliseconds per letter) and mean final diagnostic judgements (from 0 to 100) 
averaged over three different disorders per condition. 
 
Table 7 shows the descriptive statistics. In the psychological diagnosis 
condition, longer RTs were found for bio-medical mechanisms than for psychological 
mechanisms. When the diagnosis was medical, longer RTs were found for 
psychological mechanisms than for medical mechanisms. This pattern of results shows 
an interaction effect consistent with our predictions. These impressions were confirmed 
by a repeated measures ANOVA 2 (Diagnosis: Psychological disorder vs. medical 
disease) x 2 (Mechanism: Psychological mechanism vs. bio-medical mechanism), which 
yielded the significant effect of Diagnosis, F (1, 33) = 8.6, MSE = 287.75; p = .006; η 2 
= .21, and the significant effect of the interaction Diagnosis x Mechanism, F (1,33) = 
33.43, MSE = 61.76; p < .001; η 2 = .50. The effect of Mechanism was not significant, F 
(1, 33) = 2.66, MSE = 58.41; p = .112. The analyses of the simple effects of Mechanism 
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within each level of Diagnosis revealed the significant effect of the former within both 
the psychological diagnosis condition, t (33) = -3.59; p = .001; η 2 = .28, and the medical 
diagnosis condition, t (33) = -4.64; p < .001; η 2 = .39. 
As expected, we found an inconsistency effect which was significantly 
modulated by the preliminary information concerning the diagnosis received by the 
patient. When the causal mechanisms were consistent with the participants’ causal 
theories for the disorder or disease, the target sentences were read faster than when the 
causal mechanisms were inconsistent. Note that this result cannot be explained by 
claiming that the detection of inconsistencies was based on the plausibility of the causal 
mechanisms regardless of the participants’ causal theories of the disorders/diseases. 
Without an involvement of the participants’ causal theories, no interaction effect should 
have been found. Thus, the best account of the results in RTs is that the participants 
automatically activated their causal theories of the disorders/diseases mentioned in the 
preliminary information, and that the theories were rapidly and efficiently used to make 
inferences and to integrate information from later sentences, which led to a fast 
detection of inconsistencies. As in previous experiments, this speaks to the presence of 
System 1 processes of causal reasoning. 
A possible criticism concerning our interpretation of the results is that, according 
to such interpretation, a significant difference between the psychological disorder and 
the medical disease conditions should have been found within the psychological 
mechanism condition. Specifically, RTs should be longer in latter than in the former 
condition. However, such a straightforward comparison may be misleading given the 
large and robust main effect of Diagnosis on RTs. In general, the participants were 
slower in the psychological-disorder than in the medical-disease condition. As all 
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participants were Psychology students, they might have been more concerned for their 
performance in the former than in the latter condition. After all, Psychology students are 
expected to perform well on psychological rather than on medical diagnosis. This 
difference in the participants’ concern may well explain why they made a more careful 
reading in the psychological-disorder than in the medical-disease condition. 
Diagnostic judgements. A single mean diagnostic judgement was calculated for 
each participant in each of the four conditions by averaging across disorders/diseases. 
Table 7 shows the participants’ mean judgements in each condition. As expected, in the 
psychological diagnosis condition, the participants agreed with the previously given 
diagnosis to a greater extent when the mechanisms were psychological than when they 
were bio-medical. Conversely, in the medical diagnosis condition, the participants’ 
ratings were higher when the described mechanisms were bio-medical than when they 
were psychological. This interaction indicates that the participants agreed with the 
diagnosis to a greater extent in the consistent than in the inconsistent reports. This 
pattern was confirmed by a repeated measures ANOVA 2 (Diagnosis: Psychological 
disorder vs. medical disease) x 2 (Mechanism: Psychological mechanisms vs. bio-
medical mechanisms) on the participants’ diagnostic judgements, which yielded the 
significant main effects of Diagnosis, F (1, 33) = 97.25, MSE = 374.84; p < .001; η 2 = 
.75, and Mechanism, F (1, 33) = 9.90, MSE = 264.28; p = .003; η 2 = .23, as well as the 
significant interaction Diagnosis x Mechanism, F (1, 33) = 149.14, MSE = 263.87; p < 
.001; η 2 = .82. Further analyses of the simple effects of Mechanism within each level of 
Diagnosis revealed the significant effect of the former factor in the psychological 
diagnosis condition, t(33) = 10.93; p < .001; η 2 = .78, and in the medical diagnosis 
condition, t (33) = 6.36; p < .001; η 2 = .55. 
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Our results show that the participants’ diagnostic judgements were affected by 
several factors. First, they were affected by the coherence among the observed 
symptoms and the diagnosis regardless of mechanisms (main effect of diagnosis). As 
the main symptoms were diagnostic criteria of mental disorders, this effect is not 
surprising. Diagnostic judgements were also affected by the type of mechanism 
regardless of diagnosis. Given that main symptoms were diagnostic criteria and that 
symptoms connecting them were a mix of somatic and psychological symptoms, it 
seems that they were regarded to be more consistent with psychological than bio-
medical mechanisms. Most important, the interaction effect found shows that diagnostic 
judgements depended on the coherence among diagnosis, the causal theories connected 
with the diagnosis, which includes assumptions about the underlying mechanisms, and 
the observed symptoms and mechanisms. Focusing on the diagnosis of psychological 
disorders, the results show that assumptions about mechanisms strongly influence 
diagnosis even when the diagnostic criteria established by the DSM-IV are held 
constant.  
As in the previous experiments, the pattern of results found in diagnostic 
judgements fits quite well the pattern of results found in RTs. This again suggests that 
the causal reasoning processes that occur automatically when clinical reports are read 
may play an important role in later diagnostic judgements. It seems that the 
inconsistencies detected while intuitively processing the given information affect the 
explicit appraisal of diagnostic hypotheses, and this could be other indirect evidence 
that System 1 causal reasoning processes may have affected diagnostic judgements. 
However, this evidence is again indirect. 
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Treatment-decision judgements. Statistical analyses were conducted to test 
whether the participants’ preference for psychological vs. medical treatments depended 
on the causal mechanism described in the clinical reports regardless of the diagnosis 
received by the client. We expected higher ratings for the psychological treatment in the 
psychological than in the medical mechanism condition. The opposite pattern of results 
was expected to be found concerning the ratings received by the medical treatment. 
As the judgements for each type of treatment were complementary, we analysed 
the participants’ preference for the psychological treatment. Thus, a rating of 30 would 
imply that the medical treatment received a rating of 70. As in the case of RTs and 
diagnosis, a single mean decision judgement per condition and participant was 
calculated. The analyses reported have been conducted on these means. Table 7 shows 
the participants’ mean judgements in each condition. The participants gave higher 
ratings to the psychological treatment in the psychological mechanism than in the 
medical mechanism condition. Complementarily, the medical treatment received higher 
ratings in the medical mechanism than in the psychological mechanism condition. 
Importantly, the difference between the psychological and the medical mechanism 
condition did not seem to have been modulated by the diagnosis received by the client. 
This was confirmed by a repeated measures ANOVA 2 (Diagnosis: Psychological 
diagnosis vs. medical diagnosis) x 2 (Mechanism: Psychological mechanism vs. 
medical mechanism) on the participants’ judgements, which yielded the significant 
main effect of Mechanism, F (1, 33) = 140.26, MSE = 210.39; p < .001; ŋ2 = .81. The 
effect of Diagnosis was only marginally significant [F (1, 33) = 3.91, MSE = 230.11; p 
= .056], and the interaction was not significant [F (1, 33) = 1.77]. 
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As expected, the participants’ decisions about treatment were affected by the 
causal mechanism that explained how symptoms developed. In the medical mechanism 
condition, the participants’ preference for the psychological treatment decreased, 
whereas the preference for the medical treatment increased. This suggests that the 
description provided about the mechanisms through the clinical reports were interpreted 
as intended. 
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The main objective of the present study was to show that not only slow and 
deliberative reasoning processes, identified as System 2 processes by Kahneman & 
Frederick (2002), can be at work in diagnostic judgements. Fast and on-line reasoning 
processes with the properties attributed to System 1 may also be at work. At the same 
time, we have gone to some length to show that these System 1 processes can be 
affected by diagnosticians’ causal theories. As mentioned in the Introduction, causal 
reasoning is crucial to make accurate inferences, to choose effective interventions, and 
plays an important role in comprehension processes in many different situations. 
However, when it comes to the diagnosis of mental disorders, clinicians are trained to 
use the DSM diagnostic criteria without taking into account their causal theories or their 
causal beliefs about how symptoms are linked to each other. Therefore, the diagnosis of 
mental disorders is an interesting situation to test how strong is our tendency to rely on 
our causal beliefs, and whether such reliance could bias our diagnostic judgements, 
thereby causing some departure from the DSM prescriptions. 
 The objective stated above was divided up into four experimental questions. The 
first question was whether we could replicate the diagnostic bias based on the causal 
status effect found by Kim & Ahn (2002), and whether we could find evidence of the 
involvement of System 1 causal reasoning processes in the commission of such bias. 
The second question was whether we could find more compelling evidence for the role 
of causal reasoning processes in biases in the diagnosis of mental disorders by showing 
the influence of information regarding the temporal order in which symptoms develop 
and the causal connections between them. Again, we also aimed to find evidence 
demonstrating the implication of System 1 causal reasoning processes in such bias. The 
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third question was whether biases in diagnostic judgements were based on System 1 
computation of causal coherence, and to see whether, contrary to the previous 
experiments, we could demonstrate such causal reasoning influence on Psychology 
students. The fourth question was to what extent information regarding causal 
mechanisms is also involved in System 1 causal reasoning, and, thus, could also be 
responsible for the commission of biases in diagnostic judgements. Experiment 1, 
Experiment 2, Experiment 3 and Experiment 4 were focused on these four questions, 
respectively. In all of the experiments, the study of System 1 causal reasoning processes 
was based on the detection of fast, on-line reasoning processes during reading of clinical 
reports. The on-line technique relied upon RT measures of sentences subjected to the 
manipulation of consistency according to the inconsistency paradigm in reading 
comprehension. 
In Experiment 1, we created different levels of inconsistencies based on the use 
of target sentences stating the absence of either central- or peripheral-cause symptoms 
in the clinical reports. All inconsistencies, though, involved the absence of diagnostic 
criteria of equal importance according to DSM-IV. The results showed a general 
inconsistency effect in both samples of participants (i.e., Psychology students and 
experienced clinicians) in the sense that RTs for the target sentences were longer in the 
inconsistent condition than in the control (or neutral) condition. Second, only in 
experienced clinicians, the inconsistency effect was modulated by the causal status of 
the symptom referred to in the target sentence. Specifically, the inconsistent effect 
detected was of a greater magnitude when the target sentence referred to the absence a 
central-cause symptom than when it referred to the absence a peripheral-cause 
symptom. Third, in all cases, RTs results were congruent with the diagnostic 
judgements obtained. Both students and clinicians gave lower judgements of agreement 
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with the diagnosis provided in the inconsistent than in the control condition. Only 
within the sample of experienced clinicians, these judgements showed an inconsistency 
effect modulated by the symptom causal status, that is, a greater inconsistency effect in 
the causal than in the peripheral symptom. 
In Experiment 2, we manipulated the information concerning the temporal 
sequence of symptoms and the causal connections between them. As in 
Experiment 1, Experiment 2 was carried out both with students and experienced 
clinicians. The results found with students showed that their diagnostic judgements 
were affected by information about the temporal sequence of symptoms together 
with information about causal connections. Specifically, students agreed on the 
diagnosis received by the hypothetical patients to a greater extent when the 
temporal sequence of symptoms and the causal connections between them were 
consistent with the entertained causal theories of the diagnosed disorders than 
when the information provided was inconsistent with such theories. Also, students 
spent more time in the diagnostic judgement in the inconsistent non-causal than in 
the consistent causal condition. However, we did not find convincing evidence of 
fast and on-line causal reasoning processes in this sample, as the time spent 
reading the target sentences conveying information about the temporal sequence of 
symptoms seemed to be unaffected by whether the temporal order was consistent 
or inconsistent with the causal theory of the disorder mentioned in the preliminary 
information of the clinical report. The results found in experienced clinicians also 
showed a greater agreement on the diagnosis received by the hypothetical client in 
the consistent causal condition than in the inconsistent non-causal condition. 
Clinicians also took longer in the diagnostic judgement task in the latter than in the 
former condition, suggesting that they were trying to solve the causal 
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inconsistencies found in the clinical report before making the judgement. 
Additionally, we found evidence of fast and on-line causal reasoning, as evidenced 
by the clinicians’ RTs for the target sentences. Specifically, RTs were significantly 
longer when the information was inconsistent than when it was consistent with 
causal theories of the disorder with which the hypothetical client had been 
diagnosed. 
In Experiment 3, advanced Psychology students read clinical reports providing 
information about the presence or absence of three symptoms considered as diagnostic 
criteria according to the DSM-IV. The students had been previously trained on causal 
theories of the mental disorders used in our experiment according to which the 
symptoms formed part of a causal chain of the sort S1→S2→S3. Inconsistencies were 
created by providing preliminary information about the disorder that the hypothetical 
client had been diagnosed with and by including a sentence stating the absence of one of 
the symptoms. The most compelling evidence of on-line causal reasoning was that RTs 
were slowed down when participants read a sentence stating the presence of a symptom 
when its causal antecedent was absent. This result indicated that the participants 
detected a causal inconsistency as, according to the supposedly entertained causal 
theory, given the absence of the causal antecedent, the following symptom in the causal 
chain should not have occurred. The pattern of diagnostic judgements conformed to the 
predictions from the causal model theory (Rehder, 2001, Rehder & Hastie, 2004, 
Rehder & Kim, 2010), according to which, diagnostic (categorical) judgements are the 
result of the computation of coherence. Finally, the fact that the inconsistency effects 
found in RTs were consistent with the participants’ diagnostic judgements suggests that 
the computation of coherence relied upon System 1 processes of causal reasoning, 
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which took place during reading in an on-line manner. Such processes are also likely to 
have played an important role in the participants’ judgements. 
In Experiment 4, we searched for evidence supporting the idea that causal 
reasoning is intimately related to the notion of causal mechanism (Ahn & Bailenson, 
1996; Ahn & Kalish, 2000; Ahn et al., 1995). To achieve this aim, Psychology students 
previously trained on the disorders used read clinical reports informing about the 
presence of three symptoms that, as in Experiment 3, formed part of a causal chain that, 
in this case, was made explicit. Two factors were orthogonally manipulated: the causal 
mechanism leading from one symptom to the next in the causal chain, and the diagnosis 
received by the client, which was stated at the beginning of the clinical report. The 
results found in RTs revealed that the participants relied on causal reasoning processes 
based on their beliefs about the causal mechanisms underlying the different disorders. 
This conclusion is supported by the longer RTs found for the sentences informing about 
bio-medical mechanisms compared with the sentences informing about the 
psychological mechanisms provided that the client had been diagnosed with a mental 
disorder. This result cannot be explained by invoking causal beliefs independent from 
the participants’ beliefs about mental disorders because the difference between RTs was 
reverted when the hypothetical client had been diagnosed with a medical disease. The 
pattern of results found in the diagnostic judgement task was the same as in the reading 
task, which suggests again that the on-line and fast causal reasoning processes that took 
place during reading could have had a determinant impact on diagnostic judgements. 
Finally, the results from the treatment-decision making task corroborated that the 
descriptions given for the psychological and the medical mechanism were interpreted as 
such by the participants. Specifically, the psychological treatment received higher 
ratings in the psychological than in the medical mechanism condition, whereas the 
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reverse pattern of result was found regarding the ratings received by the medical 
treatment. 
The pattern of results found in the present experimental series is very consistent 
in showing that both clinicians and Psychology students engage in very fast, on-line 
reasoning processes, which can be assimilated to Kahneman and Frederick’s (2002) 
System 1, during fluent reading of clinical reports for a later diagnostic decision. Such 
reasoning processes involved fast retrieval of causal theories about mental disorders 
from memory as well as fast inference processes that were shown to be crucial for 
computing the coherence of the information provided. Such processes are likely to rely 
upon coherence-driven processes based on activation processes as those that are 
characteristic of dynamic neural networks. Interestingly, our experimental series 
provides converging evidence demonstrating that System 1 reasoning processes 
responsible for the computation of coherence rely on causal theories of mental 
disorders, which establish the way in which some symptoms give rise to others. The 
reasoners’ reliance on causal theories through fast, on-line reasoning processes has been 
demonstrated through several manipulations that, taken together, have produced a 
strongly consistent pattern of results. Additionally, we have found a persistent 
consistency between the fast, on-line reasoning processes detected through on-line 
measures and the participants’ diagnostic judgements after the reading task, except for 
the results from students in Experiment 2. This consistency suggests that very early and 
fast System 1 processes based on causal reasoning may have biased System 2 processes 
that could be at work during the diagnostic judgement task. 
An issue that deserves some attention is that we could only find evidence of 
System 1 causal reasoning in students in Experiments 3 and 4 but not in Experiments 1 
 CAUSAL REASONING IN CLINICAL DECISION MAKING: EVIDENCE FROM ON-LINE AND OFF-LINE MEASURES 
 
116 
 
and 2. We could consider two possible explanations. On the one hand, the causal 
connections between symptoms in the clinical reports of Experiments 3 and 4 could be 
self-evident compared to the remaining experiments. Thus, the activation of causal 
features in a fast and on-line manner could have been promoted compared with 
Experiments 1 and 2. In fact, in the case of Experiments 3 and 4, students had been 
previously trained on the causal theories on which we based our manipulations. Of 
course, this is not to say that students and clinicians are equally skilled, but they could 
be, at least in Experiments 3 and 4, comparable in terms of the involvement of System 1 
processes of causal reasoning. On the other hand, students might have been less 
committed to building a coherent mental model of the clinical reports for 
comprehension purposes. Thus, they might have detected inconsistencies through 
System 1 processes but, nonetheless kept on reading at a normal speed without 
dedicating extra time and resources to solve such inconsistencies. This explanation may 
well be especially pertinent regarding Experiment 2, where the students were shown to 
have been engaged in causal reasoning during the diagnostic judgement task. 
This study leaves many interesting questions unresolved. One of them is the role 
of the clinicians’ theoretical approach in causal reasoning. Given that the theories on 
which we based our manipulations come from the cognitive behavioral approach, one 
may expect to find that the effects of such manipulations are modulated by clinicians’ 
theoretical approaches. Unfortunately, the number of clinicians with non-cognitive-
behavioral approaches who participated in Experiment 1 and 2 was very small, 
precluding our assessment of this modulating role. However, future experiments may be 
conducted to answer this question. A related question is the source of clinicians’ causal 
theories. Given that our manipulation was based on theories within the cognitive-
behavioral framework (especially in Experiments 2 through 4) taught at academic 
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institutions, it is tempting to conclude that clinicians’ and students’ causal theories come 
from this academic instruction. However, it should be acknowledged that the disorders 
that were used to design the clinical reports are highly prevalent in the population and 
well known through the media. In this sense, it remains to be determined whether the 
same results hold for less known and less frequent mental disorders.  
One limitation of Experiments 3 and 4 is that they do not allow to generalize the 
findings to the population of clinicians. It may be argued that if our experiments had been 
conducted with clinicians, they would have behaved more in accordance with the DSM-
IV diagnostic criteria and prescriptions. In other words, clinicians’ extended practice in 
the use of the DSM-IV might make them less prone to biases due to System 1 causal 
reasoning processes in the diagnosis of mental disorders. However, Experiments 1 and 2 
suggest that clinicians are also subjected to biases produced by causal reasoning 
processes, which are likely to rely upon System 1, in the diagnosis of mental disorders 
from the DSM-IV. Additionally, previous studies with clinicians have provided evidence 
for the lack of adherence to previous versions of the DSM (see Davis et al., 1993; Garb, 
1996; Rubinson et al., 1988). Furthermore, Kahneman (2011) pointed that, although 
expert intuition can certainly be very accurate, even experts remain at risk of generating 
and falling for spurious intuitions. Taking into account these considerations, we think that 
the results found in Experiment 3 and 4 are very likely to be replicated in a sample of 
clinicians. A new study aimed to assess this prediction would be very interesting and 
useful to get to know the processes responsible for clinicians’ lack of adherence to the 
DSM-IV in some circumstances. 
Finally, another concern about our study that may be raised is that causal 
reasoning could have been induced by some procedural aspects of the experiments that 
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may affect their ecological validity. Specifically, in Experiment 3, participants had to 
perform a causal judgement task, whereas, in Experiment 4, the clinical reports included 
information about the causal mechanism responsible for the development of the 
symptoms. It may be argued that neither of these circumstances is very common in 
clinicians’ daily professional experience, although it is not easy to find evidence 
supporting this claim. The same claim may be made of many previous studies. Most of 
the experiments that have been conducted to assess the role of causal reasoning include 
procedural aspects that may be viewed as even more uncommon than our procedure in 
real environments. For example, in some studies, participants are provided with 
information about causal theories through verbal instructions or are asked to make 
explicit their own causal beliefs to assess the role of causal reasoning in tasks as diverse 
as diagnostic judgement (Kim and Ahn, 2002), diagnostic reasoning (Kim & Keil, 
2003), treatment efficacy judgement (Kwaadsteniet et al., 2010; Yopchick & Kim, 
2009), judgement of the need for psychological treatment (Kim & LoSavio, 2009), or 
information seeking (Kim, Yopchick, & Kwaadsteniet, 2008). It is largely known that 
the experimental approach to the study of cognitive processes, in general, tend to lack 
ecological validity. In our view, it is important to overcome this shortcoming in future 
research on causal reasoning in clinical tasks. Otherwise, it will remain to be unknown 
whether the effects of System 1 causal reasoning found in our experiments are the result 
of artificial laboratory preparations or a common tendency in clinical psychologists’ 
environments. 
The persistent tendency to use causal reasoning conflicts with both DSM-IV 
recommendations and with how clinicians are trained to use this resource. It therefore 
appears that clinicians’ initial training regarding DSM-IV prescriptions of not relying on 
causal theories is not sufficient to prevent them from using causal reasoning when 
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performing clinical tasks. Our results suggest that one explanation for this difficulty may 
be that clinicians are not overtly aware of their use of causal theories. The involvement of 
System 1 causal reasoning that appears to have occurred during the reading task suggests 
that very rapid, efficient, and semiautomatic processes may have been at work. If such is 
the case, clinicians’ training should be supplemented by training in causal reasoning that 
is aimed at describing the different and (occasionally) subtle ways in which it can 
influence judgements and decisions in the clinical context, especially in cases of patients 
who are potentially suffering from DSM-IV disorders. It is beyond the scope of the 
present study to assess whether causal reasoning helps clinicians or is a source of errors 
that should be avoided when dealing with the diagnosis of mental disorders. In any case, 
training in causal reasoning should help clinicians gain further control of their reasoning 
and decision making. Furthermore, according to Kahneman (2011), the more we know 
about the activities and biases of System 1, the more aware we will be of how this system 
works and how it influences and misleads System 2. In addition, System 2 can be trained 
to improve (e. g. calculating probabilities and statistics). 
Our results also appear to have interesting implications for evidence-based clinical 
practice, specifically for the application of empirically supported treatments (EST). 
According to the American Psychological Association, ESTs are currently considered to 
be the best methods for addressing the treatment of mental disorders and patients’ 
behavioral problems. Although ESTs are quite standardized, there is evidence 
demonstrating that clinicians have difficulties in following the indications that are 
prescribed in textbooks (Waller, 2009) and tend to adapt the treatments to either the 
patients’ individual characteristics (McHugh, Murray & Barlow, 2009) or to the 
clinicians’ case formulation, even when such formulations are not explicit or structured 
(Pain, Chadwick & Abba, 2008; Persons, 2006). Moreover, this tendency has been 
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considered to be inevitable by other clinicians (Persons, 2005). Our results suggest that 
causal theories, which appear to be readily available in the clinician’s mind and used 
through System 1 processes, may play an important role in clinical case formulations 
(Eells, 2007). Such clinical case formulations would in turn be responsible for the 
difficulties that are experienced by clinicians when attempting to strictly follow the 
treatment protocol, especially when the theory on which the EST is based differs from the 
clinician’s causal theory (Anderson & Strupp, 1996; Beutler, 1999). Thus, clinicians’ 
application of ESTs may benefit from a certain degree of training in causal reasoning that 
is aimed to make clinicians aware of the different and subtle ways in which it can affect 
treatment decision making and treatment application. 
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Appendix A 
 
Target sentences used to create central and peripheral inconsistencies in the 
experimental and control clinical reports in Experiment 1. 
 
        Diagnosis 
                                                        Target sentences 
        Absence of the central symptom            Absence of the peripheral symptom
 
Major Depressive 
Disorder 
 
 
“He has been in a good mood lately” 
 
“He has maintained his weight during all 
this time” 
Avoidant Personality 
Disorder 
 
“He is convinced of being interesting, 
competent and appealing” 
“He gets easily involved in new 
activities” 
Borderline Personality 
Disorder  
 
“He has an adequate and stable identity  
sense” 
“He does not have auto-destructive 
behaviors or thoughts” 
Schizophrenia “His sensorial perception is in accordance 
with the reality” 
 
“He expresses in a clear and coherent 
way” 
Specific Phobia 
(Claustrophobia) 
“He does not have exaggerated or irrational 
reactions in anticipation of specific 
situations”  
“He thinks his reactions are reasonable 
and adjusted to the situation that cause 
them” 
 
Antisocial Personality 
Disorder 
“He is a sincere and honest person” “He has just been 17 years old” 
 
  
APPENDIX 
 
141 
 
Appendix B 
 
Example of the four types of clinical reports used in Experiment 1. 
 
Example of inconsistent clinical report whose symptom used to the elaboration of the 
target sentence is a central symptom of the Major Depressive Disorder: 
 
P. went to see a clinical psychologist to request some help. After an exhaustive 
assessment process, he was diagnosed with Major Depressive Disorder. He goes to 
consultation wearing blue jeans and a simple t-shirt. Since some weeks he cannot avoid 
to have excessive feelings of guilt almost every day. He tells that he has got as pet a 
pedigree dog that was given to him recently. P. tells not having any pleasure in the 
activities that he does in his daily life the great part of time. He lives in a semidetached 
house in a calm place in the suburbs of the city. He has sleep problems, like insomnia, 
and he wakes up easily several times during night. Some difficulties in focusing 
attention have exerted a negative influence in his job. His problem affects his 
relationships with people around him. P. likes computers very much and computers 
have much to do with his job. He works as a computer programmer in an important 
company in his city. He has no problem with getting to work as he lives very near his 
job. It is his office where he spends most of the time when he is outside home. He has 
been in a good mood lately. The clinician states that giving suitable psychological care 
to the patient would be important. 
 
Example of control clinical report whose symptom used to the elaboration of the target 
sentence is a central symptom of the Major Depressive Disorder: 
 
D. decided to see a clinical psychologist because he suffered from some problems. After 
an exhaustive assessment process, he was diagnosed with Cannabis Dependence 
Disorder. He goes to consultation wearing informal clothes and back sport shoes. He 
needs bigger and bigger amounts of the substance to get the wanted effects. He tells he 
has got a big collection of tin figures painted by hand. D. has to have cannabis to avoid 
the abstinence symptoms. He has lived in a shared rent flat with a friend for long time. 
He has been having the substance more time than he expected and in bigger amounts. 
Some difficulties in focusing attention have exerted a negative influence in his job. His 
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problem affects his relationships with people around him. D. works part-time in a 
vehicle repair shop for two weeks ago. He goes to his job by bus every day because it is 
far away. He does not work long hours at day, but he spends his free time in something 
useful at least. He has always liked cars and working with them motivates him. He has 
been in a good mood lately. The clinician states that giving suitable psychological care 
to the patient would be important. 
 
Example of inconsistent clinical report whose symptom used to the elaboration of the 
target sentence is a peripheral symptom of the Major Depressive Disorder: 
 
G. went to see a clinical psychologist to request some help. After an exhaustive 
assessment process, he was diagnosed with Major Depressive Disorder. He goes to 
consultation wearing blue jeans and a simple t-shirt. Since some weeks he cannot avoid 
to have excessive feelings of guilt almost every day. He tells he has got a garden where 
he cultivates his own fruits and vegetables. G. tells not having any pleasure in the 
activities that he does in his daily life the great part of time. He lives in a semidetached 
house with his elder brother and his wife. He has sleep problems, like insomnia, and he 
wakes up easily several times during night. Some difficulties in focusing attention have 
exerted a negative influence in his job. His problem affects his relationships with people 
around him. G. has got a small place to sell fruits in the market of his city. Daily he has 
his family’s help when he has more work. This is not a hard work and it let to know and 
be in contact with neighbors. All his products are varied, of good quality and are sold 
well. He has maintained his weight during all this time. His psychologist hopes a good 
collaboration. 
 
Example of control clinical report whose symptom used to the elaboration of the target 
sentence is a peripheral symptom of the Major Depressive Disorder: 
 
F. decided to see a clinical psychologist because he suffered from some problems. After 
an exhaustive assessment process, he was diagnosed with Cannabis Dependence 
Disorder. He goes to consultation wearing baggy trousers and a waistcoat of the same 
color. He needs bigger and bigger amounts of the substance to get the wanted effects. 
He tells he has got a German shepherd that was given to him in his birthday. F has to 
have cannabis to avoid the abstinence symptoms. He lives in a small flat in the suburbs 
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since he started his studies in the high school. He has been having the substance more 
time than he expected and in bigger amounts. Some difficulties in focusing attention 
have exerted a negative influence in his job. His problem affects his relationships with 
people around him. F. works some hours at week in a carpenter’s workshop to make up 
for his expenses. He shares his job with three partners and the boss. He makes 
wardrobes, tables, all type of chairs and tapestries. It is an easy work and it has not 
been very hard to learn the basic things of the job. He has maintained his weight during 
all this time. His psychologist hopes a good collaboration. 
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Appendix C 
 
Target sentences of consistent and inconsistent reports in Experiment 2. 
 
Diagnosis 
                                                        Target sentences 
        Consistent report            Inconsistent report 
 
Anorexia  
Nervosa 
 
"At first I started to get distressed about the possibility 
of becoming fat " 
"Some time later, I started to refuse to eat " 
"Eventually, my period stopped” 
 
 
"At first, my period stopped " 
"Some time later, I started to refuse to eat " 
"Eventually, I have started to get distressed about the 
possibility of becoming fat " 
Major  
Depressive  
Disorder 
"At first I started to feel very bad with myself because 
all things happened in my family" 
"Some time later, I started to feel apathy for 
everything" 
"Eventually, I have started to have problems to sleep" 
 
"At first I started to have problems to sleep" 
" Some time later, I started to feel apathy for everything " 
"Eventually, I have started to feel very bad with myself 
because all things happened in my family " 
 
Anxiety  
Generalized 
Disorder 
"At first I started to have continues worries that I didn’t 
know how to control" 
"Some time later, I started to feel breathlessness, 
unease and palpitations that appeared in any moment" 
"Eventually, I have started to have sensations of  
tiredness and lack of energy" 
 
"At first I started to have sensations of  tiredness and lack of 
energy" 
"Some time later, I started to feel breathlessness, unease and 
palpitations that appeared in any moment" 
"Eventually, I have started to have continues worries that I 
don’t know how to control " 
Obsessive 
Compulsive 
Disorder 
"At first I started to worry continually about seeing any 
thing dirty"  
"Some time later, I started to not stop cleaning and 
checking everything is clean" 
"Eventually, I have started to feel unease because no 
time to family and work" 
 
"At first I started to feel unease because no time to family and 
work" 
"Some time later, I started to not stop cleaning and checking 
everything is clean" 
"Eventually, I have started to worry continually about seeing 
any thing dirty" 
Posttraumatic  
Stress Disorder 
"At first I started to be very nervous about the car 
accident that I had" 
"Some time later, I started to try everything to not think 
about the car accident that I had" 
"Eventually, I have started to feel unease because I feel 
discouraged and unable to drive a car” 
 
"At first I started to feel unease because I feel discouraged and 
unable to drive a car” 
"Some time later, I started to try everything to not think about 
the car accident that I had" 
"Eventually, I have started to be very nervous about the car 
accident that I had" 
Specific Phobia  "At first I started to feel a lot of worries and unease 
when I meet a dog” 
"Some time later, I started to try not to walk for places 
like parks and residential areas" 
"Eventually, I have started to feel worry and unease 
about the idea of leaving home” 
"At first I started to feel worry and unease about the idea of 
leaving home” 
"Some time later, I started to try not to walk for places like 
parks and residential areas" 
"Eventually, I have started to feel a lot of worries and unease 
when I meet a dog” 
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Appendix D 
 
Example of the two types of clinical reports used in Experiment 2. 
 
Example of consistent causal clinical report, where the order of the symptoms is 
coherent to the order proposed by the theory of the Anorexia Nervosa Disorder and the 
causal connection between symptoms is showed: 
 
P. decided to see a clinical psychologist because she suffered from some problems. 
After the assessment process, she was diagnosed with Anorexia Nervosa. In what 
follows, it is provided some of P.’s verbal expressions that the clinician considered 
relevant. "At first I started to get distressed about the possibility of becoming fat"."Some 
time later, I started to refuse to eat"."Eventually, my period stopped". After the 
assessment process, a second clinician found that the events mentioned were strongly 
related, so that the distress about the possibility of becoming fat originated the refuse to 
eat which, in turn, made the period stop in the long run. 
 
Example of inconsistent no-causal clinical report, where the order of the symptoms is 
incoherent to the order proposed by the theory of the Anorexia Nervosa Disorder and 
non causal connection between symptoms is showed: 
 
S. decided to see a clinical psychologist because she suffered from some problems. After 
the assessment process, she was diagnosed with Anorexia Nervosa. In what follows, it is 
provided some of S.’s verbal expressions that the clinician considered relevant. "At 
first, my period stopped"." Some time later, I started to refuse to eat"."Eventually, I 
have started to get distressed about the possibility of becoming fat". After the 
assessment process, a second clinician could not find any relationship between the 
events mentioned: the distress about the possibility of becoming fat, the refuse to eat, 
and the interruption of the period. 
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Appendix E 
 
Questions about treatments used in Experiment 2. 
 
ANOREXIA NERVOSA:  
“To what extent do you think that a progesterone-based hormonal treatment will 
resolve, in the short-, medium-, or long-term, the following problems?” 
“To what extent do you think that a treatment focused in comparing the perception of 
the figure drawing  with a real and objective vision of it will resolve, in the short-, 
medium-, or long-term, the following problems?” 
“To what extent do you think that a treatment that face with the possibility of getting 
weight, teaching to face with consequences, will resolve, in the short-, medium-, or 
long-term, the following problems?” 
 
MAJOR DEPRESSIVE DISORDER: 
“To what extent do you think that a treatment benzodiazepines will resolve, in the short-
, medium-, or long-term, the following problems?” 
“To what extent do you think that a treatment focused in looking for motivation for 
hobbies and daily activities will resolve, in the short-, medium-, or long-term, the 
following problems?” 
“To what extent do you think that a treatment focused in the attributive style of the 
patient and self-esteem will resolve, in the short-, medium-, or long-term, the following 
problems?” 
 
ANXIETY GENERALIZED DISORDER: 
“To what extent do you think that a medical treatment with dietary supplement and 
energetic will resolve, in the short-, medium-, or long-term, the following problems?” 
“To what extent do you think that a treatment based on control of activation, as relaxing 
and breathing activities, will resolve, in the short-, medium-, or long-term, the following 
problems?” 
“To what extent do you think that a treatment based on techniques of stop and changing 
of thoughts will resolve, in the short-, medium-, or long-term, the following problems?” 
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OBSESSIVE COMPULSIVE DISORDER: 
“To what extent do you think that a treatment focused in learning guidelines of time 
organization and management will resolve, in the short-, medium-, or long-term, the 
following problems?” 
“To what extent do you think that a treatment of exposition with response prevention 
will resolve, in the short-, medium-, or long-term, the following problems?” 
“To what extent do you think that a treatment focused in intrusive-thoughts control 
techniques will resolve, in the short-, medium-, or long-term, the following problems?” 
 
POSTTRAUMATIC-STRESS DISORDER: 
 “To what extent do you think that treatment based in strengthen self-esteem and in 
objective demonstration of own capacities will resolve, in the short-, medium-, or long-
term, the following problems?” 
“To what extent do you think that a treatment focused in exposition to specific thoughts 
and in thoughts control techniques will resolve, in the short-, medium-, or long-term, 
the following problems?” 
“To what extent do you think that a treatment focused in learning relaxing and 
breathing techniques will resolve, in the short-, medium-, or long-term, the following 
problems?” 
 
 SPECIFIC PHOBIA: 
“To what extent do you think that a treatment focused in progressive exposition to 
outside situations (cinema, bars, shops) will resolve, in the short-, medium-, or long-
term, the following problems?” 
“To what extent do you think that a treatment focused in progressive exposition to 
situations where there is a high probability of dogs (parks, residential places, 
veterinary) will resolve, in the short-, medium-, or long-term, the following problems?” 
“To what extent do you think that a treatment focused in progressive presence and 
interaction with dogs will resolve, in the short-, medium-, or long-term, the following 
problems?” 
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Appendix F 
 
Target sentences of the reports used in Experiment 3. 
 
    Diagnosis 
                                                        Target sentences 
Patient 1 Patient 2 Patient 3 
 
Depression 
 
“She thinks that all good things 
happen to her wherever” 
“She never feels like going out or 
seeing her friends” 
“She is socially isolated and has 
many social problems” 
 
 
“She thinks that all bad things 
happen to her wherever” 
“She often feels like going out or 
seeing her friends” 
“She is socially isolated and has 
many social problems”  
 
 
“She thinks that all bad things 
happen to her wherever” 
“She never feels like going out or 
seeing her friends” 
“She is socially integrated and has 
no social problems” 
 
Specific phobia “He had sweet experiences with 
dogs when he was a child” 
“He feels very anxious when he is 
close to a dog” 
“He very rarely spends time near 
pet shops or parks” 
 
“He had bad experiences with 
dogs when he was a child” 
“He feels very comfortable when 
he is close to a dog” 
“He very rarely spends time near 
pet shops or parks” 
 
“He had bad experiences with dogs 
when he was a child” 
“He feels very anxious when he is 
close of a dog” 
“He very often spends time near 
pet shops or parks” 
 
Obsessive-
compulsive 
disorder 
“He is left indifferent to 
bacterial infections” 
“He washes his hands about 40 
times per day” 
“He has strong problems at the 
workplace because of lack of 
time” 
 
“He is very anxious to bacterial 
infections” 
“He washes his hands about 4 
times per day” 
“He has strong problems at the 
workplace because of lack of 
time” 
 
“He is very anxious to bacterial 
infections” 
“He washes his hands about 40 
times per day” 
“He can solve problems at the 
workplace because of disposition 
of time” 
 
 
Note. Translated from German. 
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Appendix G 
 
Example of the three types of clinical reports used in Experiment 3. 
 
Example of clinical report in the Patient 1 condition, where the absent symptom was S1. 
The symptoms formed part of a causal chain model that participants were expected to 
entertain: S1→S2→S3. 
 
Jan goes to therapy because he’s worried about his problem. After an evaluation 
process, Jan receives a diagnosis of specific phobia. He had sweet experiences with 
dogs when he was a child. He feels very anxious when he is close to dogs. He stops very 
rarely near to pet shops or parks. His psychologist tells him that needs his 
collaboration. 
 
Example of clinical report in Patient 2, where the absent symptom is S2 in a causal 
chain S1→S2→S3: 
 
Sarah needs professional help for her problem. After of evaluation, Sarah receives a 
diagnosis of specific phobia. She had bad experiences with dogs when was a child. She 
feels very comfortable when is close to some dog. She stops very rarely near to pet 
shops or parks. Both decide to begin the treatment the next session. 
 
Example of clinical report in Patient 3, where the absent symptom is S3 in a causal 
chain S1→S2→S3: 
 
Stefan considers that has a problem and goes to therapy. After of evaluation, Stefan 
receives a diagnosis of specific phobia. He had bad experiences with dogs when was a 
child. He feels very anxious when is close of some dog. He stops very frequently near to 
pet shops or parks. His psychologist says collaboration of both will be necessary. 
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Appendix H 
 
Target sentences of the four types of clinical reports used in Experiment 4. 
 Target sentences 
 Mechanism Psychological Mechanism Bio-medical 
 
Diagnosis 
Psychological: 
ANOREXIA 
 
“The diagnosis made by a professional was anorexia nervosa” 
“Firstly, the patient showed a high anxiety about the 
possibility of gaining weight” 
“The high anxiety caused aversion to food” 
“The aversion to food produced an important loss of weight” 
“The loss of weight caused a strong hormonal change” 
“The hormonal change produced amenorrhea”  
 
“The diagnosis made by a professional was anorexia nervosa” 
“Firstly, the patient showed a high anxiety about the 
possibility of gaining weight” 
“The high anxiety caused a  stomach bleeding problem” 
“The stomach problem produced an important loss of weight” 
“The loss of weight led to the use of pharmacological digestive 
treatment” 
“The pharmacological treatment produced amenorrhea” 
 
Diagnosis 
Medical: 
STOMACH 
ULCER 
 
“The diagnosis made by a professional was stomach ulcer” 
“Firstly, the patient showed a high anxiety about the 
possibility of gaining weight” 
“The high anxiety caused aversion to food” 
“The aversion to food produced an important loss of weight” 
“The loss of weight caused a strong hormonal change” 
“The hormonal change produced amenorrhea” 
 
“The diagnosis made by a professional was stomach ulcer” 
“Firstly, the patient showed a high anxiety about the 
possibility of gaining weight” 
“The high anxiety caused a bleeding stomach problem” 
“The stomach problem produced an important loss of weight” 
“The loss of weight caused the use of pharmacological digestive 
treatment” 
“The pharmacological treatment produced amenorrhea” 
 
Diagnosis 
Psychological: 
GENERALIZED 
ANXIETY 
DISORDER 
 
“The diagnosis made by a professional was generalized 
anxiety disorder” 
“Firstly, the patient experienced some difficulty to deal with 
permanent worries” 
“The difficulty to deal with permanent worries caused a 
permanent alert state” 
“The permanent alert state produced easy fatigability, 
muscular tension, and restlessness” 
“The fatigability, muscular tension, and restlessness led to the 
ingestion of anxiolytics” 
“The use of anxiolytics produced sleep alterations” 
 
“The diagnosis made by a professional was generalized anxiety 
disorder” 
“Firstly, the patient experienced some difficulty to deal with 
permanent worries” 
“The difficulty to deal with permanent worries caused strong 
headaches” 
“The strong headaches produced easy fatigability, muscular 
tension, and restlessness” 
“The fatigability, muscular tension, and restlessness led to use 
symptomatic treatment for migraine” 
“The migraine symptoms produced sleep alterations” 
 
Diagnosis 
Medical: 
MIGRAINE 
 
“The diagnosis made by a professional was migraine” 
“Firstly, the patient experienced some difficulty to deal with 
permanent worries” 
“The difficulty to deal with permanent worries caused a 
permanent alert state” 
“The permanent alert state produced easy fatigability, 
muscular tension, and restlessness” 
“The fatigability, muscular tension, and restlessness led to the 
ingestion of anxiolytics” 
“The use of anxiolytics produced sleep alterations” 
 
“The diagnosis made by a professional was migraine” 
“Firstly, the patient experienced some difficulty to deal with 
permanent worries” 
“The difficulty to deal with permanent worries caused strong 
headaches” 
“The strong headaches produced easy fatigability, muscular 
tension, and restlessness” 
“The fatigability, muscular tension, and restlessness led to use 
symptomatic treatment for migraine” 
“The migraine symptoms produced sleep alterations” 
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Diagnosis 
Psychological: 
SOCIAL 
PHOBIA 
 
“The diagnosis made by a professional was social phobia” 
“Firstly, the patient suffered afraid to feel ashamed in social 
situations” 
“The fear of feeling embarrassing caused inability to control 
the anxiety” 
“The inability to control the anxiety produced avoidance of 
social situations” 
“The avoidance of social situations caused repeated absences 
from work” 
“The repeated absences from work produced working 
problems” 
 
“The diagnosis made by a professional was social phobia” 
“Firstly,  the patient suffered afraid to feel ashamed in social 
situations ” 
“The fear of feeling embarrassing caused deterioration of his 
skin marks” 
“The deterioration of his skin marks produced avoidance of 
social situations” 
“The avoidance of social situations caused repeated absences 
from work for his disease” 
“The repeated absences from work for his disease produced 
working problems” 
 
Diagnosis 
Medical:  
SKIN 
PROBLEM 
 
“The diagnosis made by a professional was skin problem” 
“Firstly,  the patient suffered afraid to feel ashamed in social 
situations  
“The fear of feeling embarrassing caused inability to control 
the anxiety” 
“The inability to control the anxiety produced avoidance of 
social situations” 
“The avoidance of social situations caused repeated absences 
from work” 
“The repeated absences from work produced working 
problems” 
 
“The diagnosis made by a professional was skin problem” 
“Firstly, the patient suffered afraid to feel ashamed in social 
situations” 
 “The fear of feeling embarrassing caused deterioration of his 
skin marks” 
“The deterioration of his skin marks produced avoidance of 
social situations” 
“The avoidance of social situations caused repeated absences 
from work for to his disease” 
“The repeated absences from work for his disease produced 
working problems” 
CAUSAL REASONING IN CLINICAL DECISION MAKING: EVIDENCE FROM ON-LINE AND OFF-LINE MEASURES 
 
 
152 
 
Abstract in Spanish  
Resumen de la Tesis Doctoral titulada:  
Razonamiento causal en el diagnóstico de trastornos mentales: 
Evidencia de medidas online y offline 
 
 El conocimiento causal constituye una herramienta altamente eficaz para 
adaptarnos al medio en el que vivimos, ya que nos permite realizar predicciones 
precisas acerca de acontecimientos y conductas, aprender y actuar en consecuencia. El 
conocimiento causal está presente en multitud de procesos cognitivos, tales como 
categorización, representación conceptual, toma de decisiones, comprensión de textos, 
intervención, realización de inferencias, etc. Muchas de las teorías que explican el 
razonamiento causal se han desarrollado en condiciones de laboratorio artificiales (Penn 
& Povinelli, 2007; Shanks, 2010). No obstante, algunas de estas teorías se han centrado 
en dominios más naturales y aplicados, como el de tareas llevadas a cabo en contextos 
clínicos (de Kwaadsteniet, Hagmayer, Krol y Witteman, 2010; de Kwaadsteniet, Kim y 
Yopchick, 2013; Einhorn, 1986;  Haynes y Williams, 2003; Kim y Keil, 2003; Kim y 
LoSavio, 2009; Rehder y Kim, 2006; Yopchick y Kim, 2009). En este trabajo, llevamos 
a cabo cuatro experimentos centrándonos en el papel del razonamiento causal en un 
contexto clínico específico: el diagnóstico de trastornos mentales. 
 El uso del razonamiento causal en el contexto clínico específico del diagnóstico 
de trastornos mentales no debería resultar sorprendente si tenemos en cuenta que los 
procesos cognitivos donde el conocimiento causal está presente, tales como los 
comentados previamente, están también evidentemente presentes en tareas de toma de 
decisión diagnóstica. Sin embargo, si tenemos en cuenta la concepción de la 
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clasificación de trastornos mentales que propone el Manual Diagnóstico y Estadístico de 
Trastornos Mentales (DSM-IV, American Psychiatric Association, 2000), la influencia 
del razonamiento causal en el diagnóstico sí debería resultar sorprendente. La 
taxonomía de trastornos mentales que este manual propone no está basada en 
consideraciones causales, sino que intenta ser ateórico o, al menos, neutro con respecto 
a las diferentes aproximaciones teóricas a las que los clínicos puedan adherirse. De 
hecho, según el DSM-IV, las clasificaciones están basadas en criterios diagnósticos que 
no son necesarios ni suficientes. De esta forma, si el razonamiento causal se pone en 
marcha en el diagnóstico de trastorno mentales a pesar de las prescripciones de este 
manual, podríamos decir que se está cometiendo un sesgo cognitivo que podríamos 
definir como sesgo causal. 
 Kim y Ahn (2002) encontraron que tanto estudiantes de Psicología como 
expertos clínicos dependían de sus teorías causales idiosincráticas cuando se les pedía 
que realizaran juicios diagnósticos. En estos experimentos, los participantes tenían que 
dibujar mapas causales de diferentes trastornos relacionando mediante flechas los 
diferentes síntomas, considerados criterios diagnósticos del DSM-IV, así como asignar 
una puntuación de la fuerza causal que atribuían a cada relación. El objetivo de esta 
tarea fue obtener la representación causal de los trastornos de los participantes, así como 
una puntuación causal de cada criterio diagnóstico. Unos días después, los participantes 
realizaban una tarea de diagnóstico en la cual se les presentaba una serie de casos 
clínicos que contenían los síntomas que ellos habían considerado como los más 
causalmente centrales y los más causalmente periféricos. Los resultados de este 
experimento mostraron que los participantes estaban más dispuestos a diagnosticar a un 
paciente hipotético con un determinado trastorno si éste poseía síntomas causalmente 
centrales que si poseía síntomas causalmente periféricos. Además, su recuerdo de la 
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información relacionada con síntomas también estuvo influido por su sesgo causal. 
Pero, aunque ésta es la única evidencia del sesgo causal en el diagnóstico de trastornos 
mentales de la que tenemos conocimiento hasta ahora, no podemos descartar 
explicaciones alternativas a estos resultados, como la distribución estadística de los 
síntomas dentro del trastorno, su centralidad conceptual o su valor estadístico.  
 Ya que en el estudio de Kim y Ahn (2002) las respuestas de los participantes 
estaban basadas en juicios, es posible que el sesgo causal fuera fruto de la implicación 
de procesos de razonamiento controlados y deliberados, pero no podemos estar seguros 
de que procesos menos controlados y deliberados pudieran haberse puesto también en 
marcha. Si éste fuera el caso, cualquier intento de evitar o controlar el uso del sesgo 
causal en el diagnóstico de trastornos mentales debería comenzar por detectar tales 
procesos menos controlados, explicándolos y entendiendo cómo funcionan. Estas ideas 
estarían en línea con las típicas teorías de proceso dual (Chaiken y Trope, 1999; 
Hammond, 1996; Sloman, 1996), las cuales se han centrado en gran medida en la 
explicación de sesgos en razonamiento y tareas de juicios. 
 Los procesos cognitivos de alto nivel incluyen diferentes procesos, tales como 
pensamiento, razonamiento, toma de decisiones y juicios. Estos procesos cognitivos 
pueden ser divididos en lo que tradicionalmente denominamos intuición y razón, y que 
recientemente aceptamos bajo el marco de teorías del procesamiento dual. Estas teorías 
establecen una diferenciación entre procesos que son rápidos, inconscientes, 
automáticos, y procesos que son lentos, deliberados y que exigen un mayor esfuerzo. 
Kahneman y Frederick (2002) y Stanovich (1999) empezaron a usar unos términos 
neutrales para estas dos diferentes formas de procesamiento: sistema 1 y sistema 2, 
respectivamente. El sistema 1 actúa por impulsos naturales y ofrece una evaluación 
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continua de los problemas que el individuo debe resolver para sobrevivir de una forma 
rápida y eficaz, aunque pudiendo llevar a posibles errores. No obstante, frecuentemente 
el sistema 2 monitoriza al sistema 1 y se moviliza automáticamente cuando este último 
encuentra alguna dificultad para resolver la situación, pudiendo llegar a evitar esos 
errores. Sin embargo, el sistema 2 no es consciente de que a menudo está siendo 
influenciado por el sistema 1, pudiendo conducirle a la comisión de sesgos y errores. 
 Por tanto, los errores en los juicios pueden ser atribuidos tanto al sistema 1 como 
al sistema 2. Frecuentemente, estos errores están basados en el uso de razonamiento 
causal. Por tanto, el razonamiento causal puede estar relacionado no sólo con procesos 
del sistema 2, sino también con procesos del sistema 1, por lo que el sesgo causal en el 
diagnóstico de trastornos mentales puede ser el resultado de procesos de razonamiento 
causal del sistema 1. Pero, ¿cómo podemos estar seguros de que el sesgo encontrado en 
el estudio de Kim y Ahn (2002) es el resultado de procesos del sistema 1 más que de 
procesos del sistema 2? Los participantes en este estudio tenían la oportunidad de poner 
en marcha procesos de pensamiento altamente demandantes, lentos y deliberados, ya 
que sus respuestas se basaban en la elaboración de juicios diagnósticos explícitos. Sin 
embargo, el razonamiento causal puede aparecer también en tareas que no sean de toma 
de decisiones o juicios. Si el sistema 1 está implicado en el sesgo causal, el 
razonamiento causal debería aparecer en procesos eficientes y rápidos, de una manera 
más automática y sin tiempo dedicado exclusivamente al pensamiento deliberado. Por 
tanto, para mostrar la implicación de procesos del sistema 1 en la producción del sesgo 
causal en el diagnóstico de trastornos mentales, deberíamos ser capaces de ofrecer 
evidencia de razonamiento causal rápido y online como parte de los procesos de 
comprensión que tienen lugar en el mismo momento en el que los razonadores reciben 
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la información sobre los síntomas. Las técnicas y procedimientos online usados en 
comprensión de textos son especialmente adecuadas para este propósito. 
 Procesos de razonamiento causal rápidos y automáticos atribuibles al sistema 1 
parecen subyacer a la comprensión de textos. Un lector realiza inferencias durante la 
lectura con el objetivo de crear y mantener representaciones coherentes del texto tanto a 
un nivel global como local, y al menos algunas de estas inferencias son causales (Black 
y Bower, 1980; Kendeou, Smith, y O’Brien, 2012; Schank, 1975; Trabasso y Sperry, 
1985; Trabasso y van den Broek, 1985). Por tanto, se puede esperar razonamiento 
causal del sistema 1 cuando los clínicos leen informes para tomar una decisión 
diagnóstica posterior. En función de la información ofrecida, se pueden activar teorías 
específicas, creencias o expectativas sobre síntomas adicionales. Si la información 
siguiente es coherente con la información ya recibida y la información causal activada, 
puede ser fácilmente integrada en un modelo mental y podría ser percibido como 
plausible. Por el contrario, si es incoherente, se requeriría un esfuerzo cognitivo para 
resolver la inconsistencia y para integrar la nueva información en una estructura 
unificada (Ericsson y Kintsch, 1995; Kintsch, Patel, y Ericsson, 1999). Si no se 
encontrara solución, la información sería considerada implausible. Algo que se debe 
destacar de todo ello es que todas estas inferencias tendrían que operar de una manera 
rápida y online.  
 Ya que los procesos de razonamiento causal atribuibles al sistema 1 parecen 
subyacer a la comprensión de textos y a la realización de inferencias online durante la 
lectura, usamos una metodología basada en comprensión lectora. En concreto, 
empleamos el paradigma de la inconsistencia (Albrecht y O’Brien, 1993; Long y 
Chong, 2001; Peracchi y O’Brien, 2004). Según este paradigma, si en un texto 
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presentamos información que resulta inconsistente con respecto a una información 
preliminar, el tiempo de lectura de esas frases será mayor que el tiempo de lectura de 
esas mismas frases en un texto donde no resultara inconsistente con diferente 
información preliminar. Por tanto, la detección de inconsistencia durante la lectura de 
un texto quedaría reflejada en el incremento en el tiempo de lectura, el cual tiende a 
emplearse en tratar de resolver la inconsistencia detectada. Nosotros usamos este 
paradigma para detectar procesos de razonamiento causal online, rápidos y 
semiautomáticos, durante la lectura de informes clínicos. Las inconsistencias en los 
informes clínicos las creamos incluyendo información sobre los síntomas de un paciente 
hipotético que contradecía de algún modo cierta información presentada al comienzo 
del informe y que estaba relacionada con el diagnóstico que ese paciente había recibido. 
La detección de tales inconsistencias se basó en la idea de que los "diagnosticadores" 
poseen teorías o creencias sobre trastornos mentales de acuerdo con las cuales los 
síntomas de tales trastornos conforman una red causal con una estructura específica.  
Concretando, el objetivo de este trabajo fue mostrar que el diagnóstico de 
trastornos mentales no se atiene de forma estricta a los criterios diagnósticos del DSM-
IV, sino que está sesgado por teorías y creencias causales. Además, queríamos mostrar 
que, en este sesgo causal, tienen una implicación importante procesos del sistema 1. 
Para estudiar la implicación de procesos del sistema 1 en el sesgo causal, se utilizó una 
técnica de medida online basada en el paradigma de la inconsistencia en informes 
clínicos. Pudimos detectar los procesos de razonamiento causal dependientes del 
sistema 1 a partir de los efectos que estas inconsistencias tenían sobre los tiempos de 
lectura de los participantes. Si el sesgo causal se ponía en marcha, se emplearía un 
mayor tiempo de lectura en los informes que poseían inconsistencias que en los 
informes control. Al mismo tiempo, en todos los experimentos, evaluamos la posible 
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incidencia de estos procesos de razonamiento causal sobre los juicios diagnósticos que 
los participantes emitían una vez leído el informe clínico. Estos juicios diagnósticos 
consistían en decidir en qué medida se estaba de acuerdo con un diagnóstico ofrecido, 
empleando para ello una escala en la que el participante debía posicionarse. De esta 
forma, si el sesgo causal se ponía en marcha, las puntuaciones en grado de acuerdo con 
el juicio diagnóstico serían menores en los diagnósticos de los informes con 
inconsistencia que en los informes control.  
A continuación, presentamos los experimentos que se llevaron a cabo en este 
trabajo. En todos ellos, el estudio de los procesos de razonamiento causal estuvo basado 
en la detección de procesos de razonamiento rápidos y online durante la lectura de 
informes clínicos. No obstante, la manipulación de la inconsistencia y de la información 
de tipo causal se llevó a cabo de maneras diferentes.  
Experimento 1 
Los objetivos del Experimento 1 fueron: 1) replicar el efecto de estatus causal de 
Kim y Ahn (2002) y 2) demostrar que tal sesgo causal podía ser consecuencia de 
procesos de razonamiento causal atribuibles al sistema 1. A partir de los mapas causales 
sobre los síntomas de diferentes trastornos que dibujaron los participantes del estudio de 
Kim y Ahn (2002), calculamos una puntuación en centralidad causal de cada síntoma de 
cada trastorno empleado, lo cual nos permitió seleccionar el síntoma con mayor estatus 
causal, o lo que también podríamos denominar como el síntoma causalmente más 
central, y el síntoma con menor estatus, o el síntoma causalmente más periférico. Estos 
dos síntomas de diferentes trastornos fueron empleados para elaborar las frases target de 
los informes clínicos que usamos. En la condición inconsistente, esta frase resultaría 
inconsistente con el diagnóstico ofrecido al principio del informe y, en la condición 
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control, esta frase no resultaría inconsistente. En la medida en que esperábamos que los 
sujetos pusieran en marcha una teoría causal del trastorno, esperábamos encontrar un 
mayor efecto de inconsistencia asociado al uso del síntoma central, comparado con el 
uso del síntoma periférico. Al mismo tiempo, esperábamos encontrar un mayor impacto 
del síntoma central, comparado con el periférico, en juicios diagnósticos. 
En el Experimento 1 participaron 17 estudiantes de psicología de la Universidad 
de Málaga y 17 clínicos, estos últimos con 17 años de experiencia media y en su 
mayoría cognitivo-conductuales. Todos ellos leían 24 informes clínicos: 12 
inconsistentes y 12 control, en dos sesiones diferentes. En los informes inconsistentes se 
les presentaba información preliminar relacionada con el diagnóstico de los trastornos: 
depresión mayor, fobia específica, trastorno de personalidad antisocial, esquizofrenia, 
trastorno de personalidad límite y trastorno de personalidad evitativo.  En los informes 
control se les presentaba información preliminar relacionada con el diagnóstico de los 
trastornos: dependencia de cannabis, sonambulismo, juego patológico, trastorno 
orgásmico, trastorno de identidad de género e hipocondría. La frase target, en la que se 
centraba especialmente la medición del tiempo de lectura, consistía en una frase hacia el 
final del informe en la que se presentaba información aludiendo a la ausencia de un 
síntoma causal o un síntoma periférico de alguno de los trastornos mencionados para los 
informes inconsistentes. De esta forma, si esta frase aparecía tras una información 
preliminar en la que se informaba de un diagnóstico de depresión mayor, fobia 
específica, trastorno de personalidad antisocial, esquizofrenia, trastorno de personalidad 
límite o trastorno de personalidad evitativo, resultaría incoherente y los tiempos de 
lectura serían mayores. Si por el contrario esa misma frase target aparecía tras una 
información preliminar en la que se informara de un diagnóstico de dependencia de 
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cannabis, sonambulismo, juego patológico, trastorno orgásmico, trastorno de identidad 
de género e hipocondría, no tendría por qué resultar incoherente. 
En cuanto a los resultados del Experimento 1, se obtuvo efecto de inconsistencia 
tanto en estudiantes como en clínicos en el sentido de que los tiempos de lectura de las 
frases target fueron mayores en la condición inconsistente que en la condición control. 
Sin embargo, sólo en la muestra de clínicos el efecto de inconsistencia estuvo modulado 
por el estatus causal del síntoma referido en la frase target. Específicamente, el efecto de 
inconsistencia detectado fue de mayor magnitud cuando la frase target se refería a la 
ausencia de un síntoma causalmente central que cuando se refería a la ausencia de un 
síntoma causalmente periférico. En todos los casos, los tiempos de lectura fueron 
congruentes con los juicios diagnósticos obtenidos: tanto los estudiantes como los 
clínicos dieron juicios de acuerdo con el diagnóstico más bajos en la condición 
inconsistente que en la condición control. Sin embargo, sólo en los clínicos estos juicios 
mostraban un efecto de inconsistencia modulado por el estatus causal de los síntomas, 
es decir, un efecto de inconsistencia mayor en la condición de síntoma central que en la 
de síntoma periférico. Por tanto, se replicó el efecto de estatus causal obtenido por Kim 
y Ahn (2002) en juicios diagnósticos sólo en la muestra de psicólogos clínicos.  
Experimento 2 
Los objetivos del Experimento 2 fueron 1) evaluar la implicación del 
razonamiento causal manipulando el orden temporal de síntomas, lo cual es un rasgo 
definitorio de las relaciones causales, y ofreciendo información explícita sobre 
conexiones causales entre síntomas, y 2) probar, como en el Experimento 1, si nuestra 
manipulación podía sesgar el razonamiento diagnóstico de los participantes, evaluando 
la implicación de procesos de razonamiento causal atribuibles al sistema 1 en tal sesgo. 
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Esta nueva manipulación nos permitiría solventar algunas limitaciones del Experimento 
1 y ofrecer evidencia más fuerte de razonamiento causal. En este caso, la manipulación 
de información se realizaba alterando el orden temporal en el que se presentaban los 
síntomas en el paciente, de tal forma que en el informe control se presentaban los 
síntomas del diagnóstico del trastorno mencionado en la información preliminar en el 
orden adecuado de acuerdo con la teoría causal del trastorno y, en el informe 
inconsistente, esos mismos síntomas, tras ese mismo diagnóstico, se presentaban en el 
orden inverso. Además, añadimos una frase hacia el final del informe, tras la lectura de 
los síntomas, relacionada con la conexión entre ellos. En los informes inconsistentes, 
esta frase afirmaba que no existía ningún tipo de relación entre los síntomas, mientras 
que, en los informes control, esta frase afirmaba que existía una relación de causalidad 
entre los síntomas en la que el síntoma A causaba el síntoma B, y el síntoma B causaba 
el síntoma C. Al igual que en el Experimento 1, si los participantes ponían en marcha 
sus teorías causales de los trastornos, se esperaban tiempos de lectura más largos en los 
informes inconsistentes que en los informes control al comparar las frases target o frases 
que contenían los síntomas. De igual forma, esperábamos que la información referente a 
la secuencia temporal de síntomas y a las conexiones causales entre síntomas influyera 
en los juicios sobre diagnóstico. 
En el Experimento 2 participaron 71 estudiantes de psicología de la Universidad 
de Málaga y 30 clínicos, éstos últimos con 10 años experiencia media y en su mayoría 
cognitivo-conductuales. Todos ellos debían leer 12 informes clínicos: 6 inconsistentes y 
6 control, en dos sesiones diferentes. Tanto en los informes inconsistentes como control, 
se ofrecía una información preliminar en la que se presentaba a un paciente que había 
sido diagnosticado con uno de los siguientes trastornos: anorexia nerviosa, depresión 
mayor, fobia específica, trastorno obsesivo-compulsivo, trastorno de estrés 
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postraumático y trastorno de ansiedad generalizada. En este experimento, además, para 
comprobar que la teoría causal que los sujetos estaban poniendo en marcha para 
resolver las tareas de lectura y juicio diagnóstico era consistente con la presentada en los 
informes clínicos, tenían que realizar una tarea adicional en la que debían estimar la 
eficacia que diferentes tratamientos reales podrían tener sobre los diferentes síntomas 
presentados, empleando de nuevo escalas. En la medida en que las respuestas en esta 
prueba de tratamiento fueran consistentes con el uso de la teoría causal empleada en la 
elaboración del material, podríamos afirmar que la manipulación era apropiada. 
Los resultados del Experimento 2 mostraron que los juicios diagnósticos de los 
estudiantes estuvieron afectados por información sobre la secuencia temporal de 
síntomas y por la información sobre conexiones causales. Específicamente, los 
estudiantes estuvieron más de acuerdo con el diagnóstico recibido por los pacientes 
hipotéticos cuando la secuencia temporal de síntomas y las conexiones causales entre 
ellos fueron consistentes con las teorías causales de los trastornos diagnosticados que 
cuando la información ofrecida era inconsistente con tales teorías. Además, los 
estudiantes emplearon más tiempo en decidir sobre el juicio diagnóstico en la condición 
inconsistente no-causal, que en la condición consistente causal. Sin embargo, no 
encontramos evidencia convincente de procesos de razonamiento causal rápidos y 
online en esta muestra. De igual forma, el tiempo que éstos emplearon en la lectura de 
frases target relacionadas con la secuencia temporal de los síntomas parecía no estar 
afectado por si el orden temporal era consistente o inconsistente con la teoría causal del 
trastorno mencionado en la información preliminar del informe clínico. Los resultados 
encontrados en clínicos también mostraron un mayor grado de acuerdo con el 
diagnóstico recibido por el paciente hipotético en la condición consistente causal que en 
la condición inconsistente no-causal. Los clínicos además emplearon más tiempo en la 
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tarea de juicio diagnóstico en la última condición que en la primera, sugiriendo que 
trataron de resolver las inconsistencias causales encontradas en el informe clínico antes 
de realizar el juicio. Además, encontramos evidencia de razonamiento causal rápido y 
online en los tiempos de lectura de las frases target de los clínicos. Específicamente, los 
tiempos de lectura fueron significativamente más largos cuando la información fue 
inconsistente que cuando fue consistente con las teorías causales del trastorno con el 
cual el paciente hipotético había sido diagnosticado. 
Experimento 3 
El objetivo específico del Experimento 3 fue encontrar más evidencia acerca de 
que la computación de coherencia causal reside en el núcleo de los procesos de 
comprensión que dependen del sistema 1, tanto durante la lectura como en los juicios 
diagnósticos. En este caso, tras la información preliminar relacionada con el 
diagnóstico, se presentaban tres frases ofreciendo información con respecto a la 
presencia o ausencia de tres diferentes síntomas considerados criterios diagnósticos del 
trastorno en cuestión de acuerdo al DSM-IV. Tales síntomas formaban parte de una 
cadena causal (S1S2S3) que no era explicitada en el informe clínico, pero que se 
esperaba que formara parte de la teoría causal del trastorno de los participantes. Las 
inconsistencias se crearon mencionando explícitamente la ausencia de uno de esos tres 
síntomas en una de las frases. De esta forma, con esta manipulación, se crearon dos 
tipos de inconsistencias: categórica, entre el diagnóstico y el síntoma ausente, y causal, 
entre la presencia de algunos síntomas y la ausencia de sus antecedentes causales en la 
cadena causal que conectaba los síntomas. De estos dos tipos de inconsistencia, se 
podían derivar algunas predicciones de acuerdo a diferentes teorías causales 
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relacionadas con coherencia y estatus causal. Asumiendo que los participantes activaban 
automáticamente una teoría causal del trastorno, realizamos las siguientes predicciones: 
 Condición (tipo de informe clínico) 
 Paciente 1 
S1S2S3 
Paciente 2 
S1S2S3 
Paciente 3 
S1S2S3 
Frase sobre S1 S1 ausente (cat 
inconsistente) 
S1 presente 
(consistente) 
S1 presente 
(consistente) 
Predicción de TR Lectura lenta Lectura rápida Lectura rápida 
Frase sobre S2 S2 presente (caus 
inconsistente) 
S2 absent (cat y caus 
inconsistente) 
S2 presente 
(consistente) 
Predicción de TR Lectura lenta Lectura lenta Lectura rápida 
Frase sobre S3 S3 presente 
(consistente) 
S3 presente (caus 
consistente) 
S3 ausente (cat y caus 
inconsistente) 
Predicción de TR Lectura rápida Lectura lenta Lectura lenta 
Predicción de juicio 
diagnóstico 
Intermedio El más bajo El más alto 
 
Nota. cat y caus corresponden a categóricamente y a causalmente, respectivamente. 
En el Experimento 3 participaron 31 estudiantes de Psicología de la Universidad 
de Göttingen (Alemania) que habían sido entrenados previamente en los trastornos 
empleados. Los trastornos fueron: depresión, trastorno obsesivo- compulsivo y fobia 
específica. Como de cada trastorno se crearon 3 tipos de informe (S1S2S3; 
S1S2S3; S1S2S3), cada participante leía un total de 9 informes clínicos en dos 
sesiones diferentes. Al igual que en el Experimento 2, para comprobar qué tipo de teoría 
causal estaban poniendo en marcha los sujetos, éstos tenían que realizar una tarea 
adicional en la que debían estimar en qué medida cada uno de los síntomas empleados 
causaba cada uno de los restantes, de nuevo empleando escalas para responder. 
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 En cuanto a los resultados del Experimento 3, la evidencia más convincente se 
obtuvo en los tiempos de lectura. Los tiempos fueron más lentos cuando los 
participantes leían la frase que informaba de la presencia de un síntoma cuando su 
antecedente causal estaba ausente. Este resultado indicaba que los participantes 
detectaban una inconsistencia causal ya que, de acuerdo con la teoría causal activada, 
dada la ausencia de un antecedente causal, el siguiente síntoma de la cadena causal no 
debería ocurrir. Los resultados en juicios diagnósticos se ajustaron a las predicciones de 
la teoría del modelo causal (Rehder, 2001; Rehder y Hastie, 2004; Rehder y Kim, 
2010), de acuerdo a la cual, los juicios diagnósticos (categóricos) son el resultado de la 
computación de coherencia. Finalmente, el hecho de que los efectos de inconsistencia 
encontrados en tiempos de lectura fueran consistentes con los juicios diagnósticos de los 
participantes sugería que la computación de coherencia depende de procesos de 
razonamiento causal del sistema 1. 
Experimento 4 
Los objetivos del Experimento 4 fueron: 1) comprobar si el razonamiento 
diagnóstico es sensible a la manipulación de los mecanismos causales que conectan 
unos síntomas con otros, y 2) evaluar si tal sensibilidad a mecanismos causales podía 
ser atribuida a razonamiento causal del sistema 1 durante la lectura de informes clínicos. 
Este experimento se centra en procesos rápidos de razonamiento online basados en los 
supuestos de los participantes con respecto a mecanismos causales. Evaluamos si 
informando a los participantes explícitamente sobre los mecanismos que conectan los 
síntomas de un trastorno afectaba al razonamiento causal online y a posteriores juicios 
diagnósticos. En este experimento, cada informe ofrecía información acerca de un 
paciente que presentaba 3 síntomas que eran criterios diagnósticos de un trastorno. De 
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acuerdo al conocimiento general clínico, los 3 síntomas formaban parte de una cadena 
causal (S1S2S3). La única diferencia residía en los mecanismos causales que 
llevaban de un síntoma al siguiente. En una condición, los mecanismos causales fueron 
consistentes con la teoría causal del trastorno mencionado en el diagnóstico al comienzo 
del informe clínico. En la otra condición, se presentaban mecanismos causales 
plausibles alternativos, los cuales eran inconsistentes con la teoría causal del trastorno. 
Esperábamos que los participantes fueran sensibles a los mecanismos causales y, por 
tanto, que detectaran inconsistencias en los mecanismos. Según esto, esperábamos 
tiempos de lectura más largos en los casos en los cuales los mecanismos no coincidían 
con la teoría causal del trastorno. Además, esperábamos que la información sobre los 
mecanismos afectara a los juicios diagnósticos finales a pesar de que el criterio 
diagnóstico resultara inalterado. 
En el Experimento 4 participaron 34 estudiantes de psicología de la Universidad 
de Málaga, la mayoría de las cuales había recibido información previa sobre los 
trastornos empleados. Dos factores fueron ortogonalmente manipulados: el mecanismo 
causal que llevaba de un síntoma al siguiente de la cadena causal y el diagnóstico 
recibido por el paciente, el cual de nuevo aparecía en el comienzo del informe clínico. 
Los trastornos que se emplearon fueron: anorexia nerviosa, fobia específica y ansiedad 
generalizada. Ya que de cada trastorno había cuatro tipos de informe (diagnóstico 
psicológico y mecanismo psicológico, diagnóstico psicológico y mecanismo bio-
médico, diagnóstico médico y mecanismo psicológico, diagnóstico médico y 
mecanismo bio-médico), cada participante leía un total de 12 informes clínicos en dos 
sesiones diferentes. En este experimento, tras la tarea de diagnóstico, los participantes 
tenían que enfrentarse además con una tarea de tratamiento en la cual se les pedía que 
decidieran, para cada caso, si consideraban que sería más eficaz un tratamiento 
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psicológico o uno médico. Para cada respuesta, debían utilizar de nuevo una escala en la 
que en cada uno de los extremos se localizaba cada una de las formas de tratamiento. 
En el Experimento 4, los resultados encontrados en tiempos de lectura revelaron 
la participación de procesos de razonamiento causal basados en creencias acerca de los 
mecanismos causales que subyacen a los diferentes trastornos. Esta conclusión se apoya 
en la obtención de tiempos de lectura mayores en las frases informando sobre 
mecanismos bio-médicos comparados con las frases informando de mecanismos 
psicológicos, cuando el paciente hipotético había sido diagnosticado con un trastorno 
mental. Esta conclusión no puede ser explicada por la activación de creencias causales 
independientes a las creencias de los participantes acerca de trastornos mentales, ya que 
la diferencia entre tiempos de lectura se revertía cuando el paciente hipotético había 
sido diagnosticado con una enfermedad médica. El patrón de resultados encontrados en 
juicio diagnóstico fue el mismo que en tiempos de lectura, sugiriendo de nuevo que los 
procesos de razonamiento causal rápido y online que tenían lugar durante la lectura 
podían haber tenido un impacto determinante en los juicios diagnósticos. Por último, los 
resultados de la tarea de toma de decisión sobre tratamiento corroboraron que las 
descripciones ofrecidas por los mecanismos psicológicos y bio-médicos fueron 
interpretadas como tales por los participantes. Específicamente, el tratamiento 
psicológico recibía mayores puntuaciones en la condición de mecanismo psicológico 
que en la condición de mecanismo bio-médico, mientras que se obtenía el patrón 
inverso de resultados en las puntuaciones dadas al tratamiento médico. 
Discusión 
El patrón de resultados obtenidos en esta serie experimental es muy consistente, 
al mostrar que tanto estudiantes de Psicología como clínicos con experiencia emplean 
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procesos de razonamiento rápidos y online, lo que pueden ser identificados como el 
sistema 1 de Kahneman y Frederick (2002), durante la lectura fluida de informes 
clínicos para la toma de decisiones en juicios diagnósticos posteriores. Tales procesos 
de razonamiento implicaban recuerdo rápido de teorías causales sobre trastornos 
mentales almacenadas en la memoria, así como procesos de inferencia rápidos, los 
cuales demostraron ser cruciales para computar la coherencia de la información 
ofrecida. Es probable que tales procesos dependan de procesos guiados por la 
coherencia y basados en procesos de activación característicos de redes neuronales 
dinámicas. Esta serie experimental ofrece evidencia convergente demostrando que los 
procesos de razonamiento del sistema 1 son responsables de la computación de la 
coherencia que depende de teorías causales de trastornos mentales, las cuales establecen 
la manera en la cual ciertos síntomas derivan en otros. La dependencia de los 
razonadores de las teorías causales por medio de procesos de razonamiento rápidos y 
online se ha demostrado a través de varias manipulaciones que, tomadas en conjunto, 
han producido un patrón de resultados muy consistente. Además, hemos encontrado una 
consistencia persistente entre los procesos de razonamiento rápidos detectados por 
medio de medidas online y los juicios diagnósticos de los participantes tras la tarea de 
lectura, excepto en los resultados de la muestra de estudiantes en el Experimento 2. Esta 
consistencia sugiere que los procesos del sistema 1, rápidos y tempranos, están basados 
en razonamiento causal que puede sesgar los procesos del sistema 2 que podrían 
funcionar durante la tarea de juicio diagnóstico. 
Conclusión 
El patrón de resultados encontrados en la presente serie experimental demuestra 
que tanto los clínicos como los estudiantes de Psicología se involucran en procesos de 
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razonamiento on-line muy rápidos, que pueden asimilarse a los procesos del sistema 1, 
durante la lectura de informes clínicos para un juicio diagnóstico posterior. Tales 
procesos de razonamiento están implicados en la rápida activación de atributos causales 
y realización de inferencias en el mismo momento en que se recibe información 
relevante para el diagnóstico de trastornos mentales. Estos procesos serían 
fundamentales para calcular la coherencia de la información ofrecida, contribuyendo, de 
este modo, en la construcción de un modelo mental coherente para una adecuada 
comprensión del caso. 
Palabras clave: conocimiento causal, razonamiento clínico, diagnóstico de 
trastornos mentales, paradigma de inconsistencia, procesos del sistema 1 
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Detecting Fast, Online Reasoning Processes in Clinical Decision Making
Amanda Flores, Pedro L. Cobos,
and Francisco J. López
University of Málaga, and Instituto de Investigación Biomédica
de Málaga (IBIMA), Málaga, Spain
Antonio Godoy
University of Málaga
In an experiment that used the inconsistency paradigm, experienced clinical psychologists and psychol-
ogy students performed a reading task using clinical reports and a diagnostic judgment task. The clinical
reports provided information about the symptoms of hypothetical clients who had been previously
diagnosed with a specific mental disorder. Reading times of inconsistent target sentences were slower
than that of control sentences, demonstrating an inconsistency effect. The results also showed that
experienced clinicians gave different weights to different symptoms according to their relevance when
fluently reading the clinical reports provided, despite the fact that all the symptoms were of equal
diagnostic value according to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th ed., text
rev.; American Psychiatric Association, 2000). The diagnostic judgment task yielded a similar pattern of
results. In contrast to previous findings, the results of the reading task may be taken as direct evidence
of the intervention of reasoning processes that occur very early, rapidly, and online. We suggest that these
processes are based on the representation of mental disorders and that these representations are
particularly suited to fast retrieval from memory and to making inferences. They may also be related to
the clinicians’ causal reasoning. The implications of these results for clinician training are also discussed.
Keywords: diagnostic criteria, clinical reasoning, inconsistency paradigm, causal reasoning
The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th
ed., text rev.; DSM–IV–TR; American Psychiatric Association,
2000) generally assumes that all the diagnostic criteria for a mental
disorder are equivalent (Kim & Ahn, 2002). Despite this, some
studies have shown that clinical psychologists and psychology
students do not give the same weight to the different diagnostic
criteria for a mental disorder when making a diagnosis. Specifi-
cally, Kim and Ahn (2002) showed that clinicians and psychology
students were more likely to apply certain diagnostic categories
when a hypothetical client presented a given set of symptoms than
when that person presented a different set. This result is consistent
with other findings related to previous versions of the DSM (see
Davis, Blashfield, & McElroy, 1993; Garb, 1996; Rubinson, As-
nis, & Friedman, 1988). Kim and Ahn suggested that clinicians’
and students’ diagnostic judgments were affected by their idiosyn-
cratic theories, which prevented them from giving the same weight
to all the diagnostic criteria specified in the DSM–IV–TR.
The standard approach to studying this situation has been based
on tasks in which participants have to make diagnostic judgments
with sufficient time to reflect on permanently available informa-
tion about clients’ symptoms. Thus, the tendency to give more
weight to some symptoms rather than to others may be the effect
of slow, effortful, and deliberative reasoning processes that take
place when the participants are asked to make a diagnostic judg-
ment. This raises the question of whether other reasoning pro-
cesses that take place very early, rapidly, and in a partially uncon-
scious manner may also be responsible for the differential
weighting of symptoms. Specifically, these fast reasoning pro-
cesses could take place online as part of the reasoners’ compre-
hension processes as they receive relevant information about clin-
ical cases. Online processes refer to a wide variety of well-timed
processes triggered by a stream of incoming information on a
clinical case. If this information were provided in written format,
these processes would range from visual perception or lexical
access to inference and integration. These online processes are
essential to the clinician to obtain a global understanding of a
clinical case. Importantly, these processes are thought to be auto-
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matic or semiautomatic because they must occur very rapidly and
simultaneously as readers proceed from one piece of information
to the next. In theory, some of these fast online reasoning pro-
cesses would rely on the reasoners’ previous domain-specific
knowledge and theories, which would underlie the different
weights given to the different diagnostic criteria. This hypothesis
may be especially pertinent in the case of expert clinicians, ac-
cording to some theories on how expert clinicians’ represent and
use their knowledge and theories (e.g., see Charlin, Boshuizen,
Custers, & Feltovich, 2007; Charlin, Tardif, & Boshuizen, 2000;
Schmidt, Norman, & Boshuizen, 1990; Smith, 1989).
Previous studies have already shown that clinicians take a few
minutes to make diagnostic decisions, with only slight variations in
the resulting diagnosis if more time is taken (Kendell, 1973;
Sandifer, Hordern, & Green, 1970). In this period of time,
judgment-based, slow, reflective, and resource-demanding pro-
cesses can take place. However, this study focuses on processes
that take place in a few 10ths of a second and that demand few
cognitive resources. Kahneman’s (2011) distinction between Sys-
tem 1 and System 2 processes provides an appropriate framework
to differentiate between online; semiautomatic; and slow, deliber-
ate reasoning processes. The online reasoning processes that are
the focus of this study correspond to System 1 processes, which
encompass numerous fast processes and heuristics that have been
thought to underlie a huge number of biases and errors in reason-
ing and decision making. Therefore, the aim of this study was to
show how System 1 processes affect the differential weighting of
the DSM–IV–TR diagnostic criteria, as demonstrated in experi-
ments such as those conducted by Kim and Ahn (2002).
Reading clinical reports is an activity in which early, fast, online
clinical reasoning may be found. All the major text comprehension
studies have assumed that readers make online inferences during
reading (Graesser, Singer, & Trabasso, 1994; McKoon & Ratcliff,
1992; Van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983; Zwaan & Radvansky, 1998).
One of the functions of online inference-making is to maintain the
coherence of a text at the global and local levels. Maintaining text
coherence occasionally requires the search and discovery of links
that connect different portions of the text (Black & Bower, 1980;
Kendeou, Smith, & O’Brien, 2012; Schank, 1975; Trabasso &
Sperry, 1985; Trabasso & van den Broek, 1985). It has been
claimed that processes related to the search for coherence belong
to System 1 processes (Kahneman, 2011). This viewpoint has been
strongly supported by experiments using the so-called inconsis-
tency paradigm in reading comprehension studies (Albrecht &
O’Brien, 1993; Long & Chong, 2001; Peracchi & O’Brien, 2004).
The results obtained suggest that reading an inconsistent sentence
(i.e., a sentence inconsistent with preliminary information in a text)
takes longer than reading a consistent or a neutral text. If readers
encounter a contextually inconsistent sentence while attempting to
maintain text coherence, more time and cognitive resources are
needed to resolve the conflict. For example, if a preliminary
sentence states that a given client has been previously diagnosed
with avoidant personality disorder, and some sentences later, a
target sentence states that the person is convinced of being inter-
esting, competent, and appealing, the reader may detect an incon-
sistency provided he/she possesses the appropriate knowledge.
Thus, reading times for an inconsistent target sentence should be
longer than for a consistent or neutral one. Consequently, access to
previous knowledge and online inference making during reading
can be directly detected under this paradigm. Inconsistency detec-
tion during fluent reading entails the following processes: (a) fast
access to domain-specific knowledge and theories, (b) rapid
inference-making from the target sentence based on prior knowl-
edge and/or theories, and (c) the detection of a contradiction
between the inference drawn and the preliminary information
(Long, Seely, & Oppy, 1996).
Regarding the objectives previously described, the inconsis-
tency paradigm can be specifically used to study fast, semiauto-
matic, online reasoning processes in relation to the different effect
of each diagnostic criterion on diagnostic judgments. The rationale
is quite simple. A hypothetical clinical report begins with a series
of sentences stating that a client has been diagnosed with, for
example, avoidant personality disorder and that the person presents
some symptoms that form part of the DSM–IV–TR diagnostic
criteria for this disorder. Subsequently, a target sentence is en-
countered stating the absence of one of two possible symptoms
(e.g., either the absence of “views self as socially inept, personally
unappealing, or inferior to others” or the absence of “is unusually
reluctant to take personal risk or to engage in any new activities”),
both of which are considered to be diagnostic criteria for the
disorder. According to the reader’s previous theories about
avoidant personality disorder, if the first symptom seems more
relevant than the second, then the target sentence referring to the
absence of the first symptom should cause more conflict than a
target sentence referring to the absence of the second symptom.
Thus, reading the more-inconsistent target sentence should slow
down the reading process more than reading a less-inconsistent
target sentence.
The other part of the strategy used in the experiment involved
the selection of symptoms of varying degrees of relevance in order
to create different degrees of inconsistency. This issue was ad-
dressed by drawing on Kim and Ahn’s (2002) study. In their
experiments, the participants (most of them expert clinicians) had
to draw a causal map for each disorder, indicating the relationship
between symptoms by the use of arrows. For each map and
participant, the causal centrality score of each symptom was cal-
culated according to a specific algorithm. Causally central symp-
toms were those that, according to the causal map, were respon-
sible for the occurrence of many other symptoms that, in turn,
might cause further symptoms. Peripheral symptoms were the
effect of other symptoms and did not cause further symptoms.
Finally, isolated symptoms were those that did not have any causal
relationship with the other symptoms. After calculating the causal
centrality score for each symptom per disorder per participant, an
average score across participants was calculated, on the basis of
which symptoms were ordered from the most central to the most
peripheral (or isolated) for each disorder. Kim and Ahn found that
causally central symptoms had a greater impact on the partici-
pants’ diagnostic judgments than peripheral and isolated symp-
toms despite the fact that, in all cases, the hypothetical clients
presented symptoms that formed part of the diagnostic criteria for
the different disorders according to the DSM–IV–TR. Thus, under
the assumption that more-central symptoms were more relevant
than less-central symptoms, the two symptoms with the highest
mean centrality score and lowest mean centrality score within each
disorder were selected to maximize the difference in relevance.
Thus, it was predicted that the use of the central symptom in the
target sentence would be associated with a greater inconsistency
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effect than the use of the peripheral symptom. It was also predicted
that the central symptom would have a greater impact on diagnos-
tic judgments than the peripheral symptom.
Method
Participants and Apparatus
A total of 34 participants took part in the experiment on a
voluntary basis. The sample consisted of psychology students (n
17) from Málaga University in Spain and experienced clinicians
(n  17) who worked in independent practice in the Málaga area.
Their experience as clinicians ranged from 3 to 28 years (average
17 years).
Materials and Design
A total of 24 clinical reports divided into two groups of 12 were
created for the inconsistent and control conditions, respectively.
The reports for the inconsistent condition included six different
DSM–IV–TR disorders, as in Kim and Ahn’s (2002) study: major
depressive disorder, specific phobia, antisocial personality disor-
der, schizophrenia, borderline personality disorder, and avoidant
personality disorder; the disorders in the control condition in-
cluded cannabis dependence, sleepwalking disorder, pathological
gambling, orgasmic disorder, gender identity disorder, and hypo-
chondria. In the inconsistent condition, texts included a target
sentence that stated the absence of a symptom regarded as a
diagnostic criterion for the disorder that had been previously
mentioned, whereas in the control condition the same target sen-
tence appeared in a clinical report in which the diagnosed disorder
bore no relationship to this absent symptom. In addition, the target
sentences in six of the reports in the inconsistent condition related
to highly relevant symptoms, whereas in the other six reports they
related to symptoms of low relevance. As mentioned, in line with
Kim and Ahn, it was assumed that more causally central symptoms
would have greater relevance than peripheral symptoms. Conse-
quently, symptoms with the highest and lowest mean centrality
scores were selected. Therefore, it was predicted that the partici-
pants would detect an inconsistency in the inconsistent condition
alone, and hence reading times (RTs) for the target sentence would
be longer in the inconsistent condition. It was also predicted that
there would be a greater inconsistency effect (i.e., a greater dif-
ference in reading times between the target inconsistent and con-
trol sentences) associated with the absence of a highly relevant
symptom than with a symptom of low relevance.
All the clinical reports were created using the same structure
as the texts used in inconsistency paradigm experiments (Al-
brecht & O’Brien, 1993). Each clinical report consisted of 16
sentences of comparable length and semantics as well as syn-
tactic complexity. The introductory sentence was followed by
the DSM–IV–TR diagnosis that the hypothetical client had re-
ceived. The next six sentences included three sentences report-
ing the presence of three symptoms (one in each sentence)
consistent with the disorder, intermixed with three more sen-
tences including unrelated information. These symptoms had
intermediate causal centrality scores in Kim and Ahn’s (2002)
study. In addition, two frequent symptoms (i.e., present in
numerous DSM–IV–TR disorders) were also included. Immedi-
ately before the target sentence, there were four filler sentences
related to nonclinical information. The filler information would
make the previous information on clinical symptoms unavail-
able from the participants’ working memory by the time the
target information was read. The last two sentences in the text
were the target and the posttarget sentences. In a text using
avoidant personality disorder as an example, the participants in
the inconsistent/highly relevant symptom condition read the
following sentence: “She is convinced of being interesting,
competent and appealing,” which contradicts the criterion
“views self as socially inept, personally unappealing, or inferior
to others” (DSM–IV–TR; American Psychiatric Association,
2000). In the inconsistent/low-relevance condition, the sentence
was “She becomes easily involved in new activities,” which
contradicts “avoids personal risk or new activities” (DSM–IV–
TR; American Psychiatric Association, 2000). The posttarget
sentence described clinically irrelevant information and was
introduced to detect any carryover effect that could have been
produced by reading the target sentence.
Procedure
The participants read the instructions on a computer screen,
and any questions were answered before the experimental task
began. The instructions emphasized that attention should be
paid to the task because after reading each clinical report they
would be asked to what extent they agreed with a clinician’s
diagnosis. Thus, the use of clinical reasoning was encouraged
during the reading task.
Participants were also instructed to carefully and fluently read
the different reports. The whole text was initially unreadable, as it
was masked with slashes, one per written character. The reading
task was self-paced: The participants were required to press the
space bar—at which point the sentence became readable—in order
to proceed from one sentence to the next, and returning to the
previous text was not permitted. Once the space bar was pressed,
the previous sentence became unreadable again. The participants
were presented with a sample text to familiar themselves with the
reading procedure.
Immediately after the text had been read, participants completed
the diagnostic judgment task, in which they had to rate on a
continuous scale from 0 to 100 (i.e., from complete disagree-
ment to complete agreement) the extent to which they agreed
with the diagnosis provided in the text. Once participants had
rated the diagnosis, they rested for a few minutes before pro-
ceeding to the next clinical report.
The experimental task took place in two sessions, separated by
at least 1 week. The participants read 12 different clinical reports
in each session. Assigning different texts per session ensured that
the participants could not read the same target and posttarget
sentences twice within the same session. The reading order of the
different texts within each session was randomized. The procedure
followed ensured that in each session, six of the clinical reports
were from the inconsistent condition and six were from the control
condition. Orthogonally to this, half of the clinical reports were
from the highly relevant condition, whereas the other half were
from the low-relevance condition. Each session took from 20 to 30
min to complete.
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Results
Reading Times
The RTs for the target and posttarget sentences were analyzed.
An  of .05 was used in all the statistical analyses. The RTs were
filtered by removing outliers that were 3 standard deviations from
the mean. Following the filtering process, a single mean RT per
experimental condition and participant was calculated, yielding
four averaged measures for the target sentences and another four
for the posttarget sentences. In total, 12 target sentence RTs and 10
posttarget sentence RTs were eliminated.
Table 1 shows the mean RTs for the target and posttarget
sentences in each condition within each sample. As shown, the
students’ and the clinicians’ RTs for the target sentence were
longer in the inconsistent condition than in the control condition,
this being consistent with an inconsistency effect. In addition, in the case
of clinicians, the difference in RTs between the inconsistent con-
dition and the control condition appeared to be greater in the
condition including highly relevant symptoms than in the condi-
tion including symptoms of low relevance; this was not observed
in the sample of students. This finding was confirmed by conduct-
ing separate analyses for each sample. A 2 (inconsistency: incon-
sistent vs. control)  2 (relevance of the symptoms: high vs. low)
repeated-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) on the students’
RTs yielded a significant main effect of inconsistency, F(1, 16) 
24.091, MSE  271,235.080, p  .001; 2  .56. None of the
other effects were significant (all F values  2.92). The same
trend, although much smaller, was observed for the posttarget
sentence. However, an identical 2 2 ANOVA on the RTs for the
posttarget sentence yielded no significant effect (all F values 
1.27). Regarding the sample of clinicians, the same 2 2 ANOVA
on RTs for the target sentences yielded a significant effect of
inconsistency, F(1, 16)  12.801, MSE  1,036,503.4, p  .003,
2  .44; relevance of symptoms, F(1, 16)  9.043, MSE 
186,673.901, p  .008, 2  .36; and Inconsistency  Relevance
of Symptoms, F(1, 16)  6.505, MSE  286,012.319, p  .021,
2  .289. Simple effects analyses revealed a significant incon-
sistency effect in both conditions of the relevance of symptoms
factor, F(1, 16)  14.203, MSE  882,461.693, p  .002, 2 
.47; F(1, 16)  5.899, MSE  440,053.978, p  .027, 2  .27,
for the high-relevance and low-relevance conditions, respectively.
Table 1 also reveals similar results for the RTs of posttarget
sentences (i.e., a greater effect of inconsistency in the high-
relevance condition than in the low-relevance condition). This was
confirmed by the same 2 2 ANOVA, which yielded a significant
main effect of inconsistency, F(1, 16)  5.565, MSE 
297,226.601, p  .031, 2  .26, and a marginally significant
effect of the Inconsistency  Relevance of Symptoms interaction,
F(1, 16)  3.691, MSE  125,731.452, p  .073, 2  .19. The
main effect of relevance of symptoms was not significant (F 
0.66). Planned tests for simple effects yielded an inconsistency
effect within the high-relevance condition, F(1, 16)  5.873,
MSE  329,524.764, p  .028, 2  .27, but not within the
low-relevance condition, F(1, 16)  1.958.
These results indicate that, during the reading task, the students
and clinicians both engaged in some form of fast online clinical
reasoning that entailed the retrieval and use of DSM–IV–TR diag-
nostic criteria for the mental disorders used. In the case of the students,
the online reasoning processes were not modulated by the rele-
vance of symptoms, as no Inconsistency  Relevance of the
Symptoms interaction was found. However, in the case of the
clinicians, the online reasoning processes were not completely in
accordance with the DSM–IV–TR prescriptions, as the inconsis-
tency effect was modulated by the relevance of symptoms despite
all the symptoms being of equivalent diagnostic value.
Diagnostic Judgments
A single mean diagnostic judgment (i.e., the degree of agree-
ment with the diagnosis provided) per participant was calculated
for each experimental condition within each sample (see Table 1).
In general, there was more agreement among the participants on
the diagnosis stated in the preliminary information in the control
condition than in the inconsistent condition, indicating familiarity
with the diagnostic criteria of the DSM–IV–TR. However, the
difference between means was greater in the high-relevance con-
dition than in the low relevance condition within the sample of
clinicians but not within the sample of students. This was con-
firmed by statistical analyses. A 2 (inconsistency: inconsistent vs.
control)  2 (relevance of symptoms: high vs. low) repeated-
measures ANOVA on the students’ judgments yielded a signifi-
cant main effect of inconsistency, F(1, 16)  39.754, MSE 
189.997, p  .001; 2  .71. Neither the effect of relevance of
Table 1
Mean Reading Times (in ms) and Standard Deviations for Target and Posttarget Sentences, as Well as Mean Diagnostic Judgments
in the Sample of Students and Experienced Clinicians
Variable
High relevance symptom Low relevance symptom
Inconsistent Control Inconsistent Control
M SD M SD M SD M SD
Students
Target sentences 2,992.83 1,025.74 2,205.50 630.87 2,708.16 1,007.04 2,233.68 592.93
Posttarget sentences 2,049.21 642.46 1,942.93 768.85 2,104.15 623.44 1,980.50 952.73
Judgments 54.31 10.96 77.60 10.37 53.63 16.81 72.50 11.89
Experienced clinicians
Target sentences 3,472.15 1,385.86 2,257.85 562.92 2,826.20 1,084.93 2,273.56 706.01
Posttarget sentences 2,612.94 840.63 1,948.70 704.45 2,420.38 662.66 2,329.13 824.15
Judgments 36.91 19.05 69.56 23.14679 47.01 22.05 67.25 24.67
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symptoms nor the interaction between the two factors was statis-
tically significant (all F values  3.16). Regarding the sample of
clinicians, the same 2  2 ANOVA yielded a significant effect of
inconsistency, F(1, 16) 46.896, MSE 247.928, p .001, 2
.75, and Inconsistency  Relevance of Symptoms, F(1, 16) 
5.586, MSE  128.387, p  .031, 2  .26. The effect of
relevance of symptoms did not reach significance [F(1, 16) 
1.431]. The inconsistency effect was greater in the high-relevance
condition than in the low-relevance condition. Nevertheless, sim-
ple effects analyses revealed that the effect was significant in both
conditions, F(1, 16) 31.44, MSE 288.161, p .001, 2 .66;
F(1, 16)  37.257, MSE  88.154, p  .001, 2  .7, for the
high-relevance condition and low-relevance condition, respec-
tively.
These results are consistent with those identified in the RT
analysis and suggest that the reasoning processes that occurred
during the reading task could also be responsible for the effects
that were observed in the diagnostic judgment task. Specifically,
the greater impact of the highly relevant symptoms on the clini-
cians’ diagnostic judgments could have been determined by the
greater impact of these symptoms on the online and fast reasoning
processes during the reading task. The results also show that the
symptoms that were given different weights by the participants in
Kim and Ahn’s (2002) study were also given different weights by
the sample of experienced clinicians in this study.
In addition, the results of the psychology students and the
experienced clinicians were analyzed for differences between sam-
ples. Although planned comparisons allowed the results from the
two samples to be analyzed independently, an omnibus analysis
was performed with the type of sample as a factor. The 2 (incon-
sistency: inconsistent vs. control)  2 (relevance of symptoms:
high vs. low)  2 (type of sample: psychology students vs.
experienced clinicians) ANOVA revealed that the Target Incon-
sistency  Relevance of Symptoms  Type of Sample second-
order interaction was not significant regarding the RTs for the
target sentence, F(1, 32)  0.703; only marginally significant for
the posttarget sentence, F(1, 32) 4.02, MSE 125,526.813, p
.053, 2  .11; and not significant for the diagnostic judgment
task, F(1, 32)  1.37.
Discussion
The results obtained regarding RTs showed that the participants
were able to activate fast online reasoning processes to detect
inconsistencies during their fluent reading of clinical reports. De-
tecting the inconsistencies involved the fast retrieval from memory
of knowledge concerning the diagnostic criteria for the different
disorders used. In addition, experienced clinicians gave different
weights to different symptoms when detecting these inconsisten-
cies during the reading task. The differential weighting of diag-
nostic criteria may be taken as a departure from the DSM–IV–TR
prescriptions, which is consistent with Kim and Ahn’s (2002)
results. However, in contrast to their study, we suggest that this
differential weighting must have originated from fast online rea-
soning processes, given that slow, effortful, and deliberative rea-
soning processes could not be occurring during fluent reading.
This theoretical interpretation is supported by the results of the
RTs, which showed a greater inconsistency effect when the target
sentence referred to the absence of a highly relevant symptom than
when it referred to the absence of a low-relevance symptom. Two
conclusions can be drawn from these results in relation to how
experienced clinicians represent their knowledge concerning men-
tal disorders (see also Charlin et al., 2007; Schmidt et al., 1990):
(a) the status of the DSM–IV–TR diagnostic criteria varies in the
clinicians’ representations of mental disorders and (b) mental
disorders are represented in a way that allows for both the fast and
efficient retrieval from memory of domain-specific knowledge and
the fast and efficient use of retrieved information for fast
inference-making and integration processes.
The question of why experienced clinicians, but not students,
gave different weights to the symptoms used in the high-relevance
condition than to those used in the low-relevance condition remains
open. A plausible explanation is that the symptoms in the high-
relevance condition may have a closer correspondence to the
clinicians’ prototypical representations of mental diseases than the
symptoms in the low-relevance condition. This explanation would
be consistent with studies that have shown that clinicians rely on
representational heuristics in diagnostic judgment tasks (Maj,
2011; Westen, 2012; Westen & Shedler, 2000). However, in line
with Kim and Ahn’s (2002) study, it could also be argued that the
clinicians’ prototypical representations of mental disorders could
be based on their causal theories. Thus, symptoms with a high
causal role (high-relevance symptoms) would be more prototypical
than symptoms with a low causal role (low-relevance symptoms).
In this sense, it is noteworthy that the high- and low-relevance
symptoms were those that, on average, had the highest and lowest
mean centrality scores, respectively, based on causal maps for the
different disorders drawn by the participants in Kim and Ahn’s
study. In contrast, the students may have relied on less-refined
prototypical representations of mental disorders, which would
have been based on text descriptions (such as DSM–IV–TR) rather
than on causal theories or on any real-life exemplars. Reasoning
processes based on this type of prototypical representation of
mental disorders would make students less likely to demonstrate
the differential weighting effect found in clinicians.
Finally, it may be argued that clinicians do not usually make a
diagnosis by reading a clinical report alone. Thus, the generaliz-
ability of the results may be open to question. In fact, clinicians do
far more than simply read clinical reports. However, at the end of
an assessment process, they have to review all the material that has
usually been compiled in a clinical report or in another written
document. Moreover, the reading of clinical reports sometimes
precedes the assessment process. In these cases, the assessment
process could be guided by the hypotheses that clinicians may
generate after reading a clinical report. Finally, there is no reason
to think that the comprehension and reasoning processes studied
here are not at work when listening to a client in an interview
instead of reading a report. Therefore, the same online and semi-
automatic processes demonstrated in this experiment are likely to
be present in real clinical contexts.
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